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 ABSTRACT 
In this project are advanced two ways of seeing the ordinary human being with the aim of 
understanding who he is: namely, from the perspective of his personal identity and from the point 
of view of his self-conception. The chapters included in the first part are meant to treat the issue 
of personal identity from a practical perspective, whereas the ones included in the second part 
intend to assess the utility of self-conception from a phenomenological standpoint. Ultimately, I 
bring together these two perspectives into a unitary understanding of the human being in the 
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It might be thought at first glance that if there is a question we would be able to address from our 
own experience, which gets to our core and from which we should be able to draw a definite 
answer, it could be following: Who am I? Because even if we are not prepared to say anything 
about the world and the lives of others, presumably we would at least be tempted to think that we 
have enough resources for determining what makes us who we are. But formulating a satisfactory 
answer to this question has since ancient times eluded the most inquisitive and insightful minds. 
Indeed, it is no accident that the motto inscribed above the entrance to the oracle at Delphi was 
“Know thyself,” puzzling figures of the stature of Socrates. It can be gathered, from the vast 
literature that this question has given rise to, that no small inquiry would settle it. 
A further concern growing as an implication of addressing this matter can be posed in the 
follow-up question – How do I conceive of myself? Assuming that we have figured out who we 
are, the way we see ourselves would have important consequences for the characterization of self-
conception. This would be an interrelated problem, as it would seem that we should be able to 
explain what is our self-conception and how have we acquired it if we have in effect grasped who 
we are. For if we can explain who we are, we should in principle be capable of justifying the way 
we have achieved this grasp, making it thus available for the assessment of others. 
Contemporarily, these matters have been framed on the one hand in terms of the 
philosophical problems of personal identity and the nature of the self, and on the other as the issue 
of the nature of self-conception. We can see how these problems would become tractable by 
distributing them in three levels or categories of inquiry. 
We can begin discerning the human being at a ground level, belonging to the ontological 
class of inquiry, upon which we can secondly identify a practical level and thirdly a 
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phenomenological level of its existence. Now, instead of following the tradition in treating 
personal identity in the context of the first level as an ontological matter, we follow Marya 
Schechtman (2014) and situate this problem at the second level, thinking of personal identity as 
something that is practically achieved through our daily interactions and activities. Still, the 
ontological status of the human being is indirectly referenced based on how we approach personal 
identity from the standpoint of our practical considerations and concerns. Meanwhile, although 
the issue of the nature of the self is also traditionally classified as an ontological problem, we do 
not address this problem in this way. We only concern ourselves with the phenomenological 
problem of the self, thereby setting it up in the context of the third level of inquiry. Thus, while 
avoiding the reference to the ontological status of the self, we focus on self-conception since we 
are more interested in knowing how we see ourselves than pondering the nature the self. This 
phenomenological account is shown to have important implications on the practical level of the 
human being’s ordinary life, as it revolves primarily around the utility of self-conception. 
 The three levels just noted correspond to different types of inquiry about the human being, 
which is the main subject of our investigation. The point of separating our approximations to the 
human being this way is to avoid conflating types of issues that can be raised about personal 
identity and selfhood, so as to not further misunderstandings that have made these issues hard to 
treat. It must be said, though, that we sort the problems we treat here into the mentioned levels in 
function of the needs and objectives of our investigation with the intention of dividing the labor, 
such that these problems could have been organized differently had our goals been others.  
 Assuming this distinction of levels, we advance two different approaches, contexts, or 
modes of presentation of the same content, i.e., an ordinary human being, whether seen with 
respect to his personal identity or else from the perspective of his self-conception. Accordingly, 
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we divide our proposal in two parts. Part One deals with the issue of personal identity from a 
practical standpoint. Clearly, despite the fact that a human being has a notion of himself (i.e., a 
self-conception), the relationship of this individual with such an aspect of his identity will not be 
assessed in this part. This aspect is rather examined in Part Two, which is concerned with the 
general issue of the self viewed from a phenomenological angle. The intention of examining the 
topic of self-conception as a further layer of the human being is to see him from a perspective 
from which his personal identity can be reconceived as an existential issue, making it thereby 
tractable from an ulterior stance. Therefore, by separating the topics of personal identity and self-
conception this way, we can advance alternative ways of understanding the same structure or 
reference, which is that of a human being. 
 The practical approximation or mode of presentation of the human being’s personal 
identity is thus proposed in the first part, which consists of chapters I, II and III, though Chapter I 
is mainly included as a background discussion on the notion of a ‘human being’, a concept we 
adopt throughout the extent of this investigation. In the second part, we move on to the 
phenomenological discussion of the concept of ‘self’, particularly attending to the issue of the use 
of self-conception. Such a phenomenological account is elaborated in chapters IV and V, 
assuming indeed the notion of a ‘human being’ that we have elucidated in Chapter I. The point 
there is to specify, in the third level of inquiry, the role that the phenomenon of ‘oneself’ plays in 
the life of this individual by emphasizing its existential value.  
 Moreover, the separation of the subjects of personal identity and self-conception in these 
two parts is viable given that personal identity does not entail a determined self-conception, 
whereas the latter does not presuppose the former. Particularly, we can make sense of personal 
identity without having yet accounted for the utility of self-conception, while we are able to 
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explain the second without presupposing an account of the first. This is due to the fact that, even 
though a human being has a personal identity, he might still conceive of himself otherwise, 
attributing a rather different identity to himself; this is, he might have a self-conception that is 
incompatible with the character of his identity. As will be seen, the previous corresponds to a case 
of ‘alienation’ or ‘dissociation’ that constitutes part of the target of our treatments in this project. 
As we classify the problem of personal identity as practical whereas that of self-conception as 
phenomenological, our overall approach is going to serve us in discerning several factors that 
contribute to this sort of alienation and further help us determine how it can be surmounted. 
Conversely, it will be noticed that even as a human being might conceive of himself in a given 
way, this conception does not require that the individual is able to track the literal persistence of a 
substance in virtue of which his personal identity is grounded, as if his self-conception had to 
match this substance.  
 Nonetheless, it is true that we tend to think of personal identity and self-conception as 
interrelated subjects insofar as we suppose that how we conceive of ourselves depends on what 
our person identity is, so that our self-conception arises from an understanding of what this 
identity is. In effect, it is arguably the case that by explaining who we are we account for our 
personal identity and offer at the same time insight into how we see ourselves. After all, we have 
noticed that personal identity and self-conception can be regarded as two aspects of the same 
individual, so they would naturally be related to one another. Having said that, in the interest of 
clarity we will deal with these subjects separately in order to provide a fuller view of the 
connection of the personal identity of a human being and his self-conception. 
To achieve these goals, in Chapter I we start by elucidating the term ‘human being’ with 
the intention of specifying the concept associated to it that is employed in this dissertation. This is 
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Wittgenstein’s concept of an ordinary human being as it is used in the Philosophical
Investigations (2009). Furthermore, as a way of positing this concept at the center of our 
investigation, it is argued that this notion is logically primitive, that is to say, a basic element in 
our conceptual repertoire that will further serve us in specifying diverse aspects of this individual. 
The idea is to lay there most of the conceptual framework of this proposal, as in the end it is the 
same subject –namely, the ordinary human being– which will be seen from one or another 
perspective in all of the chapters of this investigation. 
Then, in Chapter II it is offered the remaining part of this dissertation’s framework. The 
issue of personal identity is advanced there from a practical stance by presenting Schechtman’s 
view of a ‘person life’. This way, we are going to expand Wittgenstein’s picture of the ordinary 
person to further capture in it relevant aspects of his everyday life, such as the activities and 
interactions of this individual with other human beings within the context of a ‘sociocultural 
infrastructure’. The chief aim is thus to forward Schechtman’s approach in a Wittgensteinian vein, 
given that she employs a notion of a ‘person’ that is based on Wittgenstein’s concept of a ‘human 
being’. In this chapter are also offered elements that play a key role in the next one, as we observe 
similarities between Schechtman’s practical account of a ‘person life’ and Wittgenstein’s 
conception of ‘forms of life’, such that we can integrate the proposals of these authors in the 
context of the human being’s everyday life.  
Next, in Chapter III a treatment of the problem of personal identity is presented by appeal 
to Wittgenstein’s understanding of the end-goal of his philosophy, this is, the transformation of 
life. Since the issue of personal identity is posed as a practical one, it is only natural that its 
‘solution’ be practical as well. Roughly speaking, this problem is conceived as a type of 
‘alienation’ in which a human being has lost a large degree of ordinariness. It will be clear, 
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however, that with “solution” it is meant the sort of ‘treatments’ or ‘therapies’ Wittgenstein 
recommends in his latter philosophy. Therefore, in this chapter the picture of a ‘person life’ 
offered by Schechtman plays a crucial role, because it is in terms of the relationship between a 
person’s life and the forms of life of a community that the type of ‘solution’ we propose to this 
practical issue can be accomplished. 
In Part Two, the notion that an ordinary human person has of himself is brought to the 
forefront, such that a phenomenological account of self-conception can be elaborated. In Chapter 
IV, the issue of the utility of self-conception is posed by first addressing the question of the origin 
of self-conception. Nevertheless, the previous question leads to the puzzle of self-conception, 
which basically challenges ways in which we have supposedly come up with a notion of 
ourselves. This is why we must address the puzzle of self-conception in the second part of this 
project, since, without a basic grasp as to the origins of self-conception, its utility would hardly be 
explained. We advance and criticize there traditional approaches to this puzzle that are framed in 
a static vein, and then argue that we need to change our approach by embracing a dynamic 
standpoint in order to make the puzzle of self-conception tractable. 
Lastly, Chapter IV proposes a dynamic approximation to the puzzle of self-conception 
and, thereby, to the problem of self-conception’s utility. After advancing some relevant dynamic 
approaches, I introduce the Two-Moment View as a way of accounting for the role of self-
conception from a dynamic standpoint. With these resources in hand, and with the aid of Mead’s 
notion of the self understood as a social construct, it is then possible to address the puzzle of self-
conception. Additionally, this final chapter provides several elements needed in our treatment of 
alienation that are not made explicit in Part One, so that by outlining there the importance of self-
conception we can point out other requirements that must be satisfied to overcome alienation. 
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This much is stressed in the Conclusions, where the richness of our twofold approach to the 
human being in terms of his personal identity and his self-conception is shown in the combination 








I.  AN ORDINARY UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN BEINGS 
 
What does it mean to say that an individual is human? It is generally thought that we place others 
in the ‘human being’ category insofar as we ascribe them a wide range of properties such as 
corporeal states like size, weight, and a physical location – and, more importantly, psychological 
states such as intentions, beliefs, desires, and feelings. Usually we do not have any trouble 
recognizing that others possess mental states or classifying other people as human. However, once 
we begin to view this matter from a philosophical perspective, we can question the nature of our 
knowledge of others as human beings. For how is it that we know for a fact that the individuals 
we see on the streets, with whom we interact on a daily basis, are actually people? Ultimately, the 
only mental states that are transparent are my own, whereas those of others lie beyond my realm 
of experience. If I am aware at all of the existence of these states, it is because I perceive my own 
 but I can only perceive the behavior of others and not the concrete beliefs, desires, and feelings 
motivating it, so the problem of whether it is an expression of mental states appears to be 
unsolvable. Thereby, if the only way I can decide whether others are human beings is by verifying 
that they have psychological states, it seems that I can never determine if I am surrounded by 
humans. 
It could be argued in response that our ability to judge others as human beings rests solely on 
the capacity of recognizing that they must be attributed the sort of properties mentioned above. 
Still, this answer does not prove satisfactory as it presupposes that viewing others as human 
necessarily means recognizing them as worthy of the application of a large set of human-like 
properties. On the other hand, it could be said that we recognize the existence of psychological 
states in others based on the analogy with our own case, as this analogy provides us with 
sufficient knowledge about humanity in individuals. Yet, for one thing, the way in which my 
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verbal behavior relates to my own mental states could hardly constitute an adequate basis for 
inferring that the behavior of others correlate, in sufficiently similar ways, to their own mental 
states. The evidence I have so far gathered about my own case is notably limited, so it could not 
serve in accounting for an indefinite number of cases; it would merely allow hasty generalizations 
about what occurs in a far greater number of cases where others are involved.  Furthermore, the 
way I verify psychological self-ascriptions significantly differs from the method through which 
mental properties are usually attributed to others. In contrast to other-ascription of mental 
predicates, I do not rely on the observation of my own behavior in order to self-ascribe these 
predicates (see Strawson 394). Given, then, that I cannot know solely on the basis of the analogy 
with my own case whether others have mental states like my own and which these might turn out 
to be, it appears that I cannot know, either, whether others are human, that is, if I can only know 
about the humanity of others after I have determined that they undergo such states. 
 Even so, it is not clear that we judge others as human beings only after we have reached the 
conclusion that they (must) have psychological states. An alternative approach to be explored in 
this chapter is that we naturally or instinctively treat others as human beings and attend to the 
psychological states they experience without previously questioning whether or not they possess 
such states. For if we are ever to know that others are people, it would rather be due to the 
characteristic reactions and responses they elicit from us.  
Now, given the multiplicity of meanings of ‘human being’ such as the genetic and moral 
acceptations of the term, we should distinguish in the course of this inquiry which notion we have 
in mind to demarcate the traits of the being we are referring to. This way, we will be able to 
clarify what we mean when saying that a certain individual is human. I shall thus analyze several 
notions typically associated to the term ‘human’. This analysis will primarily revolve around 
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Wittgenstein’s notion of a human being (1953). Other conceptions will be examined as well, 
particularly, Paul Snowdon’s genetic notion (2014). Additionally, I will advance and defend the 
claim that Wittgenstein’s notion can be interpreted as logically primitive. To substantiate this 
claim, I will argue that there exists a parity of cases with Strawson’s approach to the concept of 
person.  
 
I.1. Human Beings   
In the context of addressing a large set of philosophical assumptions, Wittgenstein appeals in his 
Philosophical Investigations to a common sense of ‘human being’ that applies to an individual 
who “has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious” (§ 281). He 
regards this individual as someone towards whom we possess a natural or instinctual attitude that 
consists of an extensive range of characteristic reactions, responses and dispositions. This is a 
creature that we automatically treat as someone in possession of mental states, which partly 
constitute what he is. This attitude goes hand in hand with the treatment of this creature as a 
human being, which crucially differs from a belief or opinion we form in order to include him in 
the human being category. As Wittgenstein states, “[m]y attitude towards him [i.e., a human 
being] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul” (II, IV, § 22). The 
notion that human beings have mental states, then, is not just a conclusion we reach based on the 
observation of their verbal behavior. On the contrary, we have a practical concern towards these 
beings that results from several interactions with them, a concern particularly shown in reactions 
that contrast those we have towards other objects of our attention. 
David Cockburn accounts for this ‘practical orientation’ as instinctually given “in part in 
the fact that certain emotions and actions would come naturally to me in response to certain 
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behavior” on the part of a human being (6). Furthermore, he stresses how important this practical 
orientation is to Wittgenstein’s approach by arguing that he places it in the center of his picture of 
the human being. What this picture offers is an ordinary context wherein numerous engagements 
with people already include a characteristic treatment that reveals the fact that we already 
conceive them as having mental states. Wittgenstein’s framework circumscribes an ordinary 
understanding of the human being meant to oppose a rationalist portrayal, where one would be in 
the position to treat others as humans only if one knew for a fact that they have experiences. In 
principle, this ordinary understanding would assist us in resisting the rationalistic view that leads 
us to be puzzled about whether others are actually human. Thus, from the ordinary standpoint, we 
feel compelled to react to someone’s manifestation of pain, e.g., treating him in consequence as a 
human being, whether we take pity on him, respond irascibly, or else feel apathy. Indifference 
would not amount to the absence of a reaction but, rather, to one reaction more amongst others. 
The main discrepancy with the rationalist picture resides then in the natural fact that we do not 
usually infer the existence of a psychological state of pain residing somehow ‘under the surface’ 
of the human being grimacing in front of us. The target of our reactions is not a putative 
homunculus expressing his pain through the human being’s features. Rather, the target is only the 
flesh-and-bone human being we are confronted with. 
Moreover, conceiving myself as a human being involves in the same sense having a 
certain attitude towards myself, which is to say, a practically driven concern about me (20). This 
attitude, again, is instinctual in that it is not the end result of a thought process through which I 
confirm that I am actually human given that I happen to find ‘in myself’ psychological states like 
those of other humans. That I am a proper object of the sort of reactions and responses 
Wittgenstein has in mind is shown in the several ways I treat myself, while these in turn incite 
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reactions and responses from other human beings. Ultimately, the attitudes I possess towards 




Although Wittgenstein opposes the rationalist picture of human beings, this does not imply that he 
advocates for a class of physicalism such as behaviorism (Philosophical Investigations § 307). 
According to him, the object of our natural reactions and responses is not just a human body, for 
what sort of distinction are we making when we say that it is the body that feels pain and not the 
man? In effect, he asks, “How does it become clear that it is not the body [that feels pain]?” (§ 
286) After all, there is some absurdity in saying that it is merely a body or a part of it that feels 
pain: “if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it writes it)” (§ 
286.). In the end, when it comes to tracking our own reactions and responses to someone’s pain, it 
is the whole human being and not only his body who we sympathize with: “one does not comfort 
the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his eyes” (§ 286.). It is true that human behavior is a 
constitutive aspect of Wittgenstein’s picture, but to limit the picture to this aspect would exclude 
several dimensions of the human being that are purposely meant to be encompassed in his 
depiction.   
In this regard, John Cook advises against reading Wittgenstein as embracing behaviorism. 
When one interprets human beings in terms of their types of actions, one’s ordinary judgments are 
not grounded in “protocol statements,” which are propositions merely about humans conduct 
amounting to “colorless bodily movements” (118). Such an analysis would depart from our 
ordinary interpretation of the actions of humans, for it is not based upon such statements. Indeed, 
Cook maintains that the assumption whereby “we are forced to recognize descriptions (or 
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observations) of bodily movements as being epistemologically basic in our knowledge of other 
persons” is unwarranted (118). Our ordinary perception of human beings does not rest on their 
description of them as bodies in movement. On the contrary, it is only after we have ordinarily 
judged the actions of humans that we can move on to a more abstract level of comprehension, 
thus perceiving them solely as physical objects moving through space. But this level would be 
derived from the ordinary perception of them and, ultimately, would depend on it. 
 
The Holism of Living Human Beings  
 
It is worth noting that Wittgenstein restricts the logical type of an individual deserving 
psychological attributions to a living human being and what resembles or behaves like it 
(Philosophical Investigations § 281). As discussed previously, recognizing others as human 
beings involves possessing a wide range of reactions with which to reciprocate them, insofar as 
they initially act in ways that provoke such reactions. Now, all of this is possible because of our 
responses to these individuals as particular forms of life. “Only surrounded by certain normal 
manifestations of life,” Wittgenstein writes in Zettel, “is there such a thing as an expression of 
pain. Only surrounded by an even more far-reaching particular manifestation of life, such a thing 
as the expression of sorrow or affection” (§ 534). This suggests, broadly speaking, that the 
presence of human life is a precondition for our ascriptions of mental states. In the absence of 
human life, the aforementioned reactions and responses to humans could not be provoked and, 
consequently, people’s psychological states would not be a matter of our concern. Actually, we do 
not include dead human beings in the category of individuals towards whom we react in the ways 
described by Wittgenstein because we do not regard them as having experience: “a corpse seems 
to us quite inaccessible to pain. — Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead is not the 
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same. All our reactions are different” (Philosophical Investigations § 284). As Wittgenstein 
observes, this difference does not yet imply that we do not respond to human corpses in a specific 
manner, which is evidently different from, say, our responses to dead animals and inanimate 
objects. To be precise, the typical responses we exhibit towards human forms of life compose a 
distinguished set, the specificity of which delimits the attitudes we would consider to be oriented 
towards living humans and what resemble them. For example, we do not fear inanimate objects in 
the same sense that we fear the aggression of human beings. As Cockburn suggests, “[f]or most of 
us another’s intense anger can be disturbing in a way which is quite different from that in which a 
landslide is generally thought of disturbing” (4).  
Then again, we are not usually disturbed only because we have determined that someone 
must hate us on the basis of observing his demeanor, as if such hatred would potentially bring 
about harm to us by using his body in a specific way so as to inflict pain on us. Quite the 
opposite: we feel one way or another about a human being as a whole. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s 
illustration: 
Imagine that I am in the presence of someone who, for one reason or another, is 
extremely annoyed with me. My interlocutor gets angry and I notice that he is 
expressing his anger by speaking aggressively, by gesticulating and shouting. But 
where is this anger? People will say that it is in the mind of my interlocutor. What this 
means is not entirely clear. For I could not imagine the malice and cruelty which I 
discern in my opponent’s looks separated from his gestures, speech and body. None of 
this takes place in some otherworldly realm, in some shrine located beyond the body of 
the angry man. It really is here, in this room and in this part of the room, that the anger 
breaks forth. It is in the space between him and me that it unfolds … anger inhabits him 
and it blossoms on the surface of his pale or purple cheeks, his blood-shot eyes and 
wheezing voice. (85) 
It is thus that Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion that psychological states inhabit something other 
than an entire human being. “Other human beings,” he argues, “are never pure spirit for me: I 
only know them through their glances, their gestures, their speech – in other words, through their 
bodies” (82). By the same token, he continues, “another human being is certainly more than 
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simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated by all manner of intentions, the origin 
of numerous actions and words” (82). Similarly, we can interpret Wittgenstein as thinking of the 
human being in a holistic way: namely, as a creature who we ordinarily perceive as undivided, 
capable of receiving psychological and corporeal ascriptions since he is uniformly the natural 
bearer of both.  
The point, then, seems not to be so much that we are human because we have human bodies 
and human psychology. Instinctively, we respond to these creatures as having mental states and 
processes with the same degree of confidence that we ascribe corporeal traits to them. To the 
same degree that we may trivially consider others as being of a certain weight and height – 
although we do not know exactly what those might turn out to be - we can rightly expect others to 
have intentions, beliefs, desires and dispositions. Therefore, whichever is the way we end up 
perceiving someone as a human being, we nonetheless treat him as one regardless. 
 
Countering Skepticism of Other Minds 
 
A notable implication of Wittgenstein’s approach is that it presents a way out of the Cartesian 
problem of other minds. His line of argumentation serves as a precedent for contesting radical 
skepticism about the humanity of others. Insofar as our treatment of others is in accordance with 
our natural reactions and dispositions towards humans, such treatment demands no justification. 
The burden of the proof rather lies on the skeptic, who must provide sufficient evidence for 
questioning humanity in others by doubting the validity of our natural reactions and dispositions 
towards them. In fact, at times one may have reasonable doubt about the authenticity of the 
expressions of sorrow or pain of other humans; but in what contexts would one deny the humanity 
of individuals even though one manifests natural reactions toward them? Without the possibility 
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of error, as Wittgenstein would say, we cannot possibly be right, so the skeptic would have to find 
plausible reasons to undermine the authenticity of our reactions. In this regard, Cook asks the 
following: 
If the question is whether they are people or not, we must ask: ‘People as opposed to 
what?’ And here the answer is not at all clear. If I look at my son playing near by 
and ask, ‘What else might he be?’, no answer suggests itself. He is clearly not a 
statue, nor is he an animated doll of the sort we sometimes see looking very lifelike. 
He is my own child, my own flesh and blood. (121) 
Cook thus interprets Wittgenstein as claiming that, when pushed to the extreme, the skeptic’s 
doubt becomes unsatisfactory. As a consequence of adopting the philosophical ideas of ‘body’ 
and ‘bodily movement’, he thinks that we create a metaphysical fissure between an ordinary 
human being and his body that cannot exist (128). However, once we take an ordinary human 
being to be central to our reactions, this fissure cannot exist. Thereby, in the absence of such a 
gap, the skeptic will have to find other ways to question the humanity of others. The burden of the 
proof lies with the skeptic, who must provide reasons for doubting our normal understanding of 
humans. In other words, the burden lies on those who want to deny humanity in the individuals 
towards whom the skeptics have already displayed natural reactions as if they were human beings. 
These reactions and responses are ‘basic’ in the sense that we do not need reasons for having 
them.  
A skeptic, though, could try to shift the burden of the proof back and demand evidence 
from Wittgenstein which would substantiate his ordinary characterization of human beings.  Still, 
at this stage Wittgenstein would claim that we have reached the rock bottom of our beliefs 
(Philosophical Investigations § 248). That we feel inclined to treat others as human beings is 
already part of what is involved in belonging to a human form of life. The only valid way to err in 
ascribing humanity to these forms of life would require seeing those individuals from outside a 
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historical, social, and physical context. But, as we are already situated in a given context and we 
are in constant contact with other humans (Taylor 76), we cannot make sense of such radical 
doubt. The starting point of our inquiries is precisely a ‘rough ground’ (Cf. Philosophical 
Investigations § 107) where we ascribe mental properties to people. This ground does not have or 
need a foundation, inasmuch as one does not ordinarily need proof of the humanity of others to 
treat them as such. 
In this respect, Wittgenstein observes a type of immediateness in the way that we become 
aware of the fact that others undergo mental states, particularly, as we naturally feel compelled to 
respond to the feelings, beliefs, and desires of others. Such immediacy takes place in the context 
of a ‘rough ground’ (§ 107) where everyday human beings interact with each other in several 
ways. Notice, though, that Wittgenstein is not simply pointing out that there is a connection 
between having instinctive attitudes towards others and recognizing them as human beings. 
Instead, he provides a picture of this connection where the rationalist assumption that there is 
something more basic or fundamental than these attitudes – such as recognizing others as humans 
– is excluded.  “The attitude,” Cockburn explains, “is what is basic in our relations with each 
other; it does not have, or need, any underpinning in the form of a ‘belief’ about the character of 
what we are confronted with” (23). The reason is that we immediately and spontaneously come 
up with such a belief: “To ‘recognize these as people’, we might say, just is to have the attitude” 
(Ibid.). This explains why Wittgenstein does not see the need to justify our reactions and 
responses to individuals, since forming a belief about the character of others is one more attitude 
amongst others. Therefore, insofar as ascribing mental states to others occurs instinctively – i.e., 
as effortlessly as treating others like human beings –, forming an opinion about their 
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psychological states is not in and of itself a ‘basic’ process on which our reactions and responses 
to others could be grounded.  
Let us now turn to Strawson’s conception of a person in order to establish the basis for 






In Individuals (1959), Strawson refers to a concept of a person that denotes a logical type of entity 
that can be ascribed different types of predicates, regardless of their class. This is, “the concept of 
a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates 
ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc. are applicable to a single individual of 
that single type” (388). These predicates apply to such an individual in virtue of the fact that 
person is a logically primitive notion, meaning that it has a central place in our conceptual scheme 
and in our linguistic practices. The fact that it is an elementary tool in our linguistic repertoire 
explains how it shapes our attributions of states of consciousness. The concept of a person, he 
stresses, is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness or body (389), so that ascriptions 
of psychological and bodily properties are logically secondary, derived from the notion of a 
person (389). By implication, a person cannot be analyzed in terms of those psychological or 
corporeal concepts, i.e., either as “an animated body or … an embodied anima.” (389). On the 
contrary, “states of consciousness could not be ascribed at all, unless they were ascribed to 
persons” (389) in that the existence of persons is a requisite for mental ascriptions. In other 
words, the primitive character of this notion is  “a necessary condition of states of consciousness 
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being ascribed at all,” because they are ascribed “to the very same things as certain corporeal 
characteristic, a certain physical situation, etc.” (389). 
It follows that the idea of a ‘pure individual consciousness’ understood as a logical ingredient 
of persons could not exist, or, at least, he thinks that it could not exist as a primitive concept by 
appeal to which the concept of person could be explained. Rather, if such a notion exists at all, it 
must be “a secondary, nonprimitive concept, which is itself explained, analyzed, in terms of the 
concept of person.” (389). A person is thus conceived as a “two-sided thing,” and not as the 
combination of “two one-sided things” (389) — i.e., as a mind or pure consciousness, on the one 
hand, and a discrete body, on the other. Therefore, affirming that an individual is a person would 
not involve conceiving it as an entity made out of a mind and a body (see Descartes 1997 48). 
From one perspective, a person is said to have a body, not to be one (Hacker “Strawson’s Concept 
of a Person” 39). From another, mental states like beliefs and desires apply not merely to a body 
but to a person undergoing those states. According to Strawson, then, ‘I’ does not refer to an 
‘inner’ subject of experience or else to someone’s body. Instead, it refers to the person employing 
the pronoun, which is the genuine bearer of both psychological and material ascriptions. The 
genuine bearer of mental predicates – a person – is naturally suitable for ‘I’ “because I am a 
person among others. And the [mental] predicates which would, per impossibile, belong to the 
pure subject [of experience] if it could be referred to, belong properly to the person to which “I” 
does refer” (390).  
 
On the First Person/Third Person Asymmetry 
 
When it comes to ascribing mental states, though, Strawson notices an asymmetry between first- 
and third-person methods of correction. It can be verified by contrasting how a subclass of 
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psychological predicates is applied to oneself and how it applies to others. According to him, one 
attributes these predicates to oneself without the help of any behavioral criterion, but judges the 
correctness of their ascription to others solely on the basis of their behavior (394). Other-
ascription of this set of predicates entails an intention or a state of consciousness which is shown 
in an action, that is, a pattern of bodily movements (398): “I mean such things as ‘going for a 
walk,’ ‘furling a rope,’ ‘playing ball,’ ‘writing a letter’” (398). For instance, ‘going for a walk’ is 
a psychological predicate that we can ascribe to others based on the observation of their actions. 
The asymmetry, though, resides in the natural fact that I can self-ascribe this property without 
external basis of observation. To be sure, I can predict my actions without interpreting my own 
behavior. Strawson claims that that the basis for self-ascriptions of mental properties is “entirely 
adequate,” and yet, “this basis is quite distinct from those on which one ascribes the predicate to 
another” (394), as this subset is other-ascribable only on the basis of behavioral criterion.  
At the same time, Strawson considers that first- and third-person methods of correction of 
mental ascriptions are interdependent. Such interdependence lies in the fact that we can interpret 
others as suitable objects of mental predicates only if we are disposed to self-ascribe them. The 
reverse is also true: namely, we can predicate these psychological properties to ourselves without 
any observational criterion because we are disposed to ascribe them to others. Moreover, in order 
to interpret the bodily movements of others as actions, one conceives oneself in function of the 
concept of a person: “It is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as 
persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on, each other, and act in accord with a 
common human nature” (399). As Hacker points out, the methods through which self-ascribable 
and other-ascribable psychological predicates are applied are not processes with absolutely 
nothing in common. They rather represent “two sides of a single coin” (“Strawson’s Concept of a 
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Person” 27). Indeed, he finds that “we interpret … the movements of the bodies of others only by 
seeing them as elements of plans of action akin to our own, of which we know the present course 
and future developments without observation of the present movements of our own body” (27). 
Strawson’s idea, then, is that we ascribe intentions to the persons whose bodily movements we 
can observe because of a displayed pattern of action only to the extent that we are also disposed to 
ascribe such actions to ourselves. If one is to make sense of one’s own intentions, one must have a 
sense of what it means to be a person with intentions or dispositions to actions, which can be 
developed only by conceiving others as relating to one another on the basis of what they intend to 
do. Therefore, the asymmetry existing between first- and third-person methods of verification 
does not make any one of these methods more indispensable over the other, for they complement 
each another in the process of learning how to apply psychological predicates pertaining to the 
subclass mentioned above.  
Now that we have examined Wittgenstein’s notion of a human being and Strawson’s concept 
of a person, let us see in what ways there is a parity of cases between these approaches. 
 
I.3. On the Logical Status of the Human Being Concept  
 
“Human being” is an ambiguous expression that connotes at least four notions. First, there is the 
genetic sense of the term referring to a member of the Homo sapiens species (Cf. Snowdon 2014). 
Secondly, there is the moral sense that applies to a member of the moral community (Cf. Warren 
1973). Furthermore, Aristotle defines a human being essentially as a rational animal, offering thus 
a third notion that focuses on the cognitive capacities of this creature. Lastly, there is the ordinary 
notion instantiated in Wittgenstein’s usage of the expression. During this dissertation, I will 
employ “human being” in the fourth sense by appealing to the notion with which Wittgenstein 
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denotes an individual towards whom we possess natural reactions, responses, and dispositions. I 
will now elaborate on the status of this concept by considering whether it can be interpreted as 
primitive in our conceptual scheme. Then, I will describe the ways it relates to the genetic notion 
to further explain the central place it has in our conceptual scheme. 
 
The Human Being in a Primitive Conception 
 
 
As previously discussed, Strawson speaks of the primitiveness of ‘person’ in relation to the 
secondary status of notions like ‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, and ‘body’. He argues that the notion of 
a person cannot be analyzed as that of an individual consciousness or body (389), while 
maintaining that ascriptions of states of consciousness, together with corporeal ascriptions, can be 
explained relative to a holistic understanding of a person. Even more, he conceives of the 
presence of a person as a necessary condition for the ascription of mental and physical states.  
Similarly, we can characterize Wittgenstein’s concept of a human being as primitive if it 
cannot be explained or analyzed either into the genetic, moral, or Aristotelian conception of a 
human being. Inasmuch as Strawson considers the concept of body to be derived from ‘person’, 
the ordinary concept of a human being is primitive or basic in relation to the (secondary) status of 
the genetic notion of a human being. If this is the case, the genetic, moral, and Aristotelian 
notions of a human being are not logical ingredients of the ordinary concept. Conversely, the 
ordinary notion must be a logical ingredient of the genetic, moral, and Aristotelian conceptions. 
Moreover, Wittgenstein considers the human being holistically, which can be interpreted – 
like Strawson’s conception of a person – as a unified object of our concern. To the same extent, 
then, it can be inferred that the common concept we possess of individuals must be present in our 
conceptual repertoire in a primitive form. For, in the end, through this concept we ultimately 
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attend to the common man. Practically speaking, from Wittgenstein’s perspective we react to the 
ordinary human being and not just to some of its attributes, that is, regardless of what is our 
attitude towards the individual in its entirety. For instance, we are instinctively prone to attend to 
the person’s suffering; his pain is part of our concern, but only insofar as it is a concern for his 
individual wellbeing. The ordinary human being, then, is not something we find in the world 
already categorized either according to a biological, moral, or psychological set of properties. On 
the contrary, it is after we grasp the common notion that we are able to develop other notions of a 
human being, depending on the interests and necessities of our endeavor.  
Thus, since the ordinary concept occupies a central position in our conceptual network, it 
serves as a starting point on which the questions driving our inquiries about human beings are 
based. It would thus be possible to explain our ascriptions of biological, moral, and cognitive 
properties relative to humans based on our primitive understanding and employment of the human 
being notion, since these properties can all be traced to the common human. Either a biological, 
moral, or psychological examination has its own advantages and disadvantages. For although it 
serves to explain a series of aspects of the ordinary human, since it is interested in one sense of 
‘human being’ over the rest, either investigation cannot do justice to all of the dimensions of the 
human being. Either way, as each secondary notion of the human being emerges by emphasizing 
aspects or characteristics of the ordinary individual, each can be said to derive from our ordinary 
understanding of this being, which is not yet categorized from either perspective.   
Now, another way in which Wittgenstein’s approach resembles Strawson’s is that the 
presence of an ordinary human being can be interpreted as a necessary condition for the 
ascriptions of biological, moral, and cognitive characteristics. Let us examine as a case study how 
the genetic characterization of a human being presupposes the existence of the ordinary human 
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being, to which we attribute biological properties that fix the latter within the category of a 
species. What we need to find out, then, is whether the set of properties ascribable to the ordinary 
human can be exhausted in a complete and accurate biological description of this creature. 
Specifically, we need to determine if our applications of the ordinary sense of ‘human being’ can 
be satisfactorily explained in function of a biological account of this individual. With this 
intention, let us see how the genetic notion of a human being is employed in an animalist 
approach. 
 
A Vantage Perspective on the Ordinary Human Being 
 
According to Paul Snowdon, what persists over the course of a person’s life is the bodily 
continuity of an animal. This view is supported on an identity thesis whereby “[e]ach of us is 
identical with, is one and the same as, an animal” (7). The person one is would amount to no more 
or less than a human animal situated in a discernible space, so that ultimately “[t]he person is the 
animal (where the person is)” (4). From his perspective, then, the person does not differ in any 
relevant way from the Homo sapiens. He suggests that many traits we would assign to the 
ordinary person or human being are explained by evolutionary theory, so that psychology, for 
example, is irrelevant to animal persistence over time. Its cognitive and linguistic capacities have 
thus arisen in the course of evolution, just as any other device from which this animal has 
benefited from (4). The development of these capacities is explained in terms of the ways this 
organism has thought about its environment.  
Yet, Snowdon seems to expand the notion of ‘animal’ so as to capture diverse types of 
properties we generally attribute to the ordinary human. In his appeal to natural selection, he 
privileges the biological dimension of the ordinary human being by selecting the genetic category 
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as the most ‘basic’ perspective to be taken on the human being. This way, the genetic concept is 
appealed to in order to argue that bodily continuity is what really matters when it comes to 
deciding what persists during the course of a human life. But it is not clear how this expansion of 
meaning would be justified. First, in its common sense, “human being” is not meant to apply 
exclusively to the body of a human being. We rather denote with it a single entity, an individual 
of a primitive logical class. Actually, our instinct is to respond to the other as a human being with 
physical characteristics, and not particularly as a homo sapiens. Secondly, this use of ‘animal’ 
would at least not be completely justified by evolutionary theory, since, for all we know, the 
cognitive and linguistic faculties of this animal make it a special case in evolutionary biology. 
Indeed, we only attribute some traits to human beings – such as using language and having 
culture, which entails passing on knowledge to future generations. Thus, it is not clear how this 
broad conception of ‘animal’ would be supported through the appeal to natural selection. 
Then again, the theoretical advantages of evolutionary theory are not in question. The 
expansion of the meaning of ‘animal’ could in turn be justified as offering one vantage 
perspective on the human being based on the background of evolutionary biology. That is, a 
standpoint on the ordinary human being from which we can predict and explain much of his 
behavior. Nonetheless, the point is rather that we do not ordinarily conceive of the human being 
as a homo sapiens: our understanding of a human being as pertaining to a species comes after the 
fact, when we classify what type of animal we are from the vantage point offered by evolutionary 
theory. Our primitive comprehension of the human being would thereby not presuppose or require 
the biological grounds afforded by evolutionary theory, as we can explain the actions and 
reactions of common human beings without its help. The issue then with how Snowdon expands 
the genetic notion of animal is that it sets stringent boundaries on the ordinary notion of a human 
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being, whilst actually the ordinary concept lacks such limitations. Our primitive understanding of 
a human being does not involve a distinction between a genetic, moral, or psychological category. 
From Wittgenstein’s perspective, the ordinary expression “human being” has no fixed or definite 
rules of application (see Philosophical Investigations § 81), just as any other ordinary expression. 
In consequence, we cannot strictly define what an ordinary human being is based on necessary 
and sufficient conditions, given that this ordinary notion has no such sharp boundaries. Setting, 
then, those strict limitations would not actually solve the natural imprecision of the ordinary sense 
of “human being.” 
 
A Sense in which the Ordinary Human is Favored 
 
But is not the ordinary sense of “human being” just another sense of the expression, so that in the 
end it is not logically primitive? For why should the ordinary concept be privileged over the other 
notions of a human being? At this stage, it is important to notice that, if the ordinary concept of a 
human being were primitive, it would only acquire this status in virtue of its relationship with 
other notions such as the genetic, moral, and Aristotelian. As the latter derive from it, the ordinary 
concept would be primitive in a relative way. There would not be, so to speak, a real sense of 
“human being” to be favored, for it is clear that this expression is ordinarily ambiguous  
favoring such real sense would thus be artificial. The common sense, though, is preferred for its 
practical advantages, to the extent that it plays a central role in our conceptual practices, 
particularly, in relation to the use of notions derived from it. The ordinary notion is a precondition 
in our understanding of the different possible senses of “human being,” so that without it we 
could not benefit from the theoretical advantages offered by adopting any particular notion 
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connoted by it. Thereby, we only favor the ordinary concept insofar as it is the logical beginning 
of our biological, moral, and psychological inquiries.  
On a final note, it is not clear though that metaphysical questions about the nature of 
human beings can be answered by favoring any secondary sense of “human being” over the rest. 
All one can do is point out the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the biologist’s 
viewpoint, who might be interested in the genetic sense; the psychologist’s stance, who might be 
concerned with the cognitive-capacity sense; or, finally, the philosopher’s (or someone else’s) 
stance, who might be interested in the moral sense. In our day-to-day life, however, we seem 
rather prone to viewing others as ordinary human beings in virtue of our practical concerns. The 
ordinary sense is thus favored insofar as we naturally fall back on it when it comes to 
characterizing others as human beings. 
Let us now turn to the main issue of the first part of this investigation, namely, the 
relationship of an ordinary human being and his everyday life so as to understand what his 
personal identity consists of. 
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II.  A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PERSONAL IDENTITY 
The main goal of this chapter is to address the philosophical issue of personal identity by 
expanding Wittgenstein’s picture of the human being in a way that further encapsulates aspects of 
his ordinary life such as his activities and exchanges with other human beings. This will be 
achieved by elaborating on Schechtman’s Person Life View, since her understanding of the 
concept of a ‘person’ is in tune with Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘human being’. Accordingly, I will 
be laying out her position while being in agreement with it, as it is also part of the conceptual 
framework of this project. The reason is that her position will complement Wittgenstein’s image 
of the human being by explicitly including in it his everyday life. In this context, Schechtman’s 
practical approach to the problem of personal identity will be explained by taking over especially 
her dependence model, the general structure of a person life, and her Person Life View, which are 
the aspects of her account that will be important when we propose in Chapter III a ‘solution’ to 
the issue of personal identity. As will be seen in the last section of this chapter, what is mostly 
relevant in these places of agreement is her ‘external’ approximation to a person’s identity as 
opposed to an ‘internal’, ‘essentialist’ view of it. It is in this sense that her practical 
approximation to personal identity will be made clear.  
 The issue we seek to get acquaintance with in this chapter is this: How can one remain the 
same individual over time? Given the alterations of state and condition that any human being 
must undergo, in what way can anyone be said to persist continuously, unaltered, during a 
lifetime? If someone is, strictly speaking, going to remain, the issue is then whether a person’s 
hypothetical avoidance of substantive change could somehow have an impact on the constitution 
of his personal identity. To put it differently: How could anyone in any way bypass all of the 
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changes implied in fully living? And why would such changes undermine the identity of a 
person?  
 In general, we tend to think of a person as having some constituting feature or element 
“which is there and remains the same” as he grows up, rendering the person ‘the same’ despite the 
diverse stages of life (Hunter 33). We believe that we have identified such a constituent element 
after completing the process of identifying a person, or at least assume its presence regardless of 
whether we can explicitly point out such a constituent (33). Our conception of the identity of a 
person thereby entails the continuity of a single element during the life of a person, since, upon its 
presence, a criterion for deciding whether an individual is the same person at different times 
would help settle the matter. In its absence we would have to decide upon such a criterion that 
someone is no longer the same but a different person —we would have to insist that the person 
has changed. That is, the individual has not merely changed radically in personality, physical 
traits, or in some other ‘basic’ way his life has undergone a radical transformation. The person has 
rather lost his identity:  
If Caesar becomes an alcoholic, it is Caesar who is now addicted; but if Caesar 
becomes Cleopatra, it is not Caesar but Cleopatra who is now Cleopatra. (33) 
 
It makes no sense to talk about two distinct individuals as being the same by saying that one has 
become the other, the first thereby losing completely his identity: if Caesar is an alcoholic and 
becomes Cleopatra, then it is Cleopatra who is an alcoholic. If we accept a change of identity, it 
follows that “we cannot attribute the new identity to the old person” (33). When we refer to a 
person’s substantial change, we are not merely speaking of a change in personality or physical 
appearance: as the psychological and physical functions of human beings unavoidably decay, by 
default none of these can constitute the one element capable of continuing ‘the same’ through 
time and guaranteeing a person’s identity. 
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However, do we require a grasp of what this alleged constitutive element might be before 
we can identify people as the individuals they are? From the standpoint of our regular experience, 
it is clear that identifying human beings is an effortless process, at least to the extent that it does 
not presuppose theoretical knowledge of the persistence of such an element in a person for the 
latter to be individuated. But then, if identifying persons is an ordinary activity that does not entail 
knowledge of the literal preservation during the span of a lifetime of a quality defining who we 
‘really’ are, why do we even think of the identity of a person in terms of the continuity of an 
unaltered element? If our ordinary conception of personal identity does not presuppose an 
ontological commitment to the continuation or preservation of such a feature, our problem must 
not be primarily ontological. Since the question of what makes a person the same over time does 
not require establishing the nature of such an essential element or property constitutive of 
persons’ identities, we can then focus on the significance of personal identity as it concerns a 
large range of interactions through which human beings are normally individuated. We can 
restrict our analysis to the diverse ways that someone’s identity is ordinarily fixed, thus putting 
aside the philosophical problem of which is the property that gives rise to one’s identity. 
Still, an appeal to the specificity of each human being in the context of his exchanges with 
others would not suffice when it comes to determining how his identity is constituted. We could 
trivially say that a person’s identity consists of the specific attributes and capacities he possesses, 
but this would hardly be of help. If we are looking to move on from a basic understanding of what 
a person is, we need to establish which sort of traits determine whether persons are to be 
considered as being ‘the same over time’. The defining elements we are seeking must particularly 
serve in individuating persons if they are going to constitute their identity. Subsequently, 
whatever might be the elements giving rise to a person’s identity, they must have individuating 
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characteristics since “otherwise … [their] presence would not show who a person is (but at most 
that he is a human being)” (36). As a matter of fact, we do not merely see people as exhibiting 
features pertaining to a common ‘human nature’ when we track characteristics of individuals with 
the intention of determining whether they are the same people we used to know. Instead, we 
distinguish each one as a unique individual depending on the qualities that are particular to their 
humanity, like those “having to do with place of birth, parents, sex, race, social status, job, 
personality, wishes and dreams” (Canfield 21).  
Now, we ordinarily think that such personal traits are central to our understanding of 
others and ourselves (21), and in this way we feel entitled to the belief that each human being is 
endowed with ‘selfhood’. Yet, whichever traits might give rise to who a person is, we are not 
going to be able to discern the latter in virtue of noticing constant traits in him, “since it is agreed 
that all such characteristics can change without our being bound to say that we have on our hands 
a different person” (Hunter 36). In effect, everything that matters for deciding whether a person 
has changed or not happens not to be, as it were, presently displayed for us to appreciate. Perhaps 
the first-person singular pronoun does not simply denote a particular person or human being 
uttering it. For if we have at our disposal a criterion of identity for deciding whether someone 
remains the same through time, we must presumably possess a degree of insight into something 
more than whatever a detailed and comprehensive examination of a specific person at any given 
moment can show.  
All the same, in a vague, general sense we do not hesitate in identifying ourselves with a 
particular human being with a given set of psychological and physical properties. However, when 
it comes to defining who this human being is, we cannot make the definition of who we are 
precise enough to put the matter to rest. We seek to narrow down the extension of ‘I’ trying to 
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pick out whatever we assume makes up for the person we are. But are we going to posit the 
existence of a ‘self’ as opposed to a specific, ordinary person we recognize ourselves to be, so that 
we will say that ‘I’ in a narrow sense selects a ‘self’? Suppose, then, that whatever it is to be a I in 
the narrow sense is not exhausted in being a specific person. Accordingly, whatever it is to be a 
person would not be equivalent to being a self. For if being a person presupposes being a self, and 
if this in turn presupposes being a unity (this is, given his numeric identity), we cannot make use 
of the concept of a ‘person’ to select the concept of ‘I’. The reason is that ‘I’ is already assumed 
in the concept of a person. Thereby, personal identity would have little to do with the identity of 
the ‘self’. As a consequence, it would not be necessary to conceive of ‘I’ as a concept denoting a 
self in the narrow sense in order to understand the multiple ways that persons are individuated. 
Indeed, inasmuch as a single element or property in persons need not be selected for us to be 
thought of as being ‘the same’ over time, we do not require ‘selves’ for particular human beings 
to be identified.  
Still, if it is the case that the concept of ‘I’ is not exhausted when defined in terms of the 
ordinary notion of a human being, why should we define the former by appealing to the latter? At 
any rate, cannot we define ourselves exclusively as moral, biological, or psychological individuals 
when it comes to selecting an element capable of meeting the persistence conditions for a human 
being to continue in life as the same individual? When seen from a metaphysical standpoint, 
animalism (e.g., Snowden 2014) could provide an appealing theoretical assessment, such that our 
personal identity would be accounted for through our physical continuity. Nevertheless, as in the 
case of defining personal identity either in terms of a moral or rational agent, the animalistic 
alternative would offer an incomplete –although probably accurate– picture of the matter. It 
would basically fail to speak to the different types of properties and capacities that can be ascribed 
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in general to ordinary human beings (see I.3). It is by virtue of the many sorts of characteristics 
that are ascribable to ordinary persons that we end up deciding whether we are confronted with 
the same person we knew. Thus, even though it is true that in a way each individual is a Homo 
sapiens, this would not get us any closer to fulfilling our task. Even if this account helps us 
determine what we are, it would not serve to individualize who we are (see Olson 66). 
Meanwhile, one could argue that under a psychological conception of a ‘person’, personal identity 
is successfully defined as the continuity of character and memory (see Locke Book Two, ch. 
xxvii). Nonetheless, this would not help draw a complete picture of the persistence of an ordinary 
human being over time: while the character of a person might drastically change, there is no loss 
of identity (see Cockburn 137). Though again, it is not as if the distinction made by Locke 
between a human animal (which is understood as a living organism) and a person (which is seen 
as the continuity of psychological capacities and attributes) could not prove useful. This would 
depend on the type of properties we are looking to underscore so as to explain a given aspect of 
the ordinary human person. The general point is rather that his distinction between human animal 
and person makes no real difference in the ordinary human being. 
So far we would only have a trivially correct view of personal identity framed within the 
limits of the types of properties and faculties that can be attributed to ordinary human beings. An 
alternative meant to overcome this difficulty consists in reconceiving personal identity as a 
practical issue. Thus understood, our view of the problem would be such that many unwarranted 
assumptions about the continuity of a single, essential element in a human being could be 
dropped. As the difficulties concerning the literal identity of persons are pushed to the 
background, we would focus instead on understanding the conditions under which the identity of 
a person is practically established. Indeed, as we rethink our general objectives in practical terms, 
 35 
it looks like we are not searching anymore for a substance concept to explain the meaning of ‘I’, 
say, as a rational agent, a moral agent, or a Homo sapiens. We are thus not searching for a simple, 
continuous element, property, or principle constituting our personal identity. This would also 
demand a change in our methodological expectations, as we are not trying to construct a theory 
about what satisfies the persistence conditions of a human being. If personal identity is to be 
treated as practical problem, it naturally requires a practical ‘solution’. The latter will be proposed 
and evaluated in Chapter III.  
In this chapter, we are trying to explain what it means to approach the problem of personal 
identity from a practical perspective. I want to focus here on the issue of personal identity 
assuming a primitive, elementary conception of ordinary human beings (Cf. I.3). I follow 
Schechtman in the idea that we should examine the relevant characteristics of our ordinary lives 
in order to properly articulate a practical account of personal identity. Thus, the basic connection 
between Schechtman and Wittgenstein’s considerations about ordinary persons will be presented 
here. 
II.1. Personal Identity from a Practical Standpoint 
 
 
In order to justify a turn from a metaphysical to a practical approach to the identity of human 
persons, I adopt the strong dependence model of the relation between practical considerations and 
the literal identity of these individuals that is offered by Schechtman.  
 She advances an account of personal identity that takes a person to be an appropriate 
target of all of our practical concerns, which is to say, of “the different interests, judgments, and 
practices involved in our interactions with other people” (68). When speaking of a ‘person’, she 
thinks of the locus of the multiple conceptual activities through which we get to individuate an 
ordinary human being. According to a strong dependence model of the relationship between 
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personal identity and practical concerns, the reality of persons is a necessary condition for the 
application of a wide set of practical considerations about them. Although our main endeavor is 
restricted to practical concerns about a human person, that does not mean that there is nothing to 
be said about the literal identity of this individual. On the contrary, from the standpoint of the 
strong dependence model there is an ontological commitment to the existence and reality of a 
person conceived as “an appropriate target of practical questions and concerns” (41). An account 
of personal identity is thus meant to individuate the target of our considerations for these to be 
intelligible (41), so that, ultimately, our practical concerns presuppose such a target. Schechtman 
sees this model as one in which there is a logical dependence between personal identity and 
practical concerns. The relationship between these two is conceptual: “an account of personal 
identity … [is] conceptually dependent upon practical considerations because the relation which 
constitutes identity must by necessity be one which makes a person an intrinsically appropriate 
unit about which to raise particular practical questions” (41). A practical approach to personal 
identity would then shed light onto the metaphysical status of persons, since practical questions 
and considerations end up fixing the reference of these individuals in order to evaluate them as 
objects of our concerns: “[p]ractical concerns are dependent on facts about personal identity in the 
sense that identity must be in place before particular practical judgments can be appropriately 
made—identity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for these judgments” (41). Therefore, 
Schechtman relies on such a model to indirectly provide an account of the literal identity of 
persons.  
 Given our objectives in this chapter, we can think of Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
human beings as supporting this strong dependence model. From this perspective, his picture of 
the human being presupposes the existence of an individual with whom to enter in contact and 
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towards whom to develop instinctive attitudes. From another point of view, it is worth mentioning 
that Strawson underscores the primitive character of the notion of a ‘person’ to suggest that this 
notion constitutes a necessary condition for the attribution of states of consciousness and physical 
characteristics (389). One might thus say that most of our conceptual practices are intrinsically 
tied to the ontological commitment to human persons. 
 In the following sections, we will see how to expand the picture of the ordinary human 
being provided by Wittgenstein so as to include in it elements that are pertinent to the discussion 
of his personal identity. 
 
The Expanded Set of Practical Considerations 
 
On the basis of an expanded conception of a ‘person’, Schechtman tackles the issue of which 
practical considerations are inherently linked to a person’s identity. She proposes an explanation 
of the full range of person-related practices that constitute a practical unity relative to a person 
and his life. In effect, she is looking for a type of complex unity to be associated with the concept 
of a ‘person’ that includes a full range of practical considerations and interests.  
Schechtman argues for opening up our understanding of the notion of a ‘person’ so as to 
capture not only with it individuals that fall in the forensic category –those that can be rightly 
praised or blamed for their actions– but, moreover, the full range of behaviors encompassed in 
‘treating others’ as ordinary persons. In harmony with Wittgenstein’s holistic picture of a human 
being, she conceives of the notion of a ‘person’ as connoting “the full range of everyday 
behaviors that make up the lives of human persons” (72). Such comprehension of a ‘person’ is 
thereby not restricted to the range of behaviors generally associated with those of either a moral or 
rational agent. Being a person would not only entail a range of forensic capacities and moral 
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attributes but, even more, the large set of behaviors of ordinary human beings in the context of 
their daily lives.  
This way, Schechtman enlarges the forensic notion of a ‘person’ used by Locke so as to 
capture ordinary aspects of our interactions with one another. Recognizing someone as a person 
would not be limited to judging him as such in virtue of the moral or rational properties he 
exhibits. While adopting Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘forms of life’, she argues on the contrary that 
conceiving “someone as a person is not to make a particular kind of judgment about her, but 
rather to treat her in the myriad ways that this form of life entails” (72). Seeing and treating 
someone ‘as a person’ would not then presuppose “sophisticated assessments of moral 
responsibility or prudential rationality,” as it rather involves basic practices that help constitute 
someone’s personal identity (75). Being a person, therefore, is not just about bearing rights, being 
the object of duties, or being a proper object of praise and blame (75) as it entails a wider range of 
behaviors, including the instinctive responses by means of which we regularly interact with other 
human beings. She thus widens the concept of personhood as applying to individuals that might 
not be regarded as such according to a psychological description of personhood that excludes 
infants, those who have lost their mental capacities, and the mentally challenged: “[e]ven those 
who lack these capacities (e.g., very young children, the demented, and those with significant 
deficits) can be treated as, and so constituted as, persons with personal identities” (74). For 
instance, treating someone with dementia as a person involves more than judging him as a person 
because it meets a minimum rational threshold. Schechtman thinks of ‘person’, instead, as a 
concept designating the individuals connoted by the forensic notion and the ones excluded by it, 
like the patient with dementia, who is still treated as a person although he might actually be acting 
like an animal. Likewise, it can be argued that “those who lack sentience can be (and are) 
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included, albeit minimally, in person-effective activities,” as in the case of an individual in a 
persistent vegetative stage: “[it] is typically dressed in clothes, lies in a bed with sheets, and is 
referred to by a name” (74). It is thus that, while these individuals might not actually possess and 
exhibit the cognitive properties normally ascribed to human beings, “[t]hey are the recipients of 
person-specific attentions even if they cannot actively reciprocate” (74).  
Schechtman stresses that she is not diminishing the significance of the forensic notion of 
personhood. Her point is rather that an account of personhood and personal identity focused 
solely on this notion would not be complete: “it is not enough to define identity in a way that 
makes persons exclusively forensic units” (76). An adequate account, she suggests, has to 
comprehend also the multiple practices constituting a person’s identity, “such that on it persons 
are appropriate units of forensic concern as well as of other kinds of concerns and practices 
associated with personal identity” (76).  
 
II.2. The Unity of a Person Life  
 
 
While addressing the issue of personal identity, Schechtman simultaneously tackles what she 
refers to as the ‘problem of multiplicity’, i.e., the difficulties encountered when trying to provide 
an account for the single relationship in virtue of which a person has an identity (81). By 
insulating such a relationship, a response to the issue is in principle attempted as such a relation 
would account for the continuity of an individual by meeting its persistence conditions. As these 
problems are interconnected, she addresses them simultaneously by selecting a unit as an 
appropriate target of a wide net of practical concerns.  
 The problem of multiplicity specifically involves accounting for how “an individual 
person, defined as the appropriate target of the range of person-related practices and concerns,” 
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can be constituted by “a single entity” (87). The difficulty lies in the fact that, if we think of 
‘human being’ or ‘person’ as terms denoting different types of individuals, we would not have a 
unified locus for our multiple practical considerations and questions. With the use of a moral 
conception of a ‘human being’, for instance, we would refer to a moral agent bearing rights and 
respect; with a genetic sense of the expression, we would denote a Homo sapiens; and by means 
of defining a human being as a rational and speaking animal, we would target a rational agent. 
Similarly, when we employ ‘person’ in a forensic sense, we signify an individual accountable for 
his actions; but while we use it in a moral sense, we refer to an individual that is a member of the 
moral community. How, then, can the variety of considerations we can have about human beings 
and persons, respectively, be explained in terms of a single, continuous entity? With regard to a 
‘human being’, such an entity would have to be at once a Homo sapiens, a moral and a rational 
agent, while in the case of a ‘person’ it would have to be both a rational and moral agent. Yet, if 
we are looking for a single relationship explaining the continuity or persistence of an individual, it 
appears as if we are confronted with an impossible choice.  
 Admittedly, it is not clear how embracing one or another notion of either ‘human being’ or 
‘person’ can help since, for example, when using ‘person’ in a forensic sense infants and those 
with severe cognitive deficits would fall out of the category. But if we follow Schechtman in the 
idea that several types of practical considerations relative to persons in ordinary contexts help 
constituting their identities, then the forensic notion will not do. For if we operate solely with the 
forensic notion, we readily dismiss any dimension of a human life that is not an object of duties 
and responsibilities as external or accidental to what constitutes his identity. But as there many 
different types of practical concerns that apply to an ordinary person, Schechtman argues, “it is by 
no means obvious that we will be able to encounter a single relation that defines an appropriate 
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target for them all” (81). This means that there is no single practical relation that makes up for a 
person identity, so that “the project of finding a single relation that defines the appropriate locus 
for our practical concerns appears … hopeless” (81). Given the complex unity of the life of a 
person or human being in which there is no single relation underlying all of the different types of 
practical concerns and questions that can be raised about him, there is nothing to select as 
uniquely responsible for his personal identity. As there is no one thread, as it were, based on 
which we could say what the identity of a person resides in, a potential solution to problem of 
multiplicity seems incoherent: “[i]f the aim is to define a locus which is the appropriate target of 
all of our person-related practices (including forensic judgments) and to define personhood in 
such a way that those who are not appropriate targets of forensic judgments are persons,” such an 
aim “is going to be pretty hard to meet” (81).  
 Now, Schechtman does not quite abandon the problem of multiplicity as if it were ill-
founded. On the contrary, according to her we encounter in the ordinary world “unified (albeit 
ridiculously complex and multi-faceted) individuals” (83). This much is clear in the context of our 
daily interchanges with others: 
[t]he son I feed and clothe and comfort is the same person I chastise for behaving 
badly to her sister and the same person to whom I try to teach the value of hard 
work and explain the benefit of making small sacrifices now for larger benefits 
later.  He is also the same person whose straight As bring me pride and whose 
disappointments are a cause for my sadness, and the person whose health I am 
concerned to safeguard. I do not have a moral son and an animal son and a 
psychological son—I have a single son who has all of these aspects and is important 
to me in all of these ways. (83)  
 
She suggests there is something odd in the presuppositions that give rise to the problem of 
multiplicity. Particularly, this issue is at odds not only with how our practical exchanges come 
about but with how our practical concerns demand the existence of a unified individual as their 
target, however complex this might actually be. The point, then, is not that the individual cannot 
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be treated solely according to one of his given dimensions; one could be concerned only with a 
person as a psychologically endowed animal insofar as the task of a psychiatrist, for instance, is to 
enhance someone’s mental wellbeing. But, one way or the other, we presuppose the existence of 
other facets of a person without compromising the integrity of his identity when focusing only on 
his psychological aspects. Therefore, “[h]owever much complexity there is to our practical lives 
each of us is, in the end, a single thing” (84), meaning, one multifaceted entity. This is why we 
might after all “have a further question about what it is that possesses self-consciousness, 
rationality, and the ability to act as a moral agent” (84). Ultimately, our practical considerations 
are about a single individual: they are “concerns … directed at someone, and in the end we want 
an answer to the question of what constitutes the integrity of that someone” (85).  
 The again, Schechtman’s issue is not to address the question of a person’s identity by 
singling out a unique, intrinsic type of relationship in virtue of which an individual can literally be 
said to be the same over time. For “[i]f we must have a single unified entity that is the target of 
the full range of person-related practices,” then there does is not available a single relation that 
can be taken as the target of all of our practical concerns (84). But if, on the other hand, the 
multiplicity of relationships constituting an individual’s life do not compromise our experience of 
person as a multifaceted being that, still, is identical to himself, then, according to Schechtman, 
maybe we should “give up on the idea that the target of our practical interactions and judgments 
must be intrinsically suited for being so” (84). If our business is instead to point out, from an 
external perspective, how diverse types of practical considerations and concerns are linked to 
form a complex unity, it follows that what matters when individuating persons is not a single 
relationship: 
[p]erhaps all we need is an entity that we are able to individuate and track over 
time, and which can be designated as the individual about which we ask practical 
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questions, make practical judgments, and otherwise engage in person-related 
interactions. Of course we have such an entity ready to hand in the form of the 
human organism. (84) 
 
The challenge of an individual unity involved in problem of multiplicity is thus met by 
understanding the identity of a person in terms of different relations making him an appropriate 
locus of the full range of person-related concerns even though these concerns can come apart, so 
that a person is understood, at any given time, as a unified target of a variety of distinct practical 
concerns.  
In order to explain how Schechtman describes the way these diverse relationships 
constitute personal identity, let us now examine her understanding of the different aspects of a 
person’s ordinary life. 
 
The Paradigmatic Structure of a Person Life 
 
Remember that Schechtman uses ‘human being’ and ‘person’ in their ordinary sense which 
follows from her adoption of Wittgenstein’s phraseology (see 114). Particularly, she employs the 
notion of a ‘person’ in an ordinary sense in her discussion of paradigmatic forms of human life. 
She refers to “beings like us—you who are reading a book and I who am writing it” when 
articulating a model of a paradigmatic or standard person life (114). In turn, she avoids the 
challenge to individual unity by defining personal identity in terms of the unity of the life of a 
person, referring thus to a single yet multi-faceted ‘entity’ (109). In general, she conceives of a 
‘person life’ as something “held together by the form of its unfolding” structure and not, say, by 
the existence of a definite human animal (109). That here is such a thing as the form of a person 
life is clear from a holistic perspective, this is, understanding a human life as a structured, 
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ongoing whole. Diachronically, a person is constituted by an entire life, and not just by the 
attributes that can be ascribed to him at any given stage of it:   
[i]t is a structural whole that has, by its very nature, attributes that apply to it as a 
whole which do not necessarily apply to each individual portion. We can thus say 
that the mature person is the same person as the infant or (in unlucky cases) 
dementia patient because there is a single life course that starts (roughly) with 
infancy, develops into maturity, and devolves (possibly) into dementia. The person 
is defined by the unfolding of the pattern in which these stages all play their part. 
(108) 
 
The form of the complete diachronically structured unity described by the unfolding life of a 
person accounts for the singularity of his life (108).  
 Then again, how does she exactly conceive of the structure of a person life? Schechtman 
advances the Person Life View whereby we generally define persons in terms of the 
“characteristic lives they lead” (110). Being a person amounts to having or living a ‘person life’: 
“persons are individuated by individuating person lives; and the duration of a single person is 
determined by the duration of a single person life” (110). She explains what it is to be a person by 
accounting for the basic structure of a typical person life, implying that peoples’ lives share a 
distinctive and standard structure, although not a stringent one —in the end, what counts as a 
‘standard person life’ varies from culture to culture. She appeals to paradigmatic cases of persons’ 
lives by pointing to “typical enculturated humans” (111), so that paradigmatic exemplars of 
human beings exhibit the standard structure of a person life. It is, then, an appeal to a 
typical/atypical distinction between forms of person life that brings forward practical 
considerations meant to provide the elements required for a proper definition of personal identity. 
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II. 3. A Property Cluster Model of a Person Life  
 
Now that we have seen what the paradigmatic structure of an ordinary human life consists of, we 
will explain in what way Schechtman’s account of personal identity is practical in character. This 
can be seen in the fact that she assumes an externalist approach, which ends up being more 
persuasive than competing positions such as animalism because she does not rely on an intrinsic 
attribute of human beings like the biological property of being an animal to define his identity. 
This way, she avoids formulating an essentialist account of personal identity that would not in the 
end satisfy us. This biological property together with the psychological and social aspects of 
human beings are rather subsumed under her view of persons, as she gives them a place in her 
practical approach. Therefore, her account is ‘practical’ as she thinks of the human being in the 
context of his everyday life, where all of these aspects contribute to his personal identity. 
Particularly, her approach to the ‘person life’ of this individual is practical as it involves his 
regular activities and interactions of with other human beings. 
 There is, of course, a way in which it is trivially true that there is a human being out there 
with a life of his own. With the intention of rendering her conception of a person life informative, 
Schechtman maintains that the characteristic developmental trajectory which we recognize as a 
standard person life is constituted by “three interconnected levels: the level of [individual] 
capabilities and attributes, the level of activities and interaction, and the level of social 
infrastructure” (138). First, we find a typical encultured human being with biological and 
psychological capacities and attributes serving as a paradigmatic example. This is the dominion of 
properties normally attributed to an ordinary person. Secondly, we find the particular interactions 
in a daily life of a person with other human beings and the activities he engages in. Finally, there 
is a cultural and social set of “institutions and practices that grow out of social organization of 
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beings who … set the norms that govern interactions among persons” (138). She thinks of the 
previous level as forming a “person-space” (138) wherein the daily life on a person occurs. In this 
third level –which comprises the other two– we find practices, customs, and institutions that offer 
the background within which we judge the daily activities and interactions of particular persons 
(112).  
In this way, Schechtman advances a picture of a typical mature person in terms of the three 
interconnected levels. Hierocles similarly thought that “each one of us is, as it were, entirely 
encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger” (qtd. in Martin and Barresi 26). The 
individual human being  
has drawn as though around a center, his own mind … the body and anything taken 
for the sake of the body; for it is a circle of virtually minimal radius, and almost 
touches the center itself … further removed from the center, but enclosing the first 
circle [are] parents, siblings, wife, and children … [and in the] outermost and 
largest circle [is] the whole human race. (26) 
 
Schechtman notices how social, psychological, and biological properties and functions belong to 
different levels in a person life, and they reciprocate one another in a way that a distinct life of a 
human being emerges. Because of such reciprocity, an individual can develop a personal identity: 
[w]e have already seen the way in which [the sociocultural] infrastructure shapes 
the kinds of daily activities, relationships, and interactions a person engages in by 
setting the parameters within which these take place and providing the background 
institutions and practices they require. But the infrastructure is also constrained by 
the physical and psychological attributes of the individuals who reside in the 
person-space it defines. (115) 
 
What is more, the property of ‘being alive’ is attributed holistically to the human individual, and 
not ascribed to any of his parts. What is true of the whole person in the context of his life and 
within the parameters of a sociocultural infrastructure is not true of any of his dimensions. 
Likewise, being ‘one and the same’ is not a property that applies to any given dimension of the 
person (whether it is the psychological, moral, or biological) but to the person itself relative to his 
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life. Being someone, thereby, would not be reduced to being a moral agent, a rational animal, or a 
Homo sapiens. It would further involve engaging with others and performing activities that 
constitute a person life in the wider context of a given sociocultural infrastructure. Since we apply 
holistically a host of biological, psychological, and social attributes to ordinary persons, such 
distinctions among categories of functions and properties can mislead us into thinking that an 
individual human being is made up of “a biological or psychological or social life” (115). Yet, 
when we speak of the life of a person we rather refer to particular sorts of activities “within a 
person life” involving interactions with other human beings (115). Then, the particular way in 
which a life unfolds would explain how a person persists over time as the same individual, as we 
ascribe to the human being physical and psychological properties and capacities but, moreover, 
social qualities and functions.  
It is important to further notice that Schechtman has only offered a picture of a human 
being to whom a cluster of properties applies in a given context. But the division shown between 
the levels mentioned might be somewhat artificial (115), given that the typical psychological and 
biological attributes of the individual, his daily life, and the sociocultural infrastructure wherein 
such a life takes place complement, reinforce, and support one another. Such differentiation of 
levels, however, is still helpful insofar as it provides guidance in grasping the ways in which the 
elements pertaining to the different categories relate to one other:  
The development on the one hand of cognitive and agential capacities and on the 
other increasingly complex and self-directed interpersonal relationships and 
interactions should not be seen as distinct processes, but rather as two sides of a 
single coin. In order to develop psychologically and physically as human persons 
typically do, it is necessary to mature in an environment that provides the proper 
scaffolding and social support for such development. By the same token, there are 
particular psychological capacities that are required if one is to engage in the more 
sophisticated kinds of interpersonal interactions found in a standard in a standard 
person life … Without the ability to develop these internal resources active 
participation in a person life would be severely limited. (112) 
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A given sociocultural infrastructure is necessary for there to be a person life, and this 
infrastructure presupposes, in turn, an individual with psychological and physical properties to 
ever live a person life, as “the infrastructure could not exist … unless those who are part of 
person-space have the necessary capacities and attributes to create and maintain it” (112). 
Thereby, such individual capacities and properties constitute a necessary condition both for a 
person life to exist and for there to be a person-space wherein the activities of such a life can take 
place, since the institutions and customs constituting a sociocultural infrastructure depend on the 
existence of individual capacities and properties of persons. Indeed, according to this picture, 
“[t]he development of institutions and norms of the sort that define person lives (e.g., prisons, or 
systems of punishment, economies, theologies, art) requires beings who have certain kinds of 
memory systems, reflective self-consciousness, rationality, and related cognitive and affective 
abilities” (116).   
 Meanwhile, the individual capacities of persons depend both on sociocultural institutions 
and on the activities and interactions constituting persons’ lives (116). Without the framework 
offered by a sociocultural infrastructure, there would be no place for a person’s life to acquire a 
form of its own, in the absence of which it would not make sense in turn to speak of a person’s 
identity. In effect, our psychological and physical capacities “depend upon the existence of a 
social infrastructure and engagement in characteristic lives” (116). In the absence of these two 
levels, individual capacitates would not develop, at least not to the extent and manner we would 
associate with the qualities of a typical mature person. When we search for the traits of a standard 
mature person in a human life form within the context of a given community, it is clear that the 
“sophisticated and agential capacities of human persons depend upon social scaffold to develop,” 
so that, for example, if they are not exposed to language or the appropriate kinds of 
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developmental stimuli, infants will “not develop the kind of cognitive, social, and affective 
capabilities that are found in mature persons” (116).  
Hence, Schechtman’s Person Life View is a practically-based account of a standard person 
life (118). This is clear from the fact that “a person life is made up of the kinds of practical 
interactions peculiar to persons, and occupying a place in person-space just is to be a locus of the 
practical interests and concerns that apply to beings like us” (118). An implication of this view is 
that having a personal identity presupposes leading a particular form of life comparable in some 
way to the paradigmatic structure of a person life. This aspect of Schechtman’s view is further 
elaborated on the next chapter.  
The Sociocultural Infrastructure as a Form of Life of Personhood 
In this section, we will provide elements that are relevant for the articulation of a ‘solution’ to the 
personal identity issue in the next chapter. We lay here the groundwork for then pointing to 
similarities between Schechtman’s Person Life View and Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘forms of life’. 
According to Schechtman, a particular form of life of a human individual amounts to an 
exemplar of the general form of life of a community. For living a person life entails more than 
being a suitable object of ascription of a cluster of physical, psychological, and social properties 
in the context of the activities and interactions making up one’s daily life. If it is going to count as 
such, a person life should aim to be a model of the general standard of a typical human life. But, 
in order to be a model, there must be a fixed background of assumptions against which the 
accordance or deviation of a given life can be judged. This background, Schechtman argues, sets 
the parameters within which our person life unfolds, informing us of the type of person that we 
are (113). Moreover, the social roles we engage in when interacting with others are validated 
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externally, i.e., by the standard of a community: “[i]n the case of human persons, for instance, 
other humans play a particular prescribed role that is set by social and cultural institutions and not 
accorded on an individual basis” (113). Therefore, what counts as being a particular person with a 
typical life sets the bar for what a community of speakers would accept as such. 
 One could object to the Person Life View that it leads to conventionalism. A ‘typical’ 
developmental trajectory of human exemplars is presumably going to be whatever a given 
community of speakers takes as ‘typical’. Schechtman replies by pointing out the fact that we 
have not explicitly agreed to adopt the sociocultural infrastructure wherein our lives develop. This 
‘person-space’ afforded by living in a sociocultural infrastructure “is not simply something we 
choose or make up, but rather something that evolves with us and is responsive to and constrained 
by facts about us and about the world” (119). This does not yet imply that there is something like 
a sociocultural macrostructure composed of the general forms of life of existing communities: 
“[o]f course,” she claims, “not every culture must contain all of … [the same] elements, and the 
details of such institutions will vary over time and place” (119). The sociocultural infrastructure, 
though, is “absolutely central” inasmuch as it is required for the existence of personhood:  
[t]here would be no persons without person-space, and to be living a person life is 
to be accorded a place in person-space, to live as and be treated as a unified locus 
of the sorts of practical concerns and interactions that typify the life of those who 
generate and maintain the social/cultural infrastructure within which these lives 
take place. (119)  
 
Furthermore, what is accepted as a person or human being is not a matter of belief or opinion. 
Schechtman argues that to treat someone as a human being is to make him a focus of our practical 
concern, as we are instinctively prone to form an attitude towards him. Reacting to others as if 
they were human beings shows our commitment to ascribe to them  “automatically … a place in 
person-space,” this is, as long as they have a life of their own, since “a person is constituted by a 
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person life” (188). Following Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations II, IV, § 22), 
Schechtman suggests that the background of ‘assumptions’ composing the sociocultural 
infrastructure we live in is not merely believed in (114). It is not as if we simply think that others 
are persons because of the attributes they display and, under that assumption, we are willing to 
interact with them expecting some given set of responses in return. Instead, the diverse ways we 
instinctively react and respond to others signal a deep commitment to their humanity: 
We do not, when we encounter animate things in daily life, make an assessment of 
their attributes and capabilities before deciding whether they should be viewed and 
treated as fellow persons. When we encounter other humans we automatically see 
them as persons and interact with them as such. (113)  
 
In other words, we do not get to choose who we will regard as a fellow human being: our 
reactions give away the fact that we naturally see them as such. Thus, treating ‘others’ as 
particular forms of human life involves having a basic attitude or orientation towards the 
humanity in others. Such an attitude is not restricted to a rigid set of dispositions. Treating others 
as members of the world of life roughly involves being disposed to see them as if they were part 
of a larger community of persons than those included in a given sociocultural infrastructure (114).  
 
Unity of Life and Personal Identity 
 
From the perspective of the Person Life View, what makes up for a person’s identity depends on 
how a person life is individuated, so that the persistence of a person is tantamount to the 
continuation of a person life. Schechtman maintains that persons are individuated in terms of their 
lives, i.e., their daily interactions and activities (139). This is possible given her conception of a 
‘person life’ as a term connoting a cluster of psychological, biological, and social properties 
which are holistically assigned to an ordinary person.  
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Nevertheless, it is not as if any given (type of) property constitutes a necessary or 
sufficient condition for a person to persist. As long as there is a person life to be continued, it will 
be possible to say of a corresponding human being that it is the same person. Following Chiong 
(141-85), Schechtman suggests that the persistence conditions of a person life are not bound by 
the limits of the continuation of any given element in a person. Actually, no element is necessary 
or sufficient for a person life to continue and, hence, for a person to be the same. Chiong 
maintains that ‘being alive’ is a property that connotes “a cluster of characteristics—none of 
which is in itself necessary and sufficient for an organism to be alive, but all of which contribute 
to an organism’s being alive,” as the properties applicable to ordinary human beings tend to 
support and constrain one another in paradigmatic instances (Schechtman 138). Thus, as all of the 
different properties and functions that are ascribed holistically to a person contribute to the 
persistence of his life, Schechtman claims that no element is indispensable for one to validly 
speak of a person as persevering in existence (138).  
We can give up on the project of defining the personal identity of an individual in terms of 
the continuation of some set of properties as, for example, his biological traits, since “[l]ives are 
… such complicated and multi-faceted things that providing a single list of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for one to continue would be hopeless” (138). When speaking of the 
continuation of a person life, Schechtman recommends that we look for the persistence of a 
cluster of properties and functions without looking for any specific property or function to subsist 
(145). Given a series of characteristics taken as paradigm cases of person lives, Schechtman 
accounts for the continuation of a person life as the perpetuation of the support, constrain and 
dependency of biological, psychological, and social capacities and functions on one another 
(147). Such relations among properties integrate a particular human being into his own life form, 
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resulting in a practical unity responsible for the continuation of the person. In effect, it is due to 
the interaction of the different types of properties and functions that a life continues, and not 
because of the specific persistence of any given property or function that the person remains the 
same. The persistence conditions for an individual are thereby explained in terms of the 
continuation of a whole entity regardless of whether any of his parts stay the same over time. 
To illustrate this point, Schechtman employs Olson’s analogy between the life of a human 
organism and the life of a storm. Under normal circumstances, we can decide 
whether the storm that hit Cuba yesterday and the storm that brought floods to 
Alabama today are the same storm or different ones; and our ability to know this 
doesn’t involve any judgments about the persistence of material objects. We don’t 
first need to find out whether the material object composed of all and only those 
particles caught in the Cuban storm is the same as, or different from, the material 
object composed of those particles caught in the Alabama storm. There may not 
even by any such material objects. (139-40) 
 
Schechtman contends that we can obviously identify a storm at different times without having any 
independent way of verifying whether “all and only the matter that is caught up in it” has 
remained (141). Similarly, in the case of person, “we are in principle able to identify and 
reidentify salient loci of interaction by a string of events rather than through the reidentification of 
material substance” (141.). The central point is that, when it comes to individualizing a person 
life, our criteria is not merely grounded on bodily continuity. Instead, “[a]ll that is necessary” 
when it comes to identifying and reidentifying human lives “is to be able to follow the series of 
activities that makes up an event of the appropriate kind—a life or a storm” (141). It is then a 
mistake to try and define personal identity solely as the continuation of a bodily substance, when, 
after all, there is no such material organism existing independently of the structure of a person 
life. As in the “case of the storm, in which there is no presumption that there is any independent 
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III. IN CONSTANT RETURN TO THE WORLD OF LIFE
The aim of this chapter is to propose and evaluate the viability of a ‘solution’ or ‘treatment’ for 
the issue of personal identity. The intention is to further justify our practical approach to this 
topic. Indeed, if personal identity were understood as a practical issue, it could actually be solved 
in the context of daily activities and exchanges with others. A person would not be said then to 
have by default an identity regardless of the concrete life he leads and the sociocultural 
framework wherein such a life unfolds (Schechtman 113). Instead, a person would obtain for 
practical purposes an identity as the result of gaining a considerable degree of unity or integrity 
with his own life, so that his life would be ‘in agreement’ with the typical way human beings live 
and interact with each other in society. 
Now, if we view the issue of personal identity from a practical standpoint, it is clear that 
the only persons requiring such a ‘remedy’ would be the ones who, having departed from 
ordinary ways of living, have become distanced from their own lives. In a way, they no longer 
form a “practical unity” (73) with these. Having become alienated or dissociated from regular 
ways of relating to others, these individuals could value suggestions meant to help them in 
readjusting to what a given community deems as a ‘standard’ form of person life. This 
readjustment would involve the accommodation of a person life to a given sociocultural 
infrastructure or ‘person-space’ (114). Then, as our lives acquire unity in function of how well we 
assimilate to society, the “issue” with someone’s personal identity or lack thereof would consist 
of the gradual deterioration of patterns of behavior that we conventionally associate with the ways 
of life of ordinary human beings. It can be argued, thus, that this problem is treatable insofar as an 
estranged person manages to recover and embody many of the patterns of behavior of full-blown, 
typical individuals.  
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The task here is to explain the details of how such a ‘readjustment’ is supposed to take 
place and the way it is meant to serve those who are alienated from ordinary forms of living. In 
this respect, it will be useful to examine some aspects of Wittgenstein’s early and later 
philosophy, for he conceived of the transformation of one’s form of life as the ultimate objective 
of his philosophy. Moreover, I suggest that this is precisely the type of change that dissociated 
individuals should undergo in order to adjust to a ‘standard’ way of living. It will be necessary, 
though, to consider why Wittgenstein thinks that this vital transformation is not possible if one’s 
time is consumed with trying to go beyond meaningful speech so to articulate ‘the purpose’ of 
life, say, with the intention of ultimately understanding why one might not be fulfilling it. This 
further demands an explanation of the attitude that Wittgenstein suggests we adopt towards 
ordinary uses of language, as his goal is to assist us in resisting the temptation to go past 
meaningful uses of language to diagnose what is essentially ‘wrong’ with our life. 
In the following section, I will propose a way of reading the Tractatus (1999) that will 
eventually serve us in formulating an answer to the problem of alienation. As we first explain 
Wittgenstein’s conception of language in the Tractatus, we will construe an interpretation of the 
ethical resonance of this work that will shed light on ways of overcoming alienation. The 
elements that will play a key role in this interpretation are Wittgenstein’s conception of the 
‘willing subject’, the ‘proper attitude towards life’ that falls out from the relation of this subject 
and the world, and his notion of the ineffable, this is, ‘what cannot be said’. Thus, the problem of 
personal identity –which, from a practical standpoint, is understood as the issue of alienation– 
will be initially tackled by explaining the connection between the ‘willing subject’, his attitude 
towards life, and a type of change in his attitude that can serve him in overcoming alienation. 
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Moreover, his early philosophy will be interpreted in accordance with his later philosophy 
with some qualifications, particularly, with regard to the conception of ‘forms of life’ appearing 
in the Investigations (§ 241). In the second and last section, the idea is to offer the basis for a 
construal of Wittgenstein’s treatment of alienation that is compatible with Schechtman’s 
conception of a ‘person life’ (110-119). It will be clear that the ‘therapies’ Wittgenstein offers in 
order to surmount alienation go hand in hand with the framework of a person life provided by 
Schechtman. Thereby, against the backdrop offered by her, the ordinary human being would find 
a way of aligning his way of life with the forms of life of a community, such that his personal 
identity would gain the class of ‘practical unity’ (75-78) required for having a full-fleshed 
personal identity (141), this is, as opposed to the watered-down identity common in alienated 
human forms of life.  
 
III.1. Wittgenstein’s Early Transcendentalism: What Cannot Be Said 
 
Wittgenstein’s main objective in the Tractatus is to demarcate meaningful speech. He wants to 
“draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of thought,” excluding 
in turn meaningless expressions, such that “what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply 
nonsense” (27). He believes that this limit cannot be drawn in thought, for otherwise, “in order to 
draw a limit to thinking we would have to think both sides of this limit,” which is impossible — 
that is, we would have to “be able to think what cannot be thought” (27). He wants indeed to set 
this boundary from within language.  
To accomplish this, he first distinguishes between two classes of propositions. On the one 
side, there are empirical judgments, i.e., statements of fact, which are either true or false in virtue 
of accurately or inaccurately representing states of affairs. On the other side, there are logical 
truths and falsehoods that respectively amount to tautologous and self-contradictory statements. It 
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is said that the truth-value of the second class of propositions can be ascertained regardless of 
what is the case, whilst the truth-value of statements included in the first class can only be known 
after considering what the facts are. Assuming, then, that meaningful language is exhausted in 
these two classes of statements, any other type of proposition would have to be senseless. 
Propositions that are meant to state something other than matters of fact or else show logical 
connections between statements would lack meaning, because significant uses of language are 
classified in this way.  
This explains why Wittgenstein regards philosophical, ethical, aesthetic, and religious 
statements as ‘nonsensical’. From this perspective, these propositions transgress the restrictions of 
significant discourse. Basically, people who articulate them fail to understand the logic of 
language, contravening restrictions presupposed in the very utterance of meaningful speech. As 
these propositions do not entail either assertions of fact or logical truths or falsehoods, they 
cannot express anything: our language is just not suited for expressing what lies beyond our 
ordinary experience or specialized knowledge. 
In the interest of contextualizing his early views, it is worth considering why Wittgenstein 
distances himself from the way Ayer, Carnap, and other Logical Positivists interpret the status of 
philosophical propositions. Even though Wittgenstein agrees with Carnap, for example, in 
characterizing metaphysical propositions as “pseudo-statements” (Carnap 74), this expression 
does not mean the same for Wittgenstein. Carnap thinks of metaphysics as the “expression of the 
general attitude of a person towards life” (78). Metaphysical statements would thus relieve a 
concrete urge: they arise from “the need to give expression to a man’s attitude in life,” an attitude 
that would manifest itself “in everything a man does or says” (78) as it impresses “itself on his 
facial features, perhaps even on the character of his gait” (79). Meanwhile, Wittgenstein believes 
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that metaphysical statements cannot express anything, not even an attitude towards life. He rejects 
Carnap’s emotivism as he goes on to make the stronger claim that philosophical propositions in 
general, together with ethical and religious statements, are literally meaningless. Expressing an 
‘attitude towards life’ would somehow involve appreciating life as a whole; still, no fact or sum of 
facts can portray ‘life as a whole’, for this would require observing life from the outside, i.e., from 
a perspective external to language. In the end, it so happens that there is nothing to have a general 
attitude about in that regard. Metaphysical propositions rather intend to assert something about 
what lies beyond our regular experience of facts, so they cannot be true or false about anything.  
To see exactly why he thinks that these uses of language express nothing, it is necessary to 
explain Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said but not shown as opposed to what 
can be shown but not said.  
 
The Sense of a Proposition: What Can Be Shown 
 
Wittgenstein argues that the sense of a proposition is shown in the way that states of affairs are 
represented or depicted in the context of a statement. For example, the fact that I am sitting down 
at the moment is shown with the help of a description, such that, in virtue of the correlation 
between elements in the description and objects in the fact, it can be said that the corresponding 
description is true. Even so, this fact “can be described but not named” (Tractatus § 3.144). Since 
the meaning of a proposition is precisely the description of an event, the state of affairs making up 
the event can be described. We can thus show with the help of descriptions how the ‘world’ is, 
which is defined as “the totality of facts, not of things” (§ 1.1). Still, we cannot say what the 
world is. Making an analogy, Wittgenstein claims that “[n]ames resemble points; propositions 
resemble arrows, they have sense” (§ 1.1). This means that an object can only be named if it 
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constitutes the meaning of a sign, just like we can name a person by using a proper name. In that 
way, the proposition in which the object is named refers to a fact containing the object in 
question. Such a reference is possible as we combine names of objects in the framework provided 
by elementary propositions (§ 2.01). Therefore, a description is meaningful insofar as it shows the 
configuration of objects in a fact, although it cannot “name the fact” itself, as it were; it only 
means to show how objects are related in a fact, given the reciprocal agreement of names with 
objects. Therefore, Wittgenstein maintains that “[o]nly the proposition has sense; only in the 
context of a proposition has a name meaning” (§ 3.3), which implies that the meaning of a 
proposition can merely be shown and not said. Propositions, then, solely reveal the organization 
of elements in facts, which is the way objects are organized in space and time.  
The ‘fixed form’ of objects –which Wittgenstein regards as the fact that, for instance, a 
proper name can stand in a proposition for a specific person– is shown in the correct use of a 
name. But a proposition or representation cannot be placed outside its ‘form of representation’ –
which is what is common to the structure of empirical propositions and the structure of the facts–, 
nor can it “represent its form of representation; it shows it forth” (§ 2.172). At most, logical truths 
show this ‘form of representation’ in that they are true in every possible state of affairs (Kenny 
Wittgenstein 51). Wittgenstein considers, though, logical truths as ‘pseudo-propositions’ because 
they do not say anything about what is the case (Tractatus § 6.1.). In effect, the truth-value of an 
empirical proposition can be verified by contrasting it with a certain fact it means to represent. A 
tautologous statement, on the contrary, says nothing about the world, although it reveals the 
structure of its symbols. For instance, in the case of the statement “It is raining, or it is not 
raining,” we need not know what actually happens in the world in order to determine that it is 
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true. Nevertheless, the truth-value is so determined because “It is raining” and “It is not raining” 
oppose one another (Kenny Wittgenstein 51). 
For their part, philosophical, ethical, and religious propositions neither describe events in 
the actual world nor facts in any possible world. They do not even exhibit the type of connections 
among propositions that logical truths reveal. The question, then, is what they are meant to do and 
whether they accomplish it. Wittgenstein thinks that they intend to say what can only be shown. 
They try to describe the ‘form of representation’ of language, but this cannot be said in language. 
This form can rather be shown through the use of empirical statements. This is due to the fact 
that, in order to say something meaningful about the ‘form of representation’ of language, we 
would have to be able to ascribe meaning to our expressions by virtue of facts that have 
themselves to be represented in our propositions. Then again, to be able to do this, our 
propositions would have to share a common logical form with such facts, i.e., a structure capable 
of corresponding with a fact. But how can these applications of language be placed outside this 
‘form of representation’ and simultaneously be meaningful if any meaningful use of language 
presupposes such a form? To successfully represent this form, one would have to articulate the 
logic of language without employing this logic, which is absurd. It would be like representing by 
its coordinates “a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the coordinates of a point 
which does not exist” (Tractatus § 3.032). Wittgenstein claims, therefore, that how things are 
expressed in language cannot be expressed through language, as genuinely significant 
propositions –the ones that represent facts– only show the logical form of reality but this form 






Judgments of Absolute and Relative Value 
 
By resorting to this ‘form of representation’ as a necessary condition for there to be meaningful 
propositions, Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can be said and what can be shown so as to 
demarcate the limits of meaningful speech. In particular, he contends that ethical propositions 
have nothing to make sense of. Indeed, ethics’ subject –which can be expressed differently by 
saying “what really matters,” “the meaning of life,” or “what makes life worth living” (see 
Wittgenstein “A Conference on Ethics” 34-35)– is something that “must lie outside the world” 
together with “[t]he sense of the world” (Tractatus § 6.41). Since ethics is supposed to be about 
what is ‘good’ or ‘right’ in itself, ethical statements would have to express an absolute value. But 
again, “[i]n the world … there is no [such] value—and if there were, it would be of no value” (§ 
6.41). As everything in the world happens accidentally, this is, without being strictly necessitated, 
what we consider ‘valuable’ would have to be contingent as well; however, this would not be 
what we were looking for. By definition, an absolute value is supposed to be non-accidental. 
Thereby, if ethical propositions intend to express what is higher, what is ‘good’ or ‘right’ with 
logical necessity, there could be no ethical statements (§ 6.42). Meaningful speech cannot convey 
what would in principle reside above and beyond what is the case, because genuine propositions 
can only express factual matters. Since “facts are all as it were on a level,” what ethics tries to 
express would be something standing “above the level of the facts,” even as it cannot be a fact 
that something “stands out from the facts” (Diamond The Realistic Spirit 225).  
It must be pointed out that, when Wittgenstein claims that “[a]ll propositions are of equal 
value,” this is meant quite literally so that, by implication, no propositions are “in any absolute 
sense … sublime, important, or trivial” (Wittgenstein “A Conference on Ethics” 37). Since no 
fact stands out from the “dead level of all facts” (Diamond The Realistic Spirit 225), no empirical 
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proposition can have a remarkable or insignificant status, nor can it express anything ‘sublime’. 
Whatever it communicates can only be of relative value to us. In the end, what is of value in itself 
must not be conditioned by the contingent nature of our experience, so it cannot be captured by 
our statements. Consider, for example, the description of a homicide (Wittgenstein “A Conference 
on Ethics” 37). It will be meaningful to the extent that it comprises details of the event in 
question. But the reprehensive feature of the act of killing a human being could not be conveyed 
through the description, for the latter can only communicate facts about the homicide (37). And, 
in any case, if this feature were communicated, it would only be because it was formulated as yet 
another fact (37). Ethical judgments would ultimately be meaningless because what they propose 
involves running against the boundaries of language (43). Thus, since what ethical statements try 
to express is something that cannot be articulated in language, we are better off without uttering 
them.  
Wittgenstein still grants that we can formulate relative judgments of value such as “This is 
the correct road” in relation to a given goal, say, as we are trying to arrive to a given destination 
in the least amount of time (34). Likewise, if someone was terrible at tennis, we could tell 
whether he was playing badly but only in relation to the rules of tennis, the average performance 
of players, etc. (34). Such a person would be relatively judged as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ at tennis in 
function of his performance. Absolute ethical judgments, in contrast, are supposed to hold 
regardless of what the details of the case are. It would be as if there was an “absolutely correct 
road” to take in order to reach a given destination; namely, one we would feel logically compelled 
to follow (35). But if we understand ethical judgments in an absolute sense, what are they 
supposed to be correct or incorrect about? Since we have no independent criteria to determine 
what counts as an absolutely correct route towards a given location or an absolute good 
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performance in a game regardless of the parameters and objectives of the game in question, there 
is nothing ethical statements can be correct about. This entails that there would be no matter of 
fact we could appeal to in order to censure someone’s behavior (35). A judgment of absolute 
value such as “You ought to want to behave better” applied to an outright liar (35), for instance, 
would have to be meaningless as there is no fact or collection of parameters or rules in terms of 
which it could corrected. In other words, there would be no “ethical facts” in contrast to which we 
could evaluate such a judgment, for we can solely express relative claims of value. 
 
Whistling What Cannot Be Said 
 
In sum, the Tractatus does not propose or assume an ethical theory. Ironically, though, it has been 
argued that what is left unsaid in it is taken to be precisely what bears the greatest importance to 
Wittgenstein. In D. Z. Phillips’ view, it is as if Wittgenstein was reserving a ‘higher’ place for the 
ethical, for he indirectly posited objective values that could not be touched by other propositions 
(357). That is why many commentators usually think of the Tractatus as an ethical book. 
According to these interpreters, this work points to something that cannot be said, which can be 
conceived as the ‘right’ way of living (Wittgenstein “A Conference on Ethics” 35). In Phillips’ 
interpretation, even as Wittgenstein’s claim is that the topic of ethics lies outside the region of 
what can be expressed, he still identifies an ‘external region’ residing outside our limited, human 
comprehension. This is the region of “the mystical,” a place wherein objective values would have 
to dwell if they were to count as such. Therefore, although this region cannot be described, its 
existence would nonetheless be inferred. From one point of view, it seems that Wittgenstein said 
what presumably could only be shown, particularly, when he claimed that “[t]here is indeed the 
inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” (Tractatus § 6.522). This assertion would 
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involve Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said and what can be shown as two 
mutually exclusive categories. What is ‘mystical’ or ‘transcendental’ would thereby not be 
articulated in language or thought, since we could not view our world from the outside; however, 
it would somehow exist beyond our world.  
Accordingly, it has been pointed out that Wittgenstein’s claims in the Tractatus are 
themselves neither empirical nor tautologous, which would seem to defeat its purpose. As 
Ramsey noticed, Wittgenstein’s statement that there is the “inexpressible,” i.e., “the mystical” (§ 
6.522), is self-refuting: in the end, “[i]f you can’t say it, you can’t say it—and you can’t whistle it 
either” (qtd. in Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein 111). Wittgenstein’s efforts to separate meaningful 
language from nonsense had to be misguided, given that he transgressed the limits he had placed 
on language (Wittgenstein Tractatus 27). In effect, the question is how can Wittgenstein “tell 
what are the boundaries beyond which the human understanding may not venture, unless he 
succeeds in passing them himself” (Ayer 34). Since the Tractatus contains philosophical 
propositions about the structure of reality, language, and what ethics is supposed to be about (i.e., 
‘the mystical’), it presumably could not have achieved its objectives. In this vein, interpreters 
such as Peter Hacker and David Pears along with Phillips have taken Wittgenstein to recognize “a 
realm of ineffable fact-like quasi-truths, such as the fact-like quasi-truth that language and world 
share a common logical form” (Kremer 61). These “quasi-truths” could not be articulated in 
language, although they would be “shown” in its proper application (61). Consequently, even 
though the statements made in the Tractatus would have to strictly speaking be nonsensical, they 
would still “serve a useful purpose by directing our attention to the ineffable features of reality 
and language that undergird all our meaningful discourse. In this way, they enable us to ‘see the 
world rightly’” (61). 
66 
Demonstrating What Cannot Be Said 
Commentators such as Cora Diamond and Michael Kremer have rejected the previous line of 
interpretation, for it is clear that Wittgenstein has to condemn such a way of speaking of an 
‘external region’ of language as nonsensical. Indeed, he does say that the propositions of the 
Tractatus are “senseless,” despite the fact that in another way they are “elucidatory” (Tractatus § 
6.54). It would then be mistake to take at face value his talk about the ‘limits’ of language and the 
world, together with his claims about the “mystical” and the “inexpressible.” Kremer agrees with 
Diamond in that the act of distinguishing such a putative ‘external region’ of language inclosing 
“quasi-truths” would be equivalent to “chickening out” (61). It would amount to “a refusal to take 
seriously Wittgenstein’s claim that his propositions are nonsense” (61) for, in effect, “to take the 
propositions of the Tractatus to gesture at ineffable quasi-facts underlying all factual language is 
to continue to image necessity as a fact” (62). The problem with this image, Kremer says, is that it 
would lead us “to the nonsense of formulating as propositions that which is said to be 
inexpressible” (62). Deep down, Phillips and Hacker’s reading of the Tractatus is “incoherent” 
given the “methodical purpose of the Tractatus,” which is “to bring us to see that philosophical 
theorizing, conceived as offering us a source of grounding or justification for logic, language or 
life, will, in the end, produce nothing but such nonsense” (62). 
In order to avoid this incoherent reading of the Tractatus, Kremer suggests that this work 
in its outlook is not so far from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy — with some qualifications. 
According to him, the ‘senselessness’ Wittgenstein attributed to the propositions of the Tractatus 
does not yet make them entirely irredeemable: 
[t]here is a sense that can be given to some of these uses of ‘showing’ which does
not degenerate into the incoherence of envisaging in the form of a fact that which
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we declare not to be a fact. We should not read talk of ‘showing’, and correlatively 
of ‘perceiving’, ‘seeing’ and ‘recognizing’ that which is shown on the model of a 
relation between a subject and some ineffable fact-like entity (‘that p is shown to 
S’, ‘S perceives that p’). This form of the idea of showing is exactly what the 
Tractatus wants to teach us to abandon. Rather, we should read talk of ‘showing’, 
and correlatively ‘seeing’, on the model of the demonstration of a technique and 
the uptake required to understand the demonstration. (62)  
In this way, Kremer finds a common ground between the notion of ‘showing’ as employed in the 
Tractatus and the notion of ‘following a rule’ appearing in the Philosophical Investigations. In the 
latter, Wittgenstein conceives of the notion of ‘following a rule’ as a “practice” (Philosophical 
Investigations § 202) insofar as “[t]o follow a rule” is a custom (§ 199). Roughly, since using 
language properly involves following rules, it follows that “[t]o understand a language means to 
have mastered a technique” (§ 202). In this sense, Kremer interprets Wittgenstein’s use of 
‘showing’ in the Tractatus along the lines of understanding or demonstrating a practice. For our 
purposes, Kremer’s interpretation can serve us in avoiding the confusions that drove us into 
thinking of the Tractatus as refuting itself: 
In essence, my suggestion is that one who ‘sees’ that which is shown, is simply 
one who ‘knows how to go on’. On this reading, phrases such as ‘the logical form 
of the world’ have no independent meaning; it is only the larger contexts – 
‘showing the logical form of the world’, ‘seeing the logical form of the world’ and 
so on – which have a meaningful use. These phrases are like ‘dancing the waltz’, 
which should be understood simply as ‘waltzing’ rather than as involving a 
relation between a dancer and a particular ‘dance’ (the waltz). It is significant that 
the introduction of the terminology of ‘showing’ at TLP 4.022 (‘A proposition 
shows its sense’) is embedded in a discussion of understanding. To understand a 
proposition is to ‘know what is the case, if it is true’ (TLP 4.024). However this 
should not be seen as an instance of ‘knowledge-that’. To understand a proposition 
p is not to know another proposition of the form ‘p is true if and only if q’. Clearly 
knowing such a proposition presupposes understanding p and cannot explain it. 
Rather, understanding is a form of ‘knowledge-how’. One understands a 
proposition by knowing how to use it – when to assert it and when to deny it. 
(Kremer 62) 
 
The upshot of this interpretation about the context in which ‘showing’ appears in the Tractatus is 
that such a notion has more than one use. Depending on the use that is attributed to it, a different 
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reading of the Tractatus originates: “[o]n the one hand, talk of showing can tempt us into the 
nonsensical illusion that we grasp a realm of super-facts beyond the reach of language … [while] 
[o]n the other hand, talk of showing can …direct us to the practical abilities and masteries that are 
part of our ongoing talking, thinking and living” (63). Assuming the latter use of ‘showing’, we 
can thereby reinterpret Wittgenstein’s conception of the ‘ineffable’ in the redeeming fashion 
proposed by Kremer. Particularly, it would involve a different understanding of the sort of 
“ineffable truth” that the Tractatus is supposed to convey: 
it is also possible to redeem talk in the Tractatus of the communication of a ‘truth’ 
which is other than propositional. But, again, we should not be drawn into the 
nonsensical illusion of a realm of ineffable proposition-like ‘truths’ which we can 
yet, mysteriously, grasp. There is another sense of ‘truth’ which we can appeal to 
here … ‘Truth’ as something which one can do … is, rather, a way to be followed, 
a ‘path’ for life. Insofar as the Tractatus communicates a ‘truth’ it is by 
demonstrating to us, in practice, how to follow such a path. (63) 
 
Kremer thus reads Wittgenstein as showing us something that is ‘inexpressible’ to the extent that 
it “cannot be communicated through a set of principles, but must be demonstrated in practice” 
(63). Assuming Kremer’s interpretation of the concept of ‘showing’ as involving the 
demonstration of a practice, let us now explore how such a practice could be construed in 
Wittgenstein’s terms according to a ‘proper attitude’ towards life. In the final section of this 
chapter, such a ‘proper attitude’ will be shown to be consistent with a type of ‘conversion’ that 
Wittgenstein recommends in his later philosophy so as to overcome alienation.  
The Way of Life of the Happy 
 
A way of explaining away the internal inconsistency attributed to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy 
is thus to appreciate the resonance of his ethical stance according to its practical attributes and 
benefits. This would require tracking the value of ethics in practice itself as something to be 
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shown or demonstrated in how we live. Instead of providing an account of what an ‘ethical’ way 
of living would be, the value of ethics would be noticeable in the form of our action. 
Correspondently, Wittgenstein believes that while “ethics has nothing to do with punishment and 
reward in the ordinary sense,” it is clear however that “there must be … some sort of ethical 
reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself” (Tractatus § 6.422).  
Wittgenstein focuses on the will as the subject matter of ethics, although it is not 
something we can discuss (§ 6.43); still, it can be construed as something shown in our behavior 
and action. He defines “[t]he will … [as] an attitude of the subject to the world” (Notebooks 87e). 
In this sense, we can think of our acts as displaying either good or bad will, and of our will as 
something we have some power over — even if we cannot control anything else. Because while it 
is clear that we cannot change at will the world (i.e., what the facts are), we can nonetheless 
change our will, and with this transformation we can bring a “change [to] the limits of the world” 
(87e). Wittgenstein speaks of a change in our will by means of which we would enter in contact 
with the world from a different place. Adopting good will would lead to a difference in our way 
of living, so that “the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane 
as a whole” (Tractatus § 6.423). We have some power over our own will because the facts are 
independent of it (Notebooks 73e), of what we would want the world to look like, such that we are 
left only with the possibility of changing our general disposition or attitude towards the facts. 
Thereby, even though “I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will,” it is yet true that “I 
can … make myself independent of the world” (73e) through a change of will. Indeed, we can 
transform our will, despite the fact that this would be the only thing we can do: “[i]f good or evil 
willing affects the world it can only affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts” (Tractatus § 
6.43). Eventually, with a change of will we can enter the world, so to speak, seeing life from a 
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different angle (i.e., from ‘the inside’). It can thus be argued that Wittgenstein recommends a 
change of will in order to perceive life differently.  
Going back to Kremer’s reading of the Tractatus, he claims in this respect that “the will 
can affect the limits of the world because the willing subject simply is that limit” (73). In effect, if 
the subject constitutes the limits of the world, the world can only change to the extent that the 
subject’s will has influenced these limits, even though his will could not affect what occurs within 
them. Therefore, insofar as the will of the subject constitutes an “attitude towards the world” 
(Wittgenstein Notebooks 87e), Kremer claims that happiness resides in our readiness to not will 
that such-and-such be the case: “[m]y unhappiness stems from a lack of co-ordination between 
my antecedent wants and the contingent facts which I find in the world; I can then make myself 
happy by renouncing all such wants, counting them as nothing, and adopting an attitude of 
acceptance towards whatever happens” (73.).  
We can now follow Kremer and avoid the problematic discussion about the ‘limits’ of 
language and the world by renouncing the talk about such limits altogether, throwing away the 
ladder so as to see the world aright (Tractatus § 6.54). Here is, then, a way in which we can look 
at the Tractatus for our philosophical purposes. We can interpret Wittgenstein as saying that we 
should take the world as it is without trying to influence it whatsoever. That is, we should just 
take the world and not the limits of the world, since by adopting a good will we are already 
affecting these ‘limits’ without explicitly trying to change them. From this perspective, we can 
accommodate the ethical resonance of the Tractatus that Kremer regards as its “quasi-mystical” 
afterthought in terms of accepting an everyday proper attitude towards life. A noteworthy result 
from this reading of Wittgenstein is that we lose the problematic frames through which we see 
life, as we no longer aspire to distinguish ‘the limits’ of the world. And, without this aspiration, 
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the recalcitrant problem of the ‘meaning’ or ‘purpose’ of life would no longer trouble us. This is 
why for Wittgenstein such a change of will “must make the world a wholly different one” (§ 
6.43), as the ‘boundaries’ of the world would disappear “[a]s if by accession … of meaning” 
(Notebooks 73e) in our lives. The idea is to not presuppose ‘limits’ to meaningful language and 
the world, given that this way we would not feel the need to account for “the meaning” of life. 
Since we would not look anymore for these boundaries, there would be nothing about which we 
would want to express such “meaning.”  
Moreover, in his Notebooks Wittgenstein thinks of the problematic conception that 
someone might have of his purpose in life as an issue that can be remedied by undergoing a 
change of will. For we cannot search for ‘the meaning’ of our life in the world, as this, being an 
absolute value, cannot “lie in it but outside it” (73e). However, to the degree that our will is 
somehow “connected to the meaning of the world,” by adopting good will we can alter how we 
see and lead our life (73e). Conversely, having ill will would affect negatively our life, in that we 
would not be able to show what is meaningful about life in our actions. From this perspective, 
Wittgenstein can be read as suggesting that the sense or purpose of life is found in living in good 
faith, as this way we would be (capable of being) happy, which in the end constitutes the purpose 
of life: “the man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose of existence” (73e). The ‘solution’ or 
‘remedy’ to the problem of not finding meaning in our life is to lead the type of unworried life 
involved in having an overall good disposition: “[i]n order to live happily I must be in agreement 
with the world. And that is what “being happy” means” (75e). In effect, it is not a wild idea that 
when we live in good faith we are disposed to living happily so that, by living happily, we live in 
accordance with the world (75e). And when we live this way, the question about the purpose of 
our life does not surface, or at least it does not affect us as it would, that is, had we lived with bad 
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will. Hence, not being in agreement with the world would entail that one is living an unhappy life, 
as the grounds for our ‘happiness’ would reside in the absence of the type of existential perplexity 
that is common in persons who cannot move beyond a problematic conception of life. The 
remedy, once again, is to have good will, for he who lives with such a disposition does not see 
any longer life as an issue: “we could say that the man is fulfilling the purpose of existence who 
no longer needs to have any purpose except to live. That is to say, who is content” (73e). Thus, 
what we consider as a ‘problem’ in our general perception of life is something that can vanish by 
living happily. Ultimately, as “[t]he solution of the problem of life is seen in the disappearance of 
this problem” (74e), a change in our attitude can help relieve us from this existential doubt.    
Subsequently, after we experience a transformation in our basic disposition towards life, 
the resistance we oppose to it begins to lose its hold. It may be that those who practice a 
benevolent way of living find the ethical reward considered by Wittgenstein, perhaps as it entails 
attaining a class of peace of mind with which one lives in the present, in the day-to-day, not 
bothered anymore by questions about the meaning or sense of life (74e). Our sense of purpose is 
then no longer something to worry about, as we stop indulging in our desire to raise existential 
questions about the meaning of life. 
 
III. 2. Wittgenstein’s Later Transcendentalism  
 
 
In the remaining sections, I will propose an interpretation of the later Wittgenstein that can help 
us to think about the question of persons’ lives in a way that responds to the problem of 
alienation, which would constitute a practical account of the issue of personal identity. Now, 
having seen how Wittgenstein’ early philosophy distinguishes what can be said from what can be 
shown, it is worth explaining in this section his late views on transcendentalism. 
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Remember that Wittgenstein came in the Tractatus to the conclusion that there could be no 
philosophical propositions because they intend to trespass the boundaries of meaningful speech. 
As we saw, according to one line of interpretation he sought to overcome these limits, not just by 
enunciating philosophical propositions, but, what is more, by referring to an ineffable, 
metaphysical realm whose logical structure would be revealed through correct uses of language. 
Although we have distanced ourselves from this interpretation, it can still be said that the 
propositions expressing his putative metaphysics could not themselves be genuine statements, 
since they are not either empirical or logical truths. This was acknowledged by him in the 
Tractatus, when he claimed that the propositions appearing in this book would only be helpful as 
long as we recognize them as “senseless,” having “climbed out through them, on them, over 
them” (Philosophical Investigations § 6.54). This means, though, that from this perspective the 
Tractatus failed to an extent, namely, in its effort to distinguish meaningful uses of language from 
senseless speech, since it assumed that language had a rigid or ‘fixid form’ which senseless 
speech would attempt to vulnerate. Thus, it can at least be said that the criteria used there for 
drawing such a distinction relied on a stringent and incomplete view of how language works in 
everyday life, which gave rise to a determined picture of the ‘structure’ of reality.  
 Giving up on his old conception of the logic or ‘nature’ of language, the ‘general form’ of 
any proposition, and the ‘structure’ of reality, Wittgenstein no longer thinks in the Investigations 
that there is anything that cannot be said, for, in truth, there is nothing past the limits of meaning 
other than nonsense (Hacker Wittgenstein’s Place 111). As in the Tractatus, he now aspires to 
solve philosophical problems completely. However, he thinks that everything that can be said 
could be expressed clearly, such that there is no need to say or even imply the existence of 
something that could not be expressed: “the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. 
74 
But this simply means that philosophical problems should completely disappear” (Philosophical
Investigations § 133). He does not believe that general norms about the limits of meaning should 
be established if the propositions prescribing those norms attempt to overcome themselves the 
margins of meaningful language. Therefore, as far as his new philosophical method is concerned, 
it cannot consist of a system of statements offering criteria for deciding in the abstract which 
propositions are meaningful. For the most part, this system would not be useful for diagnosing the 
source of philosophical error. For the later Wittgenstein, philosophical problems do not have a 
single origin. By appealing to the use that is actually given to words in the context of ‘language 
games’, he holds that philosophical puzzlement arises when words are deprived from their 
common, ordinary employments. The perplexity we tend to associate with matters that transcend 
our ordinary concerns and interests depends on concrete misunderstandings about how words 
operate in regular contexts of utterance.  
What Can be Said 
It appears that, after having substituted his old philosophy of language with a pragmatic 
conception of meaning, Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘what can be said’ changed significantly. 
Religious and ethical propositions, for example, are no longer thought of as meaningless. 
Wittgenstein thinks that words like ‘God’ and ‘good’ have legitimate uses in ordinary games of 
language, but that, even so, they cannot properly become the object of philosophical scrutiny. 
Philosophy cannot prove the existence of God, because, in this case, a proof is not part of any 
linguistic game in which this word is usually employed. For him, the attempt to provide this type 
of evidence is absurd as it entails a deep “misunderstanding” of the role that religious beliefs and 
other classes of statements “about God, the soul and eternal life” have in the forms of life of those 
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who use them (see Hacker Wittgenstein’s Place 302). In effect, in ordinary language ‘God’ does 
not automatically presuppose philosophical doctrines in the asbsence of which its use would not 
make sense. It can rather be argued that when this word is abstracted from the role it plays in 
concrete linguistic practices where it has a legitimate use and then subjected to philosophical 
reflections, its content can perplex us.  
On the other hand, the subject matter of ethics’ is expressible. Ethical claims are value 
judgments that prescribe rules of conduct. They provide rules for the use of ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’, 
and the like, in the set of linguistic games. These words can serve further purposes, this is, insofar 
as they constitute “moves” in language games, becoming thus significant in virtue of having 
functions in the speakers’ forms of life. Thereby, although ethical propositions are not factual, this 
does not imply that they are meant to express something “higher.” On the contrary, ethical 
statements express grammatical rules that norm the uses of ‘good’ and ‘right’, e.g., in particular 
games and prescribe ways of conduct in corresponding circumstances.  
 
What Should Not be Said 
 
For their part, philosophical statements are not mere “pseudo-propositions” as it was alleged in 
the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, many of these statements that had been considered as 
nonsense are rather similar in kind to ‘grammatical propositions’, because they serve as 
guidelines for the use of their constituent words. To explain this, Wittgenstein distinguishes 
between empirical and grammatical statements (Philosophical Investigations § 102). The first are 
statements whose truth-value is ‘contingent’ on some given matter of fact. For instance, “It is 
raining,” “It is October,” and “Water quenches fire” are examples of empirical propositions. 
Meanwhile, the second class includes sentences like “Everything that goes up goes down,” 
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“Sometimes you lose and sometimes you win,” and “Every bar has a length” (§ 102). Unlike 
empirical statements, grammatical propositions show how to use their component words; in our 
examples, they prescribe the use of ‘up’, ‘length’, and so forth. One of the main obstacles that can 
obscure the way a grammatical proposition works is that it is impossible to imagine the opposite 
of what they assert (§ 251), and also, the assumption that, because it cannot be thought of any 
other way, such proposition must express a ‘necessary truth’. It happens that, because 
grammatical statements involve rules for the use of words, what is thought of as contrary to them 
is inconceivable. But this is due to the fact that the negation of a grammatical proposition is not a 
false grammatical proposition but rather nonsense (Hacker Wittgenstein’s Place 115). In contrast, 
the negation of a true empirical statement is always a false factual proposition, which is 
something imaginable. Wittgenstein thus compares philosophical statements to grammatical 
propositions, seeing them largely as prescriptions for modes of speech. They regulate the 
employment of expressions, even though they have the disorienting appearance of factual 
statements. He suggests that one of the main sources of confusion in philosophy is that we think 
that philosophical propositions should say something about the facts, but, in reality, they do not.  
Furthermore, he thinks of meaningful speech as occurring in the context of customs and 
institutions of human forms of life. Using language in meaningful ways involves following rules; 
this is, engaging in practices requiring the surroundings provided by the customs and habits of a 
community. Language is supposed to be a way of living, and the common rules we follow when 
employing language are supposed to help us understand each other. But the notions proposed by 
philosophical propositions are not in agreement with our ways of life. To be sure, these concepts 
take something from our ordinary uses of words but ultimately deviate from them, rejecting 
something of them. Philosophical statements significantly contravene how language is regularly 
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used, even though their departure from ordinary discourse is not always obvious — after all, their 
constituent expressions retain their usual meaning to some degree. Even as philosophers do not 
seem to be aware of how their formulations are recommending a change in our notation, they still 
distort the way we normally speak. What is problematic about philosophical statements, then, is 
that they do not show us how words are used in any game in which there are already known rules, 
but instead are themselves norms for the use of expressions.  
 
Reconsidering the Character of Philosophical Problems 
 
Yet again, for the later Wittgenstein philosophical statements can be interpreted as the expression 
of genuine issues. They are engrained worries we want to give expression to as we reflect on 
different linguistic structures. The analogy between these structures bewilders the intellect in a 
way that it leads it to aporia: “[t]he problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of 
language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; they are as deeply rooted in us 
as the forms of our language, and their significance is as great as the importance of language” 
(Philosophical Investigations § 111). Our urge to deviate from regular uses of language, to go 
beyond the limits of meaningful speech, is a testament to a human tendency that defines us (Cf. 
“A Conference on Ethics” 43), for we have an irresistible, at times compulsory, desire to 
somehow escape our ordinary ways of speaking and living. 
Philosophical problems, thereby, cannot be solved by using language improperly, which is 
to say, without attending to how their constituent expresions are usualy employed in our linguistic 
games. They can only be overcome by employing language in conformity with the forms of life of 
a community. Then, according to Wittgenstein, the way to address philosophical problems is, on 
the one side, to say what can be said so that nonsense is consequently excluded. An appeal to 
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grammar can indeed help the philosopher remember how the expressions with which he 
articulates his problems are ordinarily used (see McGinn 14-19). On the other side, philosophy 
proceeds by deconstructing philosophical problems, making the emptiness of their constituent 
statements evident. It is thus that philosophical problems end up being rejected as ill-founded. In 
general, he tries to dissuade us from engaging in philosophical discourse, as he shows time and 
again why we are misled in different opportunities into assuming that philosophical problems 
have a “profound” character (Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations § 111).   
Lastly, let us examine the type of change in our form of life that Wittgenstein recommends 
in his later philosophy to overcome alienation by appeal to the notion of a ‘person life’ provided 
by Schechtman.  
 
III. 3. What Can Be Shown: Adopting a Proper Attitude Towards Life  
 
We can think of the relationship between a person life and what is taken as a ‘standard’ person 
life (Schechtman 113-115) in terms of the relationship between a microclimate and a climate, 
correspondingly. Even though the temperature in our residence might be different from the one 
outside, at the same time it is conditioned and influenced by it. Similarly, even as we ‘construct’ 
in a sense our own life depending on the choices we make, our daily activities and exchanges with 
others are determined by the ‘person-space’ (115) we occupy in life, which is a place in a 
sociocultural infrastructure (114). Therefore, it is in the context provided by a ‘person-space’ that 
someone’s life can acquire a distinguishable human shape, although this does not mean that his 
life is necessarily determined by what society dictates. In any event, it can be argued that when 
his life is adequately situated in a ‘person-space’, this results in a “practical unity” (75-77). 
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Meanwhile, a person is alienated when his life fails to adjust to or agree with some human 
“form of life” (Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations § 241), which, in Schechtman’s terms, 
would amount to some or another ‘paradigmatic’ form of person life (2014 111-115). When we 
are alienated, it is as if our life unfolded within our own “microclimate,” seemingly living in 
isolation from the conditions and circumstances of the world; as if we lived in a microclimate that 
could have any given temperature we desired regardless of the circumstances of the outside 
world. But inasmuch as any microclimate largely depends on the temperature of the outside 
world, by the same token, each person’s life is largely impacted by what society conceives as 
“standard” ways of human life. The point is that our life cannot acquire the type of ‘practical 
unity’ Schechtman considers if we live secluded from the currency of daily affairs. For we do not 
get to decide, regardless of what are the ‘paradigmatic’ forms of human life, what type of life we 
are living any more than we can alter the climate by changing the temperature of our domicile. In 
the long run, it is in terms of society’s standards, customs, and habits that the identity of our lives 
is fixed (147). Since having a person life that resembles what is considered as a ‘typical’ human 
life is necessary for obtaining a personal identity, our identity becomes blurred insofar as we 
depart from basic, ordinary forms of living. Indeed, this is a sign that we are failing to adjust to 
the world.  
In general, our lives do not unfold as isolated phenomena; we are social individuals, living 
in agreement with some life form. It is not as if each human being inhabited a miniscule region of 
space, that is, a microclimate that each helped create, such that our lives did not impact one 
another. Quite the contrary, our lives affect and interfere with each other in several ways: they are 
organized around each other at the outset. Precisely because our life is already in constant contact 
with the lives of other human beings, it is in the course of our daily activities and exchanges that 
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it develops. The point is that we cannot evaluate human lives in isolation from the sociocultural 
infrastructure in which they are already situated. With this infrastructure serving as the 
background, we normally assess how well someone’s life has been, and this evaluation provides 
the materials needed for specifying who he is. Thus, several factors contribute to our personal 
identity so that, in order to provide a complete account of who we are, we need to assume a 
holistic approach that includes our entire life. In this regard, Schechtman’s model of a person life 
is useful for our purposes, when she argues that “being a person … involves conceiving of our 
lives in this holistic way, experiencing them as ongoing wholes” (100). For her, the practical unity 
of our life requires understanding it “not just in terms of relations between individual moments, 
but also in terms of the overall structure in which those moments play a role” (103). In effect, 
when we assess someone’s life, we judge it “as a whole” (107) for it is the “person as a whole 
[that] can be an appropriate target” of our judgments (108). Furthermore, this holistic picture of a 
person life would only make sense when appreciated in contrast to the habits and customs giving 
rise to the sociocultural infrastructure in which a determined person’s life develops.   
 Assuming this holistic approach to a person life, we can interpret Wittgenstein as 
suggesting that, in order to overcome alienation, we should live by playing the language games of 
some given forms of life, acting in agreement with them by playing diverse functions in the vast 
network of interpersonal relationships that structure what are taken as ‘standard’ ways of life. 
Specifically, he speaks of a class of ‘conversion’ through which general disaffection towards the 
ordinary could recede as a person is able to reorient his life towards the tracks of a ‘typical’ way 
of existing. It is by fulfilling our social roles and ordinary tasks in a committed fashion that we 
can see ourselves returning to the world of life. That is, by familiarizing ourselves with how life is 
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‘normally’ supposed to proceed, we can assimilate our alienated ways of behaving to ordinary 
forms so that the problematic appearance of our life vanishes. According to Wittgenstein, 
[t]he solution to the problems you see in your life is to live in a way that what is 
problematic disappears.   
Saying that life is problematic means that your life does not adjust to the form of 
life. In consequence, you must change your life and, if it adapts to the form, what 
is problematic disappears. (Aforismos § 149) 
 
As we place ourselves in a ‘person-space’ (Schechtman 2014 115), we play an active role in the 
world of life such that we situate ourselves in linguistic games where we can adapt to the forms of 
life of a community. We thus start to live again in direct contact with some typical way of being 
human, for we conceive of ourselves in terms of those around us, playing different roles through 
which we associate with other human beings. While thus interacting with them, our life enacts 
many of the habits and customs that give shape to the community wherein we reside. The 
‘conversion’ Wittgenstein speaks of can be seen as a ‘window’ into a world that we already 
inhabit but have somehow lost touch with.  
Through this conversion, Wittgenstein shows a way of providing one’s life with a 
‘standard’ framework or structure. To see what such a ‘standard’ trajectory would actually look 
like, let us recall how Schechtman speaks of a ‘typical’ person life: 
[i]t is a structural whole that has, by its very nature, attributes that apply to 
it as a whole which do not necessarily apply to each individual portion. We 
can thus say that the mature person is the same person as the infant or (in 
unlucky cases) dementia patient because there is a single life course that 
starts (roughly) with infancy, develops into maturity, and devolves 
(possibly) into dementia. The person is defined by the unfolding of the 
pattern in which these stages all play their part. (108) 
 
In spite of this, an alienated person could problematize such a ‘typical’ development, perceiving 
the very fact that ordinary persons go through (most of) these different transitions as an issue. 
Evidently, it is not the case that he would not experience many of these changes by resisting or 
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problematizing them. The point, though, is that by adopting an ‘improper attitude’ towards these 
natural transitions, he is not able to see his own life in a way that he can identify with it, thereby 
becoming alienated. Since he perceives life in general in this way, he ends up dissociating himself 
from his own life and its ordinariness to the degree that, even as he suffers these changes while 
going through the different stages of a typical life, he does not necessarily perceive himself as the 
one undergoing them. It is as if it was someone else suffering such alterations, or as if, despite the 
passage of time, he still remained deep down ‘the same’ through all of the mutations of an 
ordinary person contingently associated to him. A gap between ‘himself’ and ‘his person’ would 
then appear to open, which he must in turn bridge to surpass alienation.  
 Therefore, by not having a proper attitude in front of these changes he would grow 
dissatisfied with the reality of his life, expanding more and more the gulf he has created between 
what he sees as ‘himself’ and his ordinary life. Perhaps, as he cannot successfully define ‘himself’ 
in terms of any one phase of his life, he fails to associate himself with the entire, ongoing life of 
the ordinary person he is and with all of the roles he plays in it. In consequence, the problem he 
has with his life can be seen as a practical issue he has with his identity, for as he cannot see 
himself as an everyday person existing in a given stage of life, he assumes the wrong attitude 
towards his life. 
But the identity of a person is not defined solely based on any one phase or aspect of his 
life (Cf. II.3) anymore than it can be characterized by selecting any given role a person plays in 
ordinary life (e.g., being a father, son, husband, citizen, etc.). From Schechtman’s holistic 
interpretation of a person life, “in constructing an account of personal identity” we do not “start 
with person-parts that must somehow be brought together into a single entity” (100). Instead, 
when we assess our own identity we address our entire ongoing life and not the various parts 
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separately, which “exist in the form they do only as abstractions from the whole, and so the whole 
is, in an important sense, prior to the parts” (100). Accordingly, as “the attributes of the whole … 
do not apply to each of its individual parts” (107), it makes no sense to try and decide who we 
‘really’ are by attending to any single phase of our life, since we cannot isolate this way who we 
‘truly’ are at our core. Alternatively, it can be said that we are not defined as any specific social 
role we play in ordinary life but, as George Mead puts it, as a ‘constellation of roles’ (see 1972 
145-157). Thereby, by adopting a holistic stance on persons’ lives, we can avoid selecting any 
particular role we have in ordinary life so to define our personal identity. The reason is that, when 
we try to understand who we are, our perspective has to include a much broader range of factors, 
as we need to capture the form of our entire ongoing life.  
Then again, assuming such an expanded perspective on our ordinary life in order to 
determine who we are is not going to help us overcome alienation if we fail to change the attitude 
we have towards such a life. It is further required the adoption of a (more) gracious attitude 
towards our life and its changes, so that we are be able to see ourselves as forming a ‘unity’ with 
it. We can then identify ourselves with the constant flux that is our person life, accepting it for 
what it is, and so give up on the urge to escape such a vision of who we already are and have been 
so far. We would perceive the form of our life as a coherent, integral structure comparable in 
many ways to some ‘typical’ or ‘standard’ form of life, despite the many times we failed to 
clearly see this. After abandoning a way of perceiving human life in general that is inherently 
problematic –and, particularly, an ‘essentialist’ perspective on personal identity–, alienated 
human beings can encounter a path back to life in common. As they move away from what might 
be seen as a ‘peculiar’ form of acting and interacting with others, they can accomplish the 
conversion Wittgenstein speaks of, bending to how life in common is perceived. 
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The Bare Minimum for Conversion 
 
But how does such a “life in common” usually occur? That is, to which ‘common life’ are we 
supposed to adjust to overcome alienation? One might question the way ‘ordinary life’ is assumed 
to occur, thereby becoming skeptical as to whether an alienated person should adapt to ‘common 
ways of acting and interacting with others’ if ultimately it is not clear what would ‘life in 
common’ amount to. However, we need not settle here which is the type of life we need to 
convert to in order to surpass alienation, since the treatment of the problem of personal identity 
we are offering is not that ambitious. Even if we can question whether this or that form of life 
counts as a “common” or “standard” one, we are instead merely alluding to a bare minimum of 
ordinariness of human life that a person should be able to be in agreement with to avoid or 
surmount the fundamental class of alienation we have been considering. This requisite is a 
threshold human life forms must meet upon which they can begin to unfold in rough agreement 
with one another. Therefore, regardless of whether we are justified in criticizing the way “normal” 
people live, and even if this criticism is part of our ordinary life, I take Wittgenstein to be 
speaking of a more basic class of conversion that is necessary to acquire a distinct form of human 
life. The objective is to surmount a fundamental type of dissatisfaction with one’s life regardless 
of the details of how life in common ‘usually’ occurs. Then, although the question of exactly 
which life ‘in common’ we are speaking of would still pertinent to our understanding of human 
life in general, we need not address it in order to appreciate the value of the class of conversion 
Wittgenstein considered. After all, the latter has to do only with overcoming a potential 
preliminary alienation from our own ordinary life in the absence of which we would not have a 
clear-cut personal identity expressed in a life form we would want to associate ourselves with.   
 
 85 
Quieting Down the Problematic Undertone of Our Life 
 
 
From our construal of Wittgenstein’s treatment of alienation follows a certain kind of quietism 
that the alienated individual can adopt so as to not look at his person life in a way that leads him 
to philosophical perplexity. As the ordinary perspective he takes on his life helps him surpass its 
‘problematic’ appearance, the philosophical problems that might otherwise come up are 
sidestepped since a large part of their incentive is silenced before they can disseminate. As a 
person overcomes alienation by adjusting his life to some ‘paradigmatic’ form of person life, he 
has the grounds for ignoring the origin of the appeal of an atypical way of seeing and leading life. 
What initially motivated a person to live as an ‘outlier’ fades away given that, from the 
perspective afforded within the context of an integral or unitary life, it makes no sense to lead an 
atypical, alienated life. 
In this sense, by living in agreement with the life of an ordinary person within the 
background of a sociocultural infrastructure, the problems that led him to live an estranged life no 
longer affect him, at least not to the same degree. Against the backdrop offered by Schechtman, 
the ordinary human being would find a way of aligning his own life with the forms of life of a 
community, so that his person life would gain the class of practical ‘unity’ or ‘integrity’ needed 
for having a full-fleshed personal identity, as opposed to the watered-down identity found in 
alienated human lives. An indistinct, fragmented or dissociated way of life would thereby 
encounter the means to solidify his life, becoming part of the forms of life of a community. He 
could see himself represented in these forms of life, so that there would be no longer a gap 
between his life and such forms of life. 
We can read Wittgenstein as proposing a quietist, therapeutic conception of philosophy 
with the intention of treating this class of alienation. The desired result of his ‘treatments’ or 
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‘therapies’ (Philosophical Investigations §133d) is to calm down the progression of our 
philosophical thought whenever we want to by rejecting, for instance, the tendency to 
problematize life as a whole, as if life was in itself ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Wittgenstein’s ‘treatments’ 
(§133d) could help us dissuade ourselves from persisting in erratic trains of thought. The general 
aim is to quiet down our thought when it digresses into speculations about the meaning of life, our 
purpose in the world, and so forth. The concerns we would subsequently be left with would be 
ordinary in character, as we abandon the strangeness in our lives produced by the puzzlement of 
questions about the ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’ of our lives. By giving up on the habits that support such 
a neurotic attitude, we could forget to an extent about the troubles that were obscuring our 
understanding of the place we already have in life. Thus, we can live in an uncomplicated way as 
we persist in this state of mind. 
There is a sort of resignation involved in resisting such an estranged form of life, as we 
decide not to address anymore the question of whether life has a purpose. Nevertheless, 
Wittgenstein wants to pull us away from the notion that there is anything to grieve about. This 
‘grief’ would have no place in the linguistic games in which we would operate; there would be no 
context for it to emerge while living in agreement with the forms of life of a community. As a 
consequence, Wittgenstein does not recommed making a substantial sacrifice, because we do not 
refrain from saying anything that could have meaning. This sacrifice is not intellectual, but one of 
will or feeling (see Kenny The Wittgenstein Reader 263.). It is about renouncing, among other 
things, to the feeling that there is something transcendental that can be said, precisely because in 
abandoning this feeling lies the exit we are looking for to overcome our philosophical problems. 
Particularly, this conversion represents an antidote to the urge to problematize life. Our purpose 
could thus be described as silencing our philosophical thought (or at least its expression), since 
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we rather understand philosophy as a disease. Again, Wittgenstein talks about a transformation in 
our lives that would change our way of seeing and using language, such that we could stop 
philosophizing whenever we want to (Philosophical Investigations §133). Our ‘life’ would not 
become an enigma, for this word would only be used significantly in diverse ordinary language 
games where it is not generally problematized. Accordingly, it is in our linguistic practices that 
this transformation must begin, as we go about quieting down or attuning our strange behavior 
and roughly adopt instead the habits and customs of those around us. 
 
Wonder for the Mundane  
 
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that, to avoid alienation, a human being would have to adapt 
constantly to some paradigmatic form of person life, as he could not assume perpetually a 
‘proper’ attitude towards life as a whole. In other words, there is no privileged stage of complete 
unity in life where he could render the possibility of returning to an alienated way of life obsolete. 
The individual that has acquired a level of practical unity in his life needs to persist in his 
engagement with others, familiarizing himself with the customs and habits of the forms of life of 
a community until these become his own. Mostly, he needs to practice the activities that such 
forms of life would organize as elements in the trajectory of a  ‘typical’ person life. 
 Having said that, are such practices and activities already settled? And even if we can 
identify such practices and activities, how do we know to which community they pertain? It can 
be thus objected that it is not settled what the community’s practices involve, such that the 
alienated human being would have no guidelines to follow in returning to the world of life. 
Moreover, even if these practices exist, perhaps they do not exist uniformly, i.e., in the way he 
would require if he were to have a sense of what he needs to do in order to adapt to the form of 
life of a community. Maybe he is just different from the community in which he resides so that, if 
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there is no such fixed set of habits and customs, we could not ask him to adjust to them. From 
another perspective, perhaps he does not see the community he lives in as his own; he would not 
think that the community represents him. Thereby, even if he can recognize what the overall 
activities practiced by the members of this community are, this would not mean that the rules 
prescribing the activities of those individuals apply to him.  
 We can tackle these criticisms by pointing out once more that our treatment of the 
problem of personal identity is meant to apply exclusively to a vital class of alienation, where a 
bare minimum of normalcy in life is taken as the target. This entails that a person overcomes 
alienation by continuously adapting to ordinary behaviors shared by the vast majority of human 
beings. The ‘standard’ person life is to this extent flexible enough so as to capture habits and 
customs of forms of human life in general. A person prevails over alienation by associating with 
others in regular, instinctive ways that do not involve prior elucidation as to whether the activities 
he practices reflect who he really is. In the end, the dissociated individual abandons a peculiar 
way of life by integrating into any ‘standard’ form of person life. In this way, he commits himself 
to being a part of such forms of life only if it is a commitment to who he would naturally be had 
he not become alienated to begin with. It follows that merely becoming a member of a community 
would not suffice to overcome alienation — after all, there is a trivial sense in which he already is 
a member. The point is rather that surmounting alienation involves adopting a form of life that 
comes naturally to him regardless of the community in which he might actually be situated.  
In any event, our urge to surpass meaningful language in order to grasp ‘the sense’ of our 
concrete life could be discouraged by remembering that we have abandoned an alienated form of 
life so as to constantly adjust to a ‘paradigmatic’ structure of a person life. In this sense, the 
problem of personal identity ceases to constitute an issue to us. The ‘sense’ or ‘purpose’ that 
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one’s life could acquire would only amount to significant uses of language and modes of 
engagement with others, where our verbal behavior fits a role required by a language game 
presently played. Therefore, what is “problematic” about of our life –i.e., that which disturbs us 
and for which we say that there is no solution– is not the consequence of the discovery of an 
enigma for which we have to find an answer. Rather, that which can certainly amaze us becomes 
a ‘problem’ when we lose the focus of what is important; namely, our wonder for everyday life, 
which is something that at some point marveled us and that can surprise us again. But the lack of 
wonder leads to a false class of amazement, that of the ‘philosophical problem’, which instead of 
showing us what we have in plain sight –the everyday world with its complexities and 
ambiguities–, it offers us instead a ‘shadow’ of what we should be looking for. This is a 
simplification of our conceptual relations that can mislead us into producing conceptual 
entanglements making ‘the problem’ increasingly insoluble. Still, this is not irremediable, for if 
we can genuinely become amazed of ordinary life, the ‘problematic’ aspect of life should fade 






IV.      THE USE OF A NOTION OF ONESELF:  
A Static Approach to the Puzzle of Self-Conception 
We have set up in Chapter I ordinary human beings at the center of our discussion, after which we 
discerned in Chapter II criteria usually employed to speak of the personal identity of these 
individuals from a practical stance. We can now turn to the problem of the status of the notion of 
‘self’ or, better still, to an analysis of the ways of life in which this concept is supposed to play a 
key role.  
The issue to be addressed in this chapter and the next one can be phrased as follows: what 
is the use of a notion of oneself? Indeed, as we go about under the impression that each of us is an 
ordinary human being, what good is that impression for? It can be initially said that, under normal 
circumstances, we characterize the type of individual we are by considering our psychological and 
physical properties (see I.2), and, moreover, by assessing the kind of life we live (see II.3). We 
appear to have not just an instinctive, pre-theoretical understanding of the class of creatures we 
are, but also seem to possess a natural grasp of the identity of our own person. Roughly, then, this 
grasp would amount to a ‘self-conception’ arising from the handle we have on our own particular 
life. This handle would be prima facie indispensable from a practical perspective: without a self-
conception, we would hardly comprehend our place in society and the range of opportunities 
available to us, which in turn could significantly complicate our existence.  
Yet, this approach can be problematized by noticing how many are compelled to 
introspecting or looking inwardly to account for the uniqueness or singularity of the person they 
are. It is as if our ordinary lives unfolded in function of the persistence of who we truly are ‘on the 
inside’. We are prone to look beyond the concrete human being experienced in everyday life so as 
to isolate the source of our individuality. But why cannot we satisfy ourselves with the notion that 
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we ultimately amount to nothing more than mundane beings among corporeal objects in nature? 
In other words, why do we look for some property that would in principle separate us at our core 
not just from other species but, fundamentally, from all other persons? This tendency to search for 
a property that could explain our special place in the universe has been further institutionalized in 
the idea that, strictly speaking, we are ‘selves’ and not merely human beings. As a matter of fact, 
the belief that deep down we are ‘selves’ is shown in the attitudes we assume in our daily 
activities and interchanges with others, for we carry ourselves in ways that exhibit a special 
importance we give to ourselves. There are several ways in which this conviction is shown in the 
behavior of a person: “[o]ne could know he remains so convinced by listening to him talk about 
himself, his personal problems … or by observing him act in everyday life as if he believed he 
had a self that he valued and insisted other people value” (Canfield 1990 129). It thus seems as if 
we could infer from people’s unreflective acts and utterances not just how they usually interact 
with others but, more importantly, how they see themselves (131). 
Now, we have established that there is no single property that makes us essentially the 
concrete persons we are (Cf. II. 3). It is at least not clear why we need to appeal to ‘selves’ in 
order to explain the singularity of our person. A putative account of ‘the self’ would end up 
depending on the enumeration of attributes of a person associated to it — namely, of a person said 
to have a ‘self’. However, in this way our explanation would not be informative. A similar 
problem surfaces in the explanation of the uniqueness of persons in terms of ‘souls’ (Cf. Martin 
and Barresi 2006) since, by the same token, that account would not get us any further. Why then 
insist that I, an ordinary person, endure as the same individual throughout my life in virtue of the 
continuity of a ‘self’ associated to me? Despite the obvious fact that any person’s physical and 
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mental attributes and functions inevitably change and deteriorate in time, why should we identify 
ourselves with anything other than the ordinary person we know ourselves to be? 
For the sake of clarity, we must differentiate at this stage between two general types of 
problems regarding the status of ‘selves’. Following Canfield, we shall separate the 
phenomenological from the ontological formulation of the problem, thus recognizing two levels 
of issues surrounding the topic of the self. On the one side,“[t]here is a merely theoretical belief in 
or denial of self,” which gives rise to the ontological problem of the status of the self, while “on 
the other hand there is gut-level or existential, belief or denial” of self, which calls for a 
phenomenological approach to the subject (1990 4). A consequence of drawing this distinction is 
that, for instance, a person who has theoretically discarded the existence of ‘selves’ may still be 
convinced of their existence, which is shown in the ways he interacts with others. “This person,” 
Canfield suggests, “retains what I am calling a gut-level belief in the self. It might be named an 
existential form of belief … to signify that the belief manifests itself in a person’s life and actions 
in a strong, pervasive way, as merely theoretical beliefs do not” (130). The opposite case would 
be that of the Buddhist, who is not merely denying on theoretical grounds the reality of ‘selves’ 
(130). He further aspires to do away with the image he has of himself, since it involves the 
elementary, existential belief that he is a ‘self’.  
The issue to be examined here has primarily to do with our self-conception. We can center 
our attention on the status of existential beliefs about ourselves while disregarding the 
metaphysical issue, as these are separate problems. In effect, we can either believe or not believe 
that we are selves regardless of whether we have theoretically retained or eliminated these entities 
from the universe of speech. Thus, I will focus on the phenomenological problem, specifically, as 
it regards to the utility of self-conception. My approach in the second part of this project is 
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phenomenological insofar as it is limited to how we conceive of personhood and how this 
conception is formed from first-personal experience. For its part, the problem of the ontological 
status of ‘selves’ will not be addressed here; we need not ponder how idle the distinction between 
selves and human beings might be. We will restrict our inquiry henceforth to how ordinary 
persons appear to others and to themselves (3), as our problem involves questions about the 
individual conception persons have of themselves, how they have acquired them, and the role that 
these (might) play in their lives.  
In order to tackle our main question about the use of a notion of oneself, it will be helpful 
to first address the problem of how did we ever acquire such a notion. This problem is expressed 
in the puzzle of self-conception, which is articulated by George Mead. Thus, after formulating 
this puzzle and specifying ways of responding to it, we would have laid the groundwork we 
require to assess the issue of the use of self-conception. There are two chief ways of addressing 
this puzzle. Firstly, there are static approaches, which I will present and evaluate in this chapter. 
Secondly, there are dynamic approaches; these will be examined in the next chapter together with 
a dynamic approach I will then propose. As an upshot, we will come up with two general classes 
of approximations to the same problem, such that there will be different ways of considering the 
phenomenological problem of the use of self-conception. 
 
IV. 1. Seeking Oneself: A Static Formulation of the Puzzle of Self-Conception 
 
 
At first glance, it seems that we need not know whether the first-personal pronoun actually refers 
to anything in order to establish the origin and utility of our self-conception. We can start by 
focusing on the notion we already have of ourselves and then ask whether it is formed from a 
potential impression of ourselves, given that such a focus does not necessarily presuppose 
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understanding how ‘I’ works. Then again, how could we ever directly perceive the person we are 
so as to attain an impression of ourselves? If I can only immediately perceive parts of my body, 
how can these fragmentary impressions be put together to form my own self-conception? Since 
the development of my self-conception in this way would follow parameters set by my prior sense 
of who I am, these parameters would not be useful — they would have to be as arbitrary as the 
conception I end up making of myself, which would beg the question of how could such an 
arbitrary and therefore inaccurate image of myself be of any service to me.  
 In Mind, Self, and Society, Mead formulates this puzzle in the following terms: “[h]ow can 
an individual get outside himself (experientially) in such a way as to become an object to 
himself?” (1972 139) He thinks of this as “the essential psychological problem of selfhood or of 
self-consciousness” (139). This is a fundamental problem with our capacity to ever form a self-
conception, which leads to the question of how did we ever become self-conscious. Based on the 
assumption that “[w]e can distinguish very definitely between the self and the body” (136), the 
issue is how could we come up with a notion of ourselves, not of our bodies, since these are not 
equivalent. That they do not amount the same thing is clear from the fact that “[t]he body can be 
there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion without there being” a notion of oneself 
“involved in the experience” of our own body (136). Mead explains this as follows: 
[i]t is perfectly true that the eye can see the foot, but it does not see the body as a 
whole. We cannot see our backs; we can feel certain portions of them, if we are 
agile, but we cannot get an experience of our whole body. There are, of course, 
experiences which are somewhat vague and difficult of location, but the bodily 
experiences are for us organized about a self. The foot and hand belong to the self. 
We can see our feet, especially if we look at them from the wrong end of an opera 
glass, as strange things which we have difficulty in recognizing as our own. The 
parts of the body are quite distinguishable from the self. We can lose parts of the 
body without any serious invasion of the self. The mere ability to experience 
different parts of the body is not different from the experience of a table. The table 
presents a different feel from what the hand does when one hand feels another, but 
it is an experience of something with which we come definitely into contact. The 
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body does not experience itself as a whole, in the sense in which the self in some 
way enters into the experience of the self. (136) 
Notice that he formulates this puzzle from a ‘static’ perspective by pointing out how person 
seeking to contemplate directly his whole body would fail in achieving an awareness of ‘himself’. 
Mead particularly emphasizes one side of this paradox, namely, the case of a person failing to 
become an immediate ‘object’ of his own awareness. The difficulty consists in the fact that a 
human being cannot completely and immediately perceive himself, or else enter in contact with 
himself, so as to acquire an image of who he is. Therefore, how can we have an operative 
conception of ourselves if we do not have enough resources for coming up with this notion, given 
that we cannot become objects of our own awareness? Assuming that a person becomes self-
aware by perceiving parts of his body would beg the question, as he would apparently have no 
basis for inferring that these are parts of himself (136). It follows that “the self as an object does 
not enter [experience]” (137). 
From another perspective, while a person is trying to directly and entirely perceive 
himself, he might infer that he exists from the fact that there must be someone doing the 
perceiving. But on what basis could he infer this? While a person perceives, he should not be able 
to perceive himself, such that there would be nothing in his own awareness from which he could 
suppose that there must be a corresponding perceiver. Indeed, there is no perceiving subject to be 
perceived; he cannot, so to speak, step back and see himself as a subject. Subsequently, the self as 
a subject cannot enter experience, either. The assumption that we can infer from our present 
experience that there must be an experiencing subject implies what Canfield refers to as the ‘dual 
aspect’ to consciousness: “there is the item we are aware of and, at the same time, an awareness of 
being aware” (1990 29). He claims that this dual aspect leads to an infinite regress, since there 
would have to be an infinite amount of perceivers in order to ground the awareness of the original 
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person attempting to perceive himself: “if there is self-awareness, then the self must be a part of 
consciousness, and that … seems unacceptable,” because it “gives rise to an infinite chain of 
awareness of x, awareness of awareness of x, awareness of awareness of awareness of x, and so 
on” (31). Thus, since from this point of view a person would have to become self-aware by virtue 
of becoming a part of his own consciousness, self-awareness seems impossible.  
As a result, since no one would ever be justified in taking himself either as an object or 
subject of his own awareness, it looks like we cannot explain our self-consciousness, let alone the 
properties of our self-conception. Still, we claim to know who we are and suppose to know how 
others see us. From what we have said, though, it rather appears that we do not know who we are, 
and that our self-conception does not fit us. All in all, if we have a notion of ourselves, it could 
hardly be an accurate one. Even if we have a self-conception to entertain, its utility could not be 
estimated because we have no independent grounds on which to determine its role. 
One reason why this paradox arises is that, as a rule, any perception requires some type of 
mediation to occur. Some sense or another must be used for some experience to be obtained, so 
that through it we become aware of such-and-such. It is thus that, by default, immediately 
perceiving oneself would have to be excluded from the act of perceiving itself, just as our eye’s 
blind spot must be overlooked in order for us to observe an object. However, if the use of a notion 
of oneself is supposed to be explained in terms of a direct acquaintance with or immediate 
experience of the person one is at some point, it seems that we cannot ever come up with such a 
notion. Then, there would not be any self-conception to be explained, but this is absurd. Actually, 
we possess a self-conception insofar as we know ourselves to be this or that way, believe that we 
have such-and-such physical traits, personality, and so on. It can be further argued with Canfield 
that this conception plays a determinant role in how our lives unfold, as it largely impacts our 
 98 
behavior and how we act and interact with others, insofar as the attitudes we assume show the 
deep conviction that we are not just human beings but, more importantly, ‘selves’. This is shown 
in the special importance we put on ourselves and demand from others (130).  
As will be seen, Mead tackles the puzzle of self-conception by adopting a dynamic stance 
(see 1972 138). I will present his approach in the next chapter with the intention of grounding my 
own dynamic account of the purpose of self-conception. For now, the idea is to advance specific 
attempts to address this puzzle from a static perspective. 
 
IV. 2. Traditional Static Approaches to the Puzzle of Self-Conception 
 
 
Purism is a tradition that has paved the way for static approaches to the notion of ‘I’. This 
doctrine consists of “an appealing conception of I as purified of the demanding features and 
requirements which make other terms so complicated. A ‘simple rule’ gives its meaning. No 
identification is necessary in central cases. Each use is logically secured against failure” (de 
Gaynesford 2006 28). A classic exponent of this tradition is Descartes, for whom ‘I’ is a term 
whose referent is guaranteed against failure provided a simple rule for its use. It is thus that there 
cannot be a doubt without a doubter, a thought without a thinker (1997 36), from which one could 
infer one’s own existence (36). Accordingly, we could interpret his proof of the existence of the 
self (36) as implying that it would be practically impossible to conceive of a perception without a 
perceiver. 
However, as we begin to look for what ‘I’ denotes, we stumble right away with the issue 
of whether this term refers at all, let alone to a person or a sub-personal entity. Lichtenberg claims 
that this term does not refer, arguing in turn that ‘the self’ must be a grammatical illusion arising 
from the assumption that ‘I’ has a substantive use (1971 412). We assume, in effect, a correlative 
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reference for ‘I’ in the world as we utter it in diverse contexts, and we call this reference ‘myself’ 
or ‘the self’. Lichtenberg suggests, though, that the first person term does not refer at all because 
it works basically like ‘it’ as used in “It rains,” which is a device of language not meant to denote 
in those cases an object (412). Yet, even if we do not postulate the existence of an object denoted 
with ‘it’ in order to make sense of that statement, we tend to think that ‘I’ has a referent in the 
world. To avoid misunderstandings, he recommends reformulating Descartes’ proof of the 
existence of the self as follows: “[w]e should say, ‘It thinks,’ just as we say, ‘It thunders.’ Even to 
say cogito is too much if we translate it with ‘I think.’ To assume the ‘I,’ to postulate it, is a 
practical need” (412). Lichtenburg’s suggestion is thus to interpret the necessity attributed to 
Descartes’s proof of the self as practical, since we have to assume out of necessity a placeholder 
for ‘I’ given the way our language functions.  
Then again, since we have limited the scope of our inquiry to a phenomenological 
approach to self-conception, we need not address the concern of whether the first person term 
actually points to an object in the universe in order to account for the utility of our self-
conception. So far, we have achieved a preliminary basis for questioning the idea that ‘I’ always 
refers, which will later on serve us in loosening the grip that static approaches to the puzzle of 
self-conception tend to have in us. Keeping in mind this consideration, let us turn to an 
examination of particular attempts that have been offered to address this puzzle and show exactly 
why they have failed.  
 
Hume’s Quest for the Self as an Object 
 
Hume famously introspected in order to find a potential impression in his experience that could 
explain how he got his idea of ‘I’. His intent was indeed to track down the origin of his idea of 
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himself. He can be seen attempting to perceive himself as an object by assuming a contemplative 
approach, as he inspects the current perceptions in his stream of consciousness without finding 
anything that he could properly call ‘myself’:  
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception. (2005 165)  
 
That his attempt was futile is not really surprising; after all, it is a given that there is no actual 
object we could adequately name “myself” which enters our immediate awareness in its entirety. 
There was no such impression in his experience or else a principle of association of ideas he could 
identify with himself — nor could there ever be one, for what would such an impression or 
principle have to look like if we are to properly call it ‘myself’? For the sake of argument, let us 
assume that ‘the self’ is something that could in principle be perceived –i.e., something that could 
impress our understanding one way or another–, whether it manifests itself as an impression or as 
a cluster of impressions. Still, what Hume showed is that we are only presently aware of a flux of 
impressions or perceptions of our own state of mind, and never experience ourselves as complete 
objects of our own awareness. We are only conscious of concomitant fragments or episodes that 
he calls ‘impressions’, but never experience these fragments together as a complete object we 
could think of as ‘the self’.  
Furthermore, there is nothing we can directly perceive which is worth calling ‘the self’. 
Canfield explains that Hume’s endeavor “was to gain experiential awareness of his self. Only if 
he could have such a direct, immediate awareness would there be a source in experience for the 
idea of the self” (1990 32). But, since there is no such source, he had to conclude that there is no 
I. The point is that Hume could never have achieved his aim. The reason why this is not possible 
has to do with how we normally come into contact with objects in nature, which excludes the 
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possibility of encountering ourselves. It is part of how we normally experience objects or enter in 
contact with them in the world that we cannot experience ourselves the same way or else be 
ourselves objects to contact. By definition, our immediate experience cannot admit any object to 
be directly aware of in its entirety that we could properly conceive of as ‘ourselves’.  
 
The Subject as a Condition for the Unity of Experience  
 
Meanwhile, there have been accounts meant to explain how we can conceive of ourselves as 
subjects of our own experience. For instance, Kant speaks of the ‘transcendental subject of 
experience’ as a condition implied in the acquisition of organized, coherent experience. Still, 
unlike Descartes, he does not assert the self’s existence in a substantive way, since he just infers 
its formal existence. For Kant, we have to assume the existence of a transcendental reference for 
‘I’ even if this entity is never experienced, as it constitutes a condition for the possibility of 
experience (1984 163). The reference of ‘I’ –this is, the noumenal self– is ‘transcendental’ insofar 
as it has no referent in time and space, but it is conceived as a requirement for intelligible 
experience insofar as the idea of a ‘self’ must accompany all of our perceptions for these to be 
obtained (166-167). As a consequence, even if he regards in the end ‘the self’ as a transcendental 
illusion, the notion of ‘I’ still has a use to the extent that it accounts for how our experience is 
attained in a unified way. 
However, Kant does not explain the way in which this notion of a transcendental subject 
helps synchronize the data we retrieve from our senses. And without having a function in 
organizing our experience, it looks like we have no reason to hold on to it. In this way, Canfield 
claims that “[t]he transcendental I is a trick” (1992 43). He argues that if this entity does not lie in 
space and time, it is not clear how the existence of this subject in a “transcendental” sphere, being 
“forever devoid of contact with things in real space,” can do any “explanatory work in how things 
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are organized” in space and time (43). In effect, after close examination it is not clear that this 
concept of ‘I’ does the work that Kant wants it to: 
[t]he only thing it is called on explicitly to explain –the “unity of experience” – it 
cannot. The explanation is supposed to look something like this: “That this sight 
occurs simultaneously with this sound is explained by the fact that they are both 
experienced by a something-I-know-not-what which is itself forever beyond 
experience.” Such an explanation is only the appearance of one. (43) 
 
Although we cannot find the thing itself in the world denoted with ‘I’, we still assume that we are 
aware of a phenomenological ‘I’, if only implicitly, as the consequence of having intelligible 
experience. Nevertheless, this supposition is unwarranted. Just as we cannot experience what is to 
be strictly speaking called ‘I’ because it lies outside space and time, we have no evidence of the 
workings of a phenomenological ‘I’, not even indirectly. It is true that we possess the idea of an 
‘I’. But then, when we try to explain its origin, we arrive at a dead end: if the ‘I’ is supposed to 
synthetize our intuitions into organized experience, then it must be part of our world (that is, it 
must lie within space and time). Yet, if we cannot experiment it, it should not show up in any 
way, not even implicitly as a condition for our experience. Thereby, if the reference to a subject 
beyond our world cannot not explain what we think of as the unitary character of our experience, 
where can our self-conception acquire its content, and what would be its purpose?  
In any case, from Kant’s static perspective it is not obvious how the phenomenon of a 
‘self’ could ever emerge (even tactilely) so as to become a content to be asserted in propositions 
involving the use of ‘I’. The point is that, by restricting our approach to a contemplative 








Wittgenstein’s Conception of the Metaphysical Subject  
 
Wittgenstein’s claims in the Tractatus about the self can be interpreted from a Kantian point of 
view, whereby in a way it makes sense to speak of the ‘I’ despite the fact that, whatever the use of 
this notion might be, its referent must not lie in the world. But unlike Kant, he does not give the 
concept of ‘I’ a role in synthetizing our experience: “[a]ll experience is world and does not need 
the subject” (Notebooks 89e). Meanwhile, he denies the notion according to which “[t]he I is … 
an object” (80e), this is, something we could confront (89e). The interesting issue for him is rather 
why the ‘philosophical I’ or ‘self’ does not enter experience as a subject, although it is somehow 
implied in it: 
[t]he philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human 
soul with the psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary 
(not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my body in particular, is a 
part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones, etc., etc. (82e)  
 
But again, if the ‘philosophical I’ consists solely of the limits of the world, “[w]here in the world 
is a metaphysical subject to be found?” (80e) This question is senseless insofar as the 
metaphysical subject is not an entity to be encountered in the world. As a matter of fact, we 
cannot get acquainted with ‘the self’ –or, according to our interpretation, with the phenomenon of 
who we are – anymore than we can infer from observing something “in the visual field” that “it is 
seen from an eye” (80e). He thus argues that the self as a metaphysical subject cannot enter 
experience as an event, from which it follows that there is no phenomenon of a ‘self’ that can be 
perceived: “it is true that I do not see the subject” (86e).  
Having said that, the notion of ‘I’ still plays a key role for Wittgenstein, because “the 
subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence” (79e). Thus, even though 
“there is no knowing subject” (86e), in another sense there must be a metaphysical subject. In 
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other words, the limits of the world can be shown in meaningful uses of language, despite the fact 
that we cannot state what these limits are. At the same time, these boundaries do not make up for 
a ‘thing’ we can rightly call ‘I’, since in the end it is reduced to an “extensionless point” 
(Tractatus § 5.64). As the metaphysical subject is not in the world but constitutes a precondition 
for its existence, it is seems both true that “in an important sense there is no subject” (§ 5.631) 
while, in another sense, there has to be such a subject if the world is ever going to be experienced. 
It can be argued that Wittgenstein adopts in the Tractatus a static approach to the issue of 
the self, which is inherently problematic. The question is whether we can properly characterize 
our notion of ‘I’ by appealing to a metaphysical subject, namely, something that is “not a part of 
our world” (§ 5.641). Indeed, how could something that presumably does not exist in space and 
time impact in any degree the way we see the world and how we conceive of ourselves (i.e., the 
human being) to the extent that, without it, there would be no world for us to experience? If the 
metaphysical subject amounts to the limits of the world but, still, we cannot say what such limits 
consists of, this characterization of ‘the self’ would beg the question as to the origins of our self-
conception. That is, how could our self-conception obtain any content from a subject that does not 
exist in the realm of facts? At least in respect to the origins of our self-conception, it can be said 
that Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘the self’ as a metaphysical subject comes down to an unnecessary 
postulate, because it does not really explain how we have acquired the former — nor, to be sure, it 
is meant to explain this. Thereby, such an appeal to the metaphysical subject could not contribute 
to explaining the role of our self-conception. For even if we think of the I as the limits of our 
world, it is not clear that that is actually how we conceive of ourselves. 
 105 
The Lasting Present 
 
It is worth specifying why exactly our interpretation of Wittgenstein’s approach to the puzzle of 
self-conception would be classified as ‘static’. This is shown in the line of reasoning that leads 
him to adhere to ‘selfless realism’.  
Wittgenstein thinks that, when carried out to its ultimate consequences, solipsism – the 
idea that “only I am real, for others would consist merely in my awareness of them” (Canfield 
1990 44)– collapses into selfless realism: “solipsism … coincides with pure realism. The I in 
solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it” 
(Tractatus § 5.64). His approach is static since he speaks of contemplating the world “as a limited 
whole” (§ 6.45). Instead of trying to see the world as a whole from the outside (something he 
claims we cannot do), he finds in the complete absorption in the present a way of contemplating 
‘the self’, meaning, the limits of the world. He imagines an individual living perpetually 
immersed in the present in a way that he would not perceive the passage of time. Under those 
conditions, such a person could be said to live “eternally,” that is, “[i]f by eternity is understood 
not endless temporal duration but timelessness” (§ 6.4311). Wittgenstein characterizes this form 
of selfless contemplation of the world as a limited whole as the “mystical feeling” (§ 6.45), which 
is not something that can be said but only shown (§ 6.522). He illustrates this idea in his 
Notebooks: 
As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one is 
equally significant. 
If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but know all you know is 
the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I 
had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was 
contemplating the stove it was my world, and everything colorless by contrast with 
it .… 
(Something good about the whole, but bad in details.) 
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For it is equally possible to take the bare present image as the worthless 
momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world among 
shadows (Notebooks 83e). 
      
Whenever we contemplate an item like a stove, for example, we can become absorbed in the 
moment in a way that we forget that the stove is being perceived by us, and that there is anything 
other than the stove in the world. Our total experience can be then contained in the moment, as it 
were, since we perceive the stove with enough attention that it becomes our entire world 
(Canfield 1999 47). For we are so immersed in the present that in a sense there appears to be no 
longer a perceiver. Thus, while that “timelessness” lasts, it is as if nothing existed outside ‘the 
world’ composed by the stove and what nearly surrounds it. 
Subsequently, through sustained contemplation there seems no longer to be a dichotomy 
between the contemplative subject and the world. The previous example involves an image we 
can witness “as a limited whole” only when there is no longer a separation between subject and 
world. This explains why Wittgenstein ends up abandoning idealism, for he does not think that 
men are unique individuals to be singled out as opposed to the world. He is thus left with a 
selfless world:  
This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as 
unique, solipsism singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the 
rest of the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and on the other side, 
as unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought 
out. (Notebooks 85e) 
 
This view can be problematized by considering what would happen if we could live completely 
absorbed in the present. There would be a basic phenomenological difficulty in our experience of 
the present, which is the only thing we could ever experience: “if consciousness is tied to the 
momentary present, and we imagine time as being finely divided, then there never seems to be 
enough time to be aware of anything changing” (Canfield 1990 30). From this perspective, all we 
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could ever be aware of is the state of affairs presently experienced, so that we could not ever 
experience the passage of time — there would be no ‘next’ moment, since conscious experience 
would be altogether contained in the present. If so, our consciousness would be reduced to 
consciousness of the present, namely, of this moment. Therefore, the problem would be that we 
would have no basis for inferring from our present awareness the existence of either the self as an 
object or a subject. For if the present moment is all we have, it looks like we cannot infer the 
existence of ourselves, say, by tracking our own deeds over time, which seems highly 
counterintuitive. This would further beg the question of how did we ever come up with a notion 
of ourselves. We would be stuck again without an explanation of the origin and utility our self-
conception.  
 
IV. 3. The Basic Unviability of Static Approaches  
 
 
We have seen ways of undermining static responses to the puzzle of self-conception. Whether it is 
in respect to the ‘self’ considered as an object or a subject of experience, we cannot account for 
the origin and use of self-conception by appealing to an immediate perception of ourselves. I 
suggest that this puzzle is largely the product of how it was initially formulated. Specifically, I 
have argued that the paradox arises because we are trying to subvert a basic condition that must 
be satisfied for perception to ever occur: namely, it must be mediated. Perceiving the world 
through some channel (i.e., through a given sense) constitutes a ‘natural barrier’, so to speak, 
which is entailed in the very act of sensing. In effect, we must use some sense or another in order 
to become aware of anything. However, in order to contemplate ourselves directly and entirely we 
would have to exceed such a barrier, thus undermining the very possibility of experiencing 
anything. As a consequence, the puzzle of self-conception could not be solved with the use of a 
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static treatment anymore than we could, say, run over our own shadows. Becoming aware of 
oneself either as an object or a subject would have to be excluded from the very act of perceiving, 
given that this exclusion is precisely a necessary condition for the existence of any perception.  
 What is problematic about static approaches in general is that they address this puzzle 
from a perspective that is largely distanced from and unaffected by the world. Ironically, instead 
of finding in such ‘distance’ enough space to perceive ourselves either as objects or subjects, we 
end up missing the trees and the forest altogether. While we try to immediately perceive ourselves 
through a contemplative approach, we unwillingly insulate ourselves from the rest of world, from 
the activities and interactions that are part of people’s ordinary lives, such that the origin of our 
self-conception becomes a mystery.  
Moreover, by isolating ourselves from the context in which we are already situated, we are 
prone to think of consciousness as occurring in a private realm. We are lead to believe that our 
awareness is a phenomenon that only we could ever witness, thus implying that self-
consciousness, too, is an essentially ‘private’ event. In this way, we make it impossible for us to 
explain how did we ever become self-aware, as this would require of an infinite amount of 
perceivers to explain our original awareness (Canfield 1990 29). We are then separating the 
person from his activities and interactions with other members of the community, despite the fact 
that, as will be argued in the next chapter, it is in terms of them that we come up with a self-
conception. Of course, if we assume that we could only know who we are exclusively from what 
we discern from the first person perspective, the origin of our self-conception will remain an 
enigma. It seems that we need to change our general approach if the puzzle of self-conception is 




Changing the Approach to the Puzzle of Self-Conception 
 
I argue that a satisfactory way to tackle this puzzle is to adopt a dynamic approach. From a static 
point of view, the puzzle is intractable insofar as a contemplative human being has no way of 
becoming an object of his own awareness or else a subject to be accurately described as “aware” 
of himself. On the other hand, from a dynamic standpoint a person is already conceived as 
situated in a given sociocultural context, engaging in ordinary activities and interacting with other 
members of a community. In this sense, the individual is not insulated from his ordinary life: he is 
not in a privileged, neutral position from where he can judge what occurs in the world with the 
dispassionate attitude a contemplating human being. Adopting a dynamic stance would thus 
involve rejecting the idea of a contemplative subject who has an absolutely freestanding 
perspective. Rather, he always sees some aspect of the world and environment from a specific 
angle; this is, with a set of interests and necessities in mind. This means that a person cannot just 
passively contemplate the world from an unbiased viewpoint so as to pick out the source of his 
self-conception by pointing to some potential cluster of impressions, ideas, or facts, or else fail in 
this attempt. On the contrary, from a dynamic stance a person’s self-conception is not necessarily 
understood as a cluster of visual images or impressions. Instead, it consists of diverse attitudes 
and beliefs he has about himself. From this point of view, the individual is not separated from the 
social interconnections that shape his ordinary life. He is seen as a constitutive part of the forms 
of life around him and not just a passive bystander, which further entails that he cannot be the sole 
author of the notion he has of himself. This notion is molded in function of how others see him 
depending on the roles he plays in society. 
Hence, by considering our self-conception as originating and being shaped in the context 
of the cultural and social background in which we are already situated, we can avoid many 
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difficulties that are inherent to static approaches to the puzzle of self-conception. If we understand 
it this way, the basis of our self-conception does not appear as perplexing because it arises in the 
course of exchanges with other human beings from which it acquires its content. The viability of 




V.      THE ROLE OF SELF-CONCEPTION:  
A Dynamic Approach  
This final chapter proposes a dynamic approach to the puzzle of self-conception, so that an 
intractable problem from a static perspective may receive a satisfactory resolution. After studying 
some relevant accounts of this class of approach, I will advance what I shall identify as the Two-
Moment View to account for the use of self-conception. I will end by complementing this account 
with Mead’s conception of the ‘self’, which in turn will help us tackle the puzzle of self-
conception. 
 
V.1. Action, Deliberation, and Self-Conception or the Lack Thereof  
 
A way of replying to Hume’s static approach to the puzzle of self-conception consists of 
affirming that we become directly aware of ourselves when we willfully engage in action. James 
Cornman holds this view. He claims that “[w]hat Hume overlooked … is that self-awareness 
comes primarily, if not exclusively, when I am active; it is not some object I find in introspection” 
(1970 178). He proposes a dynamic account whereby “[s]omeone is aware of himself when he is 
active, as in willing, just as surely as he is aware of any idea” (178). Though not exclusively, he 
argues that we become objects of our own experience as long as we behave in function of ‘acts of 
will’ (178). Then, the actions through which we become self-aware are those in which our 
intentions are consciously carried out, for it is thus that we become aware of ourselves as agents 
of those actions. Canfield explains this idea by saying that “to be aware of myself, I must do 
something; I will then be able to be aware of myself performing this or that act of will” (1990 33). 
Therefore, when we undergo these ‘acts of will’ we become active individuals as our behavior 
subsequently embodies our intentions. 
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But consider this: while we (willfully) run to catch a bus that is about to leave us behind, 
we seem not to be self-aware in the way Cornman suggests, or at least we do not possess a notion 
of ourselves by means of which our action unfolds and that is at stake in this activity (Cf Sartre 
2005 48-49). Perhaps deliberating or thinking too much about what is happening at that moment 
could lead to hesitation, which can diminish our chances of getting on the bus. If we get 
distracted, say, because we are worrying about missing the bus and the consequences originating 
from this, we may slip and miss it nonetheless. In this case, it is not clear that we entertain or 
presuppose a notion of ourselves or that such a notion, presumably involved in the mentioned 
hypothesis, would be useful to our practical aim of catching the bus. Thus, if we suppose that a 
person’s rushing to catch a bus is impacted by his act of will, the previous case would constitute a 
counterexample to the emergence or usefulness of a notion of oneself in the context of action. 
Besides, what is the ontological status of these ‘acts of will’? Indeed, “[w]here are the acts 
of will or instances of “willing” Cornman alluded to?” (Canfield 1990 34) We are mainly looking 
here for the relative contribution of these ‘acts of will’ to the task of securing a self-conception. 
Yet, as Canfield argues, “[t]hey are invisible as the alleged self performing them; they, too, are 
mythological” (34). It is not obvious that a notion of oneself comes up primarily while acting 
consciously, since one has no corresponding experience of an ‘act of will’ as having any 
connection to how one behaves. Many times, in fact, it is enough to react instinctively to a bus 
leaving us behind to find ourselves already racing towards it, such that there is no conscious 
decision upon which we would perform this act. More importantly, our self-conception would not 
mediate the visual perception of the bus in motion and the act of running towards it, which 
implies that, even if the act of chasing the bus is charged with intentionality, it is not the result of 
a discrete ‘act of will’ connected to a notion of ourselves causing our behavior.  
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Therefore, if we are going to assess whether a notion of ourselves emerges in the context 
of action and whether there is any use to it, we will have to take a different route. For, as just 
seen, it is not clear that a concept of ourselves emerges and that it is operating while we are 
undoubtedly active, like when we are running to catch a bus. What is more, if there is a sense in 
which a person’s self-conception plays a role in this context, it is not explained by appealing to a 
person’s experience of himself as an agent, that is, if we only become agents when ‘acts of will’ 
are involved. It rather looks like we need not postulate a ‘self’ any more than we need to appeal to 
‘acts of will’ to explain intentional action, since we can ordinarily and under regular 
circumstances successfully interpret human action without having to appeal to either one.  
 
Performing Without a Sense of Oneself 
 
But then, if the way we see ourselves is not apparent while being active, to what extent can we 
say that appealing to a ‘self’ helps to account for the actions we undertake? Hubert Dreyfus has 
argued otherwise, claiming that many times the notion we have of ourselves does not play a role 
when we are absorbed coping with world and environment. Following Sartre (Cf. 2005 48-49), he 
suggests that when we are running to catch a bus, a deliberative subject is not present in our 
awareness whatsoever. An underlying notion of a ‘self’ motivating our actions would indeed not 
be found in this and many other instances, since it is precisely without such a notion that we excel 
when performing multiple tasks. 
He proposes this view by arguing that, when experts optimally cope by immediately 
reacting to the incoming series of solicitations or, in other words, when they perform ‘in the 
flow’, a “thinking subject” neither appears in their awareness nor does it prescribe their action 
(Dreyfus 2007 358). He adduces the case of a pilot constantly guided by solicitations of the 
 114 
aircraft and instantly responding to them. In such a case, Dreyfus contends that a ‘thinking 
subject’ is absent because the pilot is apparently not monitoring or reflecting on his behavior, 
such that the lack of concomitant thought processes on his part means that he is coping properly 
(358). It follows from this his idea that when acting in the flow one has no sense of oneself: 
“[w]hen one is bodily absorbed responding to solicitations there is no thinking subject” (358). As 
I interpret Dreyfus, the notion of a ‘thinking self’ that could otherwise interrupt our natural coping 
with the world disappears with the type of detached premeditation that it entails. This does not 
imply, though, that there is no longer an ordinary human being, for even if there is not an 
operative concept of a ‘thinking subject’ in this type of cases, there is still evidently a human 
being acting in the world of life. In Dreyfus’ view, it is rather the thinking subject that does not 
appear over and above the person. Therefore, as an awareness of a ‘thinking self’ loses its grip 
through the absorption of an ordinary person in his daily affairs (like when running to catch a bus) 
or in cases where experts such as a pilot perform at their best, it can be said that many times 
successful action does not demand a self-conception. 
On the other hand, Dreyfus maintains that an awareness of this thinking or deliberative 
subject could interfere with our performance, potentially working in its detriment. Supposedly, 
what is not present in the consciousness of experts is a deliberating subject that could harm their 
action, assuming that they excel at them when acting in the flow. Because to get in the flow it 
would be necessary to lose a deliberative notion of ourselves when performing a given task, so 
that our reactions are immediately elicited based on which are the solicitations and affordances 
surfacing in each practice. In other words, we must abandon the perspective of an impartial 
bystander on a game we are currently playing and become a part of it, immersing ourselves 
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entirely in its unfolding without trying to analyze the quality of our performance in order to 
improve it. 
Dreyfus thus thinks that once we become competent in the diverse tasks we come across, 
we have the freedom of choosing to immerge ourselves in them in a way that involves renouncing 
to another human freedom, namely, the ability to occasionally step back and reflect on our 
behavior to understand what is off about it and how we can enhance it. Importantly, he thinks that 
what differentiates the expert from the merely competent or the beginner is that the former 
voluntarily submerges in the current of responses and reactions to solicitations (355), even though 
this entails giving up on reflection: “[f]ollowing Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I claim that the 
freedom intermittently to step back and reflect presupposes a truly pervasive human freedom. 
Unlike mere animals, we have a freedom not to exercise our freedom to step back but rather to let 
ourselves be involved” (355). Experts constantly self-reflecting as they perform suggests that a 
rather widespread ability of being voluntarily absorbed in a given task has been fractured to some 
degree. Nevertheless, such a prevalent human freedom of being ‘voluntary immersed’ can be 
reacquired when we abandon our distanced reflections and choose instead to immediately respond 
to the solicitations of the world. 
 
The Second Nature of Self-Awareness: Acting With a Sense of Oneself 
 
An opposite position to Dreyfus’ can be maintained by arguing that a concept of oneself is always 
involved in action, assuming that action is conceptually charged in its entirety. A prominent 
exponent of this view is John McDowell, who, by inserting himself in the Aristotelian and 
Kantian tradition, conceives of rationality and deliberation as the human freedom per excellence 
and, thus, as its specific difference. In effect, he presupposes an Aristotelian notion of the human 
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being as he conceives this individual as a rational and speaking animal (Mind and World 88-89). 
Meanwhile, he adopts a Kantian approach insofar as he finds in the notion we have of ourselves a 
precondition for deliberate action. This view follows from his idea that mindedness is pervasive in 
the world in that it goes ‘all the way down’. Even in the context of constantly coping with the 
world, he believes that there is always rationality involved since we must deliberate our way 
about in the world. The pervasive nature of conceptuality in experience is thus shown in that “… 
thinking does not stop short of facts. The world is embraceable in thought,” as the latter 
“constitutes a background without which the special way in which experience takes hold of the 
world would not be intelligible” (33). Therefore, he follows Kant in his maxim whereby 
“[t]houghts without content are empty, [whereas] intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant qtd. 
in McDowell Mind and World 87).  
 Additionally, rationality is always involved in action inasmuch as human nature “is largely 
second nature” (87), given that “the way our lives are shaped by reason is natural” (88). Thereby, 
he reinterprets Kant’s maxim from a dynamic stance applying it to action, as he goes on to say 
that “intentions without overt activity are idle, and movements of limbs without concepts are mere 
happenings, not extensions of agency” (89). In order to convey this point, he introduces the notion 
of education (Bildung) as actualizing “… potentialities we are born with” (88). He thus wants to 
“accommodate” Kant’s maxim by further claiming that, insofar as “experiences are actualizations 
of our sentient nature in which conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated,” then, 
“intentional bodily actions are actualizations of our active nature in which conceptual capacities 
are inextricably implicated” (90). This involves, though, distancing to an extent from Kant as he 
rather sees in the Aristotelian definition of the human being as a rational animal a source of 
reasonability:  
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we can return to sanity if we recapture the Aristotelian idea that a normal mature 
human being is a rational animal, with its rationality part of its animal, and so 
natural, being, not a mysterious foothold in another [interior] realm. The way to do 
that is to realize that our nature is largely second nature. (91)  
 
The importance McDowell gives to the social aspect of rationality is seen in the way he 
characterizes his naturalism by appeal to Wittgenstein (95), who thinks of “[g]iving orders, asking 
questions, telling stories, having a chat … as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, 
drinking, playing” (Philosophical Investigations § 25). McDowell thus conceives of his view as 
aligned with what Wittgenstein calls “our natural history,” namely, “the natural history of 
creatures whose nature is largely second nature. Human life, our natural way of being, is already 
shaped by meaning” (Mind and World 95). 
With this set of assumptions as a backdrop, McDowell characterizes his notion of ‘self’ by 
equipping Kant’s ‘Transcendental Subject’ with the concept of a second nature (99), thereby 
redefining it in a way closer to Aristotle’s concept of the human being. Notice that he still holds 
on to Kant’s claim that there would be no experience without a notion of oneself, although this 
experience would now be contextualized in terms of a second nature. With Kant’s Transcendental 
Subject in mind as “accompanying all my representations” (see Kant 1984 162), McDowell thinks 
of ‘self-consciousness’ as something that “can hold together, in a single survey, states and 
occurrences that are temporally separated; they are conceived as belonging to the career of a 
continuant, a thinking thing” (Mind and World 100). Significantly, this is possible without 
assuming that self-consciousness conforms to “a criterion of identity” (100), for the literal 
persistence of a substance to be named with ‘I’ is not presupposed when employing this 
expression: “[t]o put the point in Kant’s terms: in the “I think” that can “accompany all my 
representations”, the reference of the “I” is understood as reaching into the past and the future” 
without there having to be a “persistent referent for the “I” in the “I think”” (100). Therefore, for 
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McDowell self-awareness does not imply a thorough account of personal identity because an 
individual need not keep track of the literal persistence of a substance picked out with ‘I’ in order 
to successfully conceive of the career of the human being he is: “[c]ontinuity of “consciousness” 
involves no analogue to … keeping track of the persisting self that nevertheless seems to figure in 
its content” (100).  
Still, unlike Kant, he does not describe the notion of ‘self’ in a exclusively formal and 
subjective way: “[w]e can say that the continuity of “consciousness” is intelligible only as a 
subjective take on something that has more to it that “consciousness” itself contains: on the career 
of an objective continuant, with which the subject of a continuous “consciousness” can identify 
itself” (101). For McDowell the concept that an individual has of himself has also an objective 
value capable of being appreciated from a third-person perspective, in the context of which the 
path of a person becomes intelligible from his first-person point of view. Indeed, 
[e]ven “from within”, the subjective take is understood as situated in a wider 
context; so there can be more content to the idea of persistence it embodies. The 
wider context makes it possible to understand that the first person, the continuing 
referent of the “I” in the “I think” that can “accompany all my representations”, is 
also a third person, something whose career is a substantial continuity in the 
objective world: something such that other modes of continuing thought about it 
would indeed require keeping track of it … I think something on the these lines is 
the right frame for the Kantian thought that self-awareness and awareness of the 
world are interdependent. (102) 
 
It is thus that, whilst distancing himself from Kant’s formalistic conception, McDowell 
nevertheless characterizes his notion of the ‘self’ as an essentially conscious/self-conscious 
animal. The problem he sees with Kant’s Transcendental Subject is that an appeal to “subjective 
continuity … as part of what it is for experience to bear on objective reality, cannot be equated 
with the continuing life of a perceiving animal,” for it ends up shrinking the continuity of this life 
to “a mere point of view: something that need not have anything to do with a body, so far as the 
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claim of interdependence is concerned” (102). But then, as a consequence of reinterpreting Kant’s 
notion, he understands this ‘self-conscious animal’ as the ordinary self: 
[i]f Kant’s connection between self-awareness and awareness of the world is to 
leave it open to us to regain the idea that the subjects of our experience are 
ordinary selves, then the merely formal persistence of the I, in the “I think” that 
can “accompany all my representations”, had better be only an abstraction from the 
ordinary substantial persistence of the living subject of experience. It had better not 
be something free-standing, which we might hope to build on in reconstructing the 
persistence of the ordinary self. (103) 
 
In this sense, we can take McDowell as contextualizing Kant’s notion of the ‘self’ in the ordinary 
experience of living persons. This is clear from the fact that he understands the ‘self’ as taking 
part in the world and not merely as an entity causing a body to act in diverse ways: “I think the 
way certain bodily goings-on are our spontaneity in action, not just effects of it, is central to a 
proper understanding of the self as a bodily presence in the world” (91 footnote).  
 Accordingly, the notion we have of ourselves cannot be a free-standing idea, as Kant 
would have it. On the contrary, it is relative to a living human being that one’s self-conception 
would be properly typified: “[t]he idea of a subjectively continuous series of “representations” 
could [not] … stand alone, independent of the idea of a living thing in whose life these events 
occur” (103). The issue, then, with Kant’s proposal is that it lacks of “a serious notion of second 
nature,” in the absence of which it is impossible to integrate the subject with the concept of life 
(104). In the end, he thinks that Kant gets to the “very brink of success” but fails because he does 
not localize his concept of ‘self’ in everyday life, which would include an external perspective 
from which it could also be pondered: “Kant’s insight would be able to take satisfactory shape 
only if he could accommodate the fact that a thinking and intending subject is a living animal” 
(104.).  
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Let us now survey Dreyfus and McDowell’s disagreement about the role of self-
conception in action so as to advance a response to the problem of the utility of self-conception. 
This way, we will lay the groundwork for later on addressing the puzzle of self-conception from a 
dynamic standpoint. 
 
V.2. The Partial Use of Self-Conception in Action  
 
It might seem clear that Dreyfus and McDowell think differently of the role of self-conception 
and rationality in human life. However, the exact way in which their views are opposed on this 
subject is not quite obvious.  
As we have seen, according to Dreyfus our conceptual capacities are instruments that can 
potentially interfere with our constant coping, which rather entails being absorbed in everyday life 
so as to immediately respond to solicitations of the world and environment, given the available 
affordances (2007 355). This explains Dreyfus’ hostility to McDowell’s all-embracing conception 
of language and mindedness, as he further accuses him of being subject to the so-called “myth of 
the pervasiveness of the mental” (355). Especially, he is not attracted to the Gadamerian 
terminology used by McDowell to refer to rationality as a “free, distanced orientation” (354). 
Dreyfus indicates that rationality thus viewed leads to poor engagement, as  “we are no longer 
able to act in the world” (354). Nonetheless, he concedes to McDowell that reflection in this 
detached fashion is a sort of human freedom. But he does not see this as our most relevant 
freedom since, although it is presumably found only amongst humans, he argues that reflection is 
not traced among human experts when successfully performing tasks: “I agree with McDowell 
that we have a freedom to step back and reflect that nonhuman animals lack, but I don’t think this 
is our most pervasive and important kind of freedom” (354). According to him, when human 
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experts perform in their prime they need not reflect on their actions as they take form, and 
ultimately it is not through an appeal to such reflection that they account for the success of their 
performances. Thus, since they do not step back and revise their own capacities while they act, 
reflection becomes unrequired to proper functioning. 
Even more, we noticed that Dreyfus claims not only that reflection understood as a 
‘distanced orientation’ is unnecessary to action but also that it can work in its detriment due to the 
fact that reflection can decrease the level of experts’ performances to mere competence: “when 
we are absorbed in everyday skillful coping, we have the capacity to step back and reflect but … 
we cannot exercise that capacity without disrupting our coping” (354). His negative evaluation of 
reflection and deliberation comes from the idea that we are always coping with the world, or, in 
Heidegger’s terminology, we are always beings-in-the-world (i.e., Dasein). This thought is 
expressed differently by saying that we are ordinary human beings living in direct contact with 
the world, such that we instantly react to it in a way that we need not step back and monitor on 
our action to adequately respond to the world (355). Dreyfus’ problem with reflection is that it 
can affect negatively the quality of our performance, assuming that in normal circumstances we 
successfully cope without having to reflect on how this coping takes place. 
But reflecting on one’s behavior while engaging in a given task is not always an activity 
that lacks of any kind of benefit. Dreyfus acknowledges that, when learning a new skill, 
monitoring the way the body is exercised is invaluable to the degree that it empowers apprentices 
with the skills required to become competent. Yet, once expertise is secured, he argues that 
monitoring one’s performance while engaging in a given activity can be harmful to it. Despite 
this, even when disrupted by reflection, the ability to competently cope is still operating in the 
backdrop (354). This explains how, for instance, a trained driver could reflect on his skills while 
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driving a car without crashing it, for although thus monitoring his behavior involves risking to an 
extent the quality of his performance, ultimately it does not compromise his aptitude. 
On the other hand, McDowell targets the cases proposed by Dreyfus in which individuals 
act ‘in the flow’ in order to say that even in those instances the individuals’ actions entail a notion 
of themselves. He starts by saying that if experience in general is to obtain, our conceptual 
capacities “must be operative in the experience itself” (“The Myth of the Mind as Detached” 42). 
This means that our conceptual capacities do not become operative “only when someone decides 
what to think on the basis of experience, with experience conceived as something she enjoys 
anyway, independently of any involvement of conceptual capacities” (42). Instead, he suggests in 
a Kantian vein that experience does not exist independently of the subject’s articulation of it: 
“That things are a certain way can be there for a subject to know, in her experience, whether or 
not she has the resources for explicitly judging (or saying) that they are that way” (43). Indeed, 
experience must be readily available for our conceptual capacities to embrace it such that, in the 
end, whenever an individual makes the content of his experience “explicit – even if the subject 
first has to acquire means to do that – [that] does not make the content newly conceptual in any 
sense relevant to my claim. It was conceptual already” (43). There would not be successful 
deployment of our abilities (even while acting in the flow) without these being conceptual — after 
all, as human nature “is largely second nature” (Mind and World 87), these skills, being part of 
our nature, must be shaped by reason (87). Thereby, “[i]f a rational subject does not have yet the 
means to make explicit some way her experience … it is always possible for her to equip herself 
with such means,” because there cannot be a subject of experience wondering how to cope with a 
reality that is not conceptualized ((“The Myth of the Mind as Detached” 43).  
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Next, in reference to the role of a ‘thinking subject’ involved in the deployment of these 
conceptual capacities, McDowell objects to Dreyfus’ claim that he is subject to the Myth of the 
Mind as Detached (44): “[n]ow Dreyfus thinks the very idea of conceptual capacities … brings 
into my picture of experience a detached self, standing over against and contemplatively oriented 
towards an independent reality. But this has no basis in the way the idea of conceptual practices 
figures in my picture” (42). He rejects the notion that “we are always distanced from the world of 
our experience,” further emphasizing that mindedness does not bring about the type of 
detachedness of the ‘self’ from the world that Dreyfus alleges (45). It is of particular interest that 
his picture of the pervasiveness of the mental accommodates Dreyfus’ notion of ‘acting in flow’, 
since in his view the ‘self’ is not detached as a “rational agent” who “is always at least marginally 
monitoring what she is doing, standing ready to intervene with full-blown monitoring if need be” 
(45). For even as Dreyfus claims that his model leaves no room for experts to perform with “total 
absorption,” McDowell still agrees that “[t]his supposed connection of rationality with 
detachment is particularly damaging in the case of action” (45). His point is rather that such 
detachment does not follow from his view precisely because a notion of oneself is already present 
in the form of one’s actions: 
[s]elf-awareness in action is practical, not theoretical. It is a matter of an “I do” 
rather than “I think.” And the “I do” is not a representation added to 
representations, as Kant’s “It think” is. Conceiving action in terms of the “I do” is 
a way of registering the essentially first-person character of the realization of 
practical rational capacities that acting is. The presence of “I do” … marks the 
distinctive form of a kind of phenomenon, like the presence of the “I think,” as at 
least able to accompany representations, in Kant’s account of empirical 
consciousness. (“Response to Dreyfus” 367)  
 
It is clear from this that ‘I’ is not a mere formal notion that McDowell takes to accompany all 
“experience of acting,” for it rather accompanies “acting itself” (“The Myth of the Mind as 
Detached” 45), which entails that there is no gap between the subject and the world. Indeed, “I 
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do” does not supplement the representation of our action but rather characterizes its very form 
(46).  
 For McDowell, then, “I do” describes the character of our action, whether we are 
“reflectively engaged or not” (46). Specifically, while acting in the flow the subject’s 
“absorption” does not prevent him from knowing “what he is doing in an instance of the self-
knowledge that characterizes an agent,” even if such “self-knowledge goes unexpressed and even 
if he does not explicitly think its content” (46). He admits, though, that if an individual were 
acting in the flow, then by reflecting on what he is doing and verbalizing it he would interrupt this 
flow. Nevertheless, after verbalizing what he is doing, the subject would still give “expression to 
knowledge he already had when he was acting in flow” (46). 
 
Two Types of Human Freedom 
 
Let us formulate Dreyfus and McDowell’s disagreement from a general perspective with the 
ulterior intention of pondering the role of self-conception in action.  
As we have noticed, the philosophers diverge with regard to the type of freedom that is 
essential to human beings. For Dreyfus, the primary human freedom consists in the ability to 
voluntarily immerse ourselves in the tasks we perform in a way that there is no deliberative 
subject guiding our action. Meanwhile, for McDowell the chief human freedom is the capacity to 
deliberate or reason, such that a notion of ourselves is always entailed in our action as this 
involves the actualization of our conceptual capacities. Now, McDowell could object to Dreyfus’ 
assessment of which is the fundamental human freedom by saying that this ‘voluntary immersion’ 
is not a mark that we could discern in experts when they perform in their prime. From the 
behavioral signs they display, we have no criterion to account for how experts excel while 
performing tasks without having an operative, deliberative notion of themselves. It seems that 
 125 
only through introspection they would be in the position to determine whether they are 
performing voluntarily immersed or rather reflecting on their own conduct as they go along. 
Indeed, if the way experts behave while acting in the flow is compatible with how they act when 
engaging in deliberated performances, it is not clear to what extent even they can tell when they 
are totally absorbed in their actions and when they are not. For if their behavior is one way or the 
other in accordance with the rules of the task they engage in, such ‘voluntary immersion’ could 
not ultimately be conceived as a complete departure from conceptuality.  
In return, Dreyfus would respond by recounting how Chuck Knoblauch, a second baseman 
for the New York Yankees, got ‘out of touch’ with his skills as soon as he over-intellectualized 
the way he was playing (2007 354). Although his performance was still far better than that of a 
competent player, after he tried to figure out the mechanics of throwing the ball, he could not 
retrieve the high level of his past performances. It is as if Knoblauch could not immerse himself 
again in the game. It follows from this example that, even though Dreyfus’ voluntary absorption 
could not be positively taken as a trait of human experts, we can nevertheless tell indirectly, 
through noticing the counterproductive consequences appearing in its absence, that it is a relevant 
feature to human beings’ endeavors. Still, assuming that we are always coping with the world, 
such ‘voluntary immersion’ would only be an asset for those who divert towards reflection and 
thereby compromise their immediate reactions to the influx of solicitations of the world. In other 
words, if complete absorption is the seen as the ability to avoid the temptation to step back and 
overanalyze one’s current actions, then it would only count as an ability to exploit for those 
whose performance has been harmed by the interference of excessive monitoring.  
However, this implies that people normally do not require the capacity of immerging 
voluntarily since they involuntarily return to their instinctive responses to the world after 
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occasionally having monitored their own behavior, since they would not usually undergo the type 
of disassociation that experts like Knoblauch went through. Knoblauch’s case would rather be a 
rare example in which an individual could not return to plain action because he lost the ability to 
naturally avoid monitoring his own behavior while performing. If this is correct, then the 
‘freedom’ Dreyfus considers as fundamental has no pervasive, adaptive role in virtue of which we 
could properly distinguish human beings from nonhuman animals. For even though in some 
peculiar cases voluntary immersion can ‘free’ some individuals from their own thoughts and thus 
increment the quality of their performance, such immersion would not be a feature that could pass 
as the specific difference with respect to which we could properly separate humans from 
nonhuman animals.  
In any case, depending on what we consider to be our essential ‘freedom’, we would come 
up with a different interpretation of the role of self-conception. If we suppose, following Dreyfus, 
that what makes us human does not essentially depend on engaging in deliberative processes, then 
we are not, at our core, ‘thinking subjects’. From McDowell’s perspective, though, there is always 
going to be self-awareness and conceptuality involved in action, so that experts cannot merely do 
without some degree of normativity ultimately guiding their behavior. They would not perform 
better by not reasoning through their actions, although, admittedly, by so reflecting they would 
not act ‘in the flow’. Then, for the sake of argument, we can assume that Dreyfus and 
McDowell’s dispute is verbal to the extent that it leads to a false dichotomy: this is, either we 
always presuppose an operative concept of ourselves while acting or else there are types of 
intense absorption when there is no thinking subject deliberating and guiding our action. We can 
think of their disagreement as not being substantive inasmuch as it arises from different 
interpretations of the role of our conceptual capacities while performing a given task we are fully 
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concentrated in, particularly, one in which we are not conscious of ourselves. Furthermore, if this 
is assumed, we can think of their views as complementing one another, thus providing a fuller 
picture of the matter that can be help us in explaining the utility of self-conception. This is the 
strategy we will follow. 
Before we do this, we are prepared to say that McDowell is right in respect to the fact that, 
while acting ‘in the flow’, an expert still has a notion of himself –or, in McDowell’s terms, a 
degree of self-awareness–, although this notion has been pushed to the background. For even if 
this notion does not seem operative, it is nonetheless implied in the form of his action (“Response 
to Dreyfus” 367). In effect, as he acts in the flow, he still knows himself as an agent, so we cannot 
agree with Dreyfus that while acting in the flow there is no conceptuality whatsoever in an 
experts’ performance. 
 
The Two-Moment View  
 
We can now respond to the issue of the utility of self-conception by noting that there are two 
types of moments associated to the sorts of freedom referenced by Dreyfus and McDowell, 
respectively, such that, depending on which moment an individual finds himself in, there would 
be a use to his self-conception or there would not be. In general, sometimes there is a beneficial, 
useful notion of oneself while sometimes there is not, given that it has been pushed to the 
background as it can be detrimental to action. Yet, it has not absolutely disappeared.  
Sometimes, like when we remember a series of events, engage in counterfactual thought 
or are planning what to do in the future, a phenomenon or notion of oneself appears to 
consciousness: we are the ones who felt such-and-such, did this and that, will be liable if we 
commit such-and-such actions, and will be participating in such-and-such events. For example, 
when thinking about the future a projected notion of ourselves displays anticipated characteristics 
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that we attribute to our ‘future selves’, and based on this anticipation, we can determine what 
would be the best course of action to take. We thus require a notion of ourselves to determine 
what will be the best way of moving forward. Moreover, when we presently interact with other 
persons, a notion of ourselves is implied in the form or character of our action, which embodies 
our agency, as McDowell argues. In these moments, there is a deliberative notion of ourselves 
which is indispensable in regulating our actions, as we are not only conscious of what we did, 
would do or will do, but further become self-conscious while attending to how our lives unfold 
from a present perspective — namely, as we reach into the past and the future (McDowell Mind 
and World 100). In these instances, a notion of ourselves steps indeed to the foreground and 
becomes useful in planning for what is to come, for learning from the past, or in order to attend to 
the present and decide how to conduct ourselves. 
On the other side, there are moments when our self-conception does not have a useful role 
in our activities but, on the contrary, can prove harmful. For example, when the emergence of a 
deliberative notion of ourselves can potentially disrupt the activity we are engaging in, it is best to 
push it to the backdrop. In effect, if being absorbed in the current action would help a person 
become sensitive to the solicitations of the world, whereas a deliberative self-conception could 
hurt his interaction with the world, pushing his self-conception to the background would be best. 
In this case, for the sake of performing properly a given task, it would make no sense to track the 
consequences of the decisions reached in our actions by emphasizing a deliberative notion of our 
person. Another case would be the one where our self-conception turns against us, producing a 
high degree of anxiety in us, which ultimately does not let us see beyond how we see ourselves. 
Canfield points out instances in which we are stuck with recurring self-centered thoughts (1990 
223) that in the end are impractical, since they do not help us in directing our attention outwards, 
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to the world of life, but rather bring us down. In these moments, it would be best to suspend these 
self-involved chains of thought to whatever extent is possible (225), say, by concentrating in 
practices that take our minds off of them.  
It is worth remembering, still, that in the precedent cases a notion of ourselves still 
accompanies our actions; it is just not part of our immediate awareness. As McDowell indicates, 
while this notion does not emerge directly in our consciousness, we still know ourselves to be 
agents coping with the world. Nonetheless, the point is just that our self-conception in these 
instances has no practical benefit such that it should be pushed to the back of our minds in the 
interest of responding faster to the solicitations of the activities we are engaged in, or else with the 
purpose of decreasing the anxiety produced by self-centered thoughts. Either way, in these 
moments over-reflecting on our actions by bringing our self-conception to the foreground can 
become detrimental, so it is best to try and act without an explicit self-awareness. 
It could still be objected on behalf of Dreyfus that the McDowellian type of “moment” in 
our self-conception would appear to him just the point he thinks is overintellectualized. If we 
always act with at least an implicit notion of ourselves, this notion can at some point interrupt the 
course of our action, especially when we act in the flow. For if we are precisely letting the notion 
we posses of ourselves go for the sake of improving our performance, what kind of control would 
we have over it? It rather seems that we could not prevent our self-conception from emerging all 
over again, so that it would consequently interrupt our action. Thereby, we can in this way 
unwillingly end up functioning as the type of ‘thinking subject’ that Dreyfus speaks of: our 
performance can become too mechanical, and, to that extent, we cannot enter ‘the flow’. 
Moreover, when we project ourselves into the future, we can overintellectualize our action, say, 
by thinking too much about what we have to do in order to achieve a given result. This way, we 
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can become anxious given the large number of things we have to do: although we may encounter 
several ways to achieve the desired result, the thought itself can overwhelm us and, in the midst of 
feeling anxious, we can become paralyzed as we do not know which course of action to pursue. 
Likewise, if we use too much time remembering what we have done to learn from our mistakes, 
we can unintentionally reinforce a potentially noxious self-conception we already possess, 
trapping us in the type of self-involved chains of thought Canfield refers to, so that anxiety would 
again take over and work in detriment of our action.  
However, it is clear that this is not that not what McDowell intends. He recognizes that if, 
while performing in the flow, we monitor and reflect on our action to the point that we verbalize 
what we are doing, this can in fact disrupt its ‘flow’ (“The Myth of the Mind as Detached” 46). 
Thus, he concedes that in times like this overintellectualizing our action can hinder it, particularly 
when acting in the flow, which is a class of moment in which suspending a conscious awareness 
of ourselves can be advantageous to our action. Thus, it would not be times like this which would 
be included in the McDowellian “moment,” as he seems to make a different point: that even while 
performing in the flow, we do not absolutely lose a sense of who we are, this is, that we still know 
ourselves, even if only implicitly, to be acting as agents. He insists that the knowledge a person 
acting in flow gains after verbalizing his own behavior is not new in any substantive way. It is not 
as if the skills he was deploying were non-conceptual but then became conceptualized after he 
reflected on his behavior. Quite contrary, as this individual makes the content of his experience 
“explicit – even if the subject first has to acquire means to do that – [that] does not make the 
content newly conceptual in any sense relevant to my claim. It was conceptual already” (46). 
Therefore, the knowledge he attained by reflecting on how to act in the flow while thus acting 
was all along there ready to be embraced by his conceptual capacities, which means that, after 
 131 
verbalizing what he was doing, the subject only gave “expression to knowledge he already had 
when he was acting in flow” (46). And even if we are not acting in the flow, McDowell’s point is 
not that we cannot overintellectualize our regular action in a way that is harmful to it. He just 
points out that there is always an operative concept of ourselves working while we act, which is 
as much a part of our nature, which is mostly second nature, as walking and drinking water. To 
suggest then that by saying this he is overintellectualizing action is either to deny that our nature 
is largely second nature or else miss his point. But as we are not ready to concede the former, it 
follows that Dreyfus is misinterpreting McDowell’s picture of the pervasiveness of the mental, as 
he takes McDowell’s concept of the self to be a formal, disengaged notion accompanying all 
“experience of acting,” when it actually accompanies “acting itself” (45). Hence, there would not 
be enough distance between the subject and his regular action for him to constantly 
overintellectualize it.  
Meanwhile, it is true that spending too much time planning what to do or remembering 
what we have done can be overwhelming and potentially paralyze us. This is, however, not what 
McDowell intends to do. We do not regularly and under normal circumstances overthink our 
future plans, as we just picture what we have to do while admitting that we might not even get the 
chance to do such-and-such, so that we put a stop to a rabbit hole that could lead us to anxiety as 
soon as we realize that these are mere plans and several conditions must be in place for any of 
these to be pursued. Similarly, even if we can spend a lot of time remembering what we have 
done, there comes a point when we normally understand that there is no use to this and that we 
have to move on from our self-involved thought. In these cases, we usually turn to the second 
class of moment: we return to our current, practical affairs that require our attention not just 
because we do not want to be trapped by noxious self-involved chains of thought. Instead, it is 
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because these affairs in fact demand our full attention that we naturally center our awareness in 
them, so that our self-awareness is in turn instinctively pushed to the back of our minds.  
 The particular disagreement in the Dreyfus-McDowell debate regarding the role of self-
conception can thus be explained away by asserting that both are right depending on which type 
of moment a person is presently in and what are his practical interests and needs. However, in 
another sense both are wrong insofar as we cannot exclude once and for all either type of moment, 
assuming then an inflexible attitude towards the role of self-conception, as if it involved an 
absolute benefit or cost regardless of what are the interests and needs of a concrete human being 
under specific circumstances. It follows that both types of moments constitute two modes of being 
a person, none of which can be sacrificed at the expense of the other. 
  A way to further alleviate the tension between Dreyfus and McDowell in this aspect can 
be brought about the following way. First, there is the concern of whether we can perform 
successfully in a given activity without following or conforming to a rule — which is something 
we cannot do for, presumably, we can subsume any action under some rule (see Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Investigations § 201). Following Wittgenstein, Alva Noë stresses that our actions 
always presuppose rules (i.e., a normative component), even in the case of experts excelling in 
their performances, since “[w]hat mastery (or understanding) of rules enables is for one’s actions 
to involve the rules without needing to think about them in any explicit, deliberative way” (2007 
181). Secondly, assuming that conformity to rules is not the issue here, the question on behalf of 
Dreyfus is whether overthinking (i.e., monitoring in excess) decreases the quality of experts’ 
actions. But then, the relevant problem for him could not be the presence of thought while acting 
in the flow; because understanding what it is to excel in a given practice and doing so involves 
some expectation on the part of the expert, that is, of what should be done, which entails a 
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previous acquaintance with the rules of a concrete activity. Thereby, the issue is whether 
overintellectualizing an action can disrupt it in any significant way. It is true that ‘overthinking’ 
understood as hesitation or doubt in the face of solicitations that demand instant, opportune 
reactions can be disadvantageous. Yet, this does not imply that experts’ actions are not rule-
governed, although it constitutes a fair warning on their potential propensity to monitor in excess 
their behavior while performing.  
Thereby, while conceding to McDowell that at a proficient level experts always operate 
with concepts –meaning, categories or rules with which they guide their actions (though not in a 
stringent, determinate way)–, it could be said on the other hand that a weaker interpretation of the 
implications of Dreyfus’ notion of ‘voluntary immersion’ can be taken as an asset for successful 
performance. For if there is good reason to think that experts choose to be immersed in the class 
of uninterrupted state of spontaneous reactions to solicitations so as to remain sensible to 
unforeseen factors, avoiding reflection seems to be a useful guideline to expertise. Such 
susceptibility to the context arguably requires that one should not think too much, that is, that one 
should not reflect on one’s role and the expectations of such a role, etc. Once more, this does not 
mean that experts in their prime do not follow rules at least unconsciously or implicitly (181). 
Rules are internalized indeed through practice to avoid having to review them time and again, 
especially while performing a task that requires an elevated degree of focus. Practice makes rules 
eventually unspoken, and perhaps such silence is the type of indication of success Dreyfus alludes 
to when speaking of experts, as in the case of professional pilots who can flight flawlessly but 
cannot provide the rules that explain their success (Cf. 2007 358). Nevertheless, following the 
weak interpretation of Dreyfus’ ‘voluntary immersion’, it can be argued that even if experts seem 
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many times not to follow any rule or do not to recall any such rule to account for their success, it 
is clear that they are still acting in accordance with rules that have already been internalized. 
 
V. 3. The Self as a Social Construct: A Dynamic Response to  the Puzzle of Self-Conception 
 
 
Finally, in order to tackle the puzzle of self-conception, it will be helpful to draw from Mead’s 
concept of the ‘self’. By employing this concept, the utility of self-conception will be further 
accounted for.  
According to Mead, the ‘self’ comes down to a process of social control regulated by 
further social processes, so that a person acquires a notion of himself by internalizing social 
practices (1972 158). One has a ‘self’ in accordance with the multiplicity of roles one plays in 
society, such as being a father, a husband, a lawyer, etc. This way, he proposes a view of the self 
that takes its resources from the outside, namely, relative to the roles undertaken by other 
members of society: “[t]he individual has, as it were, gotten outside of his limited world by taking 
the roles of others” (xxix). Insofar as one has several social roles, one obtains a ‘self’ by 
coordinating these functions in consciousness, from which it can be said that ‘the self’ is formed 
by a constellation of roles (xxix.). ‘The self’, then, is a mechanism of social control (158), given 
that the roles people play are structured by the functions of other people in a community.  
A person has a notion of himself in virtue of putting himself in the place of others, 
namely, by interiorizing and appropriating himself with their behavior, referring their conduct to 
his own person and life. Thereby, a notion of ourselves enters our experience to the extent that we 
become objects to ourselves, which is not possible in an immediate manner:  
[t]he individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from 
the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or 
from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he 
belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or 
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immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first 
becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his 
experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of 
other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of 
experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved. (138) 
We obtain a self-conception by assuming the perspectives of others on us, that is to say, by 
adopting the beliefs and attitudes that others have towards us, as we thereby become indirect 
objects of our own experience. The notion or image we have of ourselves is derived from how 
others see us, so that we only attain a grasp of who we are through interacting with other persons 
in the multiple activities that make up for the customary or habitual manner in which people 
conduct themselves, that is, according to the forms of life of a community. Consequently, we 
would not acquire a self-conception through introspection –as Hume intended–, regardless of 
which are the attitudes that those around us have towards us. Quite the opposite, we obtain it due 
to our participation in the customs and habits of the forms of life of a community (see Consigni 
2001 124). Indeed, we acquire knowledge of the particular human being we are only as we 
participate in the ways of life of a community, living amongst other human beings. Therefore, to 
the degree that we share the forms of lives of others we discover who we are, so that our self-
conception would amount to a compound perspective on ourselves afforded by the standpoints 
that those around us possess about us (Mead 1972 138). It follows that there can be no “privileged 
standpoint” from which we may observe who we ‘truly are’, this is, independently of the forms of 
life of a community in which we reside, since our self-conception is rather the product of our 
engagement with others (see Consigni 2001 124). 
 
The Sense in which the Self Is a Social Construct  
 
It is worth observing that there is a use to our self-conception as we adopt the attitudes that others 
have towards us, thereby becoming objects of our own awareness. Mead’s notion of the ‘self’ as a 
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mechanism of social control illustrates a further use of self-conception, as it serves to organize in 
our “field of direct experience” the roles we play in society (1972 158), regulating our action 
based on social processes in which we participate. In these cases, a notion of ourselves emerges 
and plays a crucial function given our present needs and interests, having thus a practical value as 
it coordinates a person’s life relative to his being a member of a community. Hence, we can think 
of our self-conception in terms of the practices in which it serves a purpose. It will be seen in the 
last section of this chapter the way in which Mead’s concept of the ‘self’ as a mechanism of social 
control constitutes a counterpart to McDowell’s considerations of self-conception. 
 Now, as each of us “has a persistent, gut-level belief in the reality of the self” (Canfield 
1990 129), this conviction can be shown to play a role in the formation of the social beings we 
are. Since we can deny the existence of the ‘self’ without thereby abandoning our existential 
belief in it, the issue is whether the notion we form of ourselves exhibits any properties in 
function of which we could explain why we treat ourselves the way we do. According to 
Canfield, the practical impact of our self-conception is traced in our particular “manner of 
walking, gesturing, style of dress, and so on” (218), which he regards as a sort of ‘accent’ or ‘fine 
behavior’ that speaks to the specific life we lead, for it involves a series of attitudes we have 
towards it. Then, given that from Mead’s perspective the phenomenon of the ‘self’ ultimately 
amounts to a social construct, the question is whether the notion we possess of ourselves plays a 
significant enough role to render it necessary in the organization of our interpersonal practices.  
 The usefulness of our self-conception can be specified if we qualify it as a ‘necessary 
fiction’, as it is a social figment we require to properly navigate the world. Insofar as this notion is 
needed to see ourselves the way others see us, its fictitious aspect roughly resides in that there is 
no matter of fact about what should our idiosyncratic behavior comprising our particular gestures, 
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ways of speaking and carrying ourselves actually be. Following Mead, Canfield characterizes the 
‘self’ as a “figment of the social imagination” (129) as opposed to something ‘real’, i.e., a 
substantive entity. He maintains that our self-conception reflects a ‘persona’, which is “the object 
or target of acts of self-characterization” (143). A ‘persona’ would be the leading character in the 
stories we narrate to ourselves about the lives we live –this is, our autobiographical narratives–, 
which we have in part invented: “[i]n a natural, untutored way, we cast ourselves as central 
figures in stories we supply characterization and narrative structure. We are the protagonists” 
(134). In other words, the persona is the “believed-in self, the I a person holds so dear” (134).  
The persona depicted by our self-conception reflects the self-conceptions of other 
characters in our autobiographical narratives, which correspond to other persons in our lives: 
“[o]ur sense of the other players also often involves some view we hold about ourselves. She as 
unfair aggressor, for instance, mirrors me as a victim” (134). This shows how a person adopts a 
self-conception by mirroring the way others see him, given the social roles he has in life, which 
work around the roles that others have. Self- and other-characterization are then codependent as 
they inform one another: “[o]ne’s (pretheoretical) self-beliefs, and those other-beliefs which 
reflect oneself, make up a self-image” (134). However, one’s self-image is not equivalent to the 
person one is, though it is directly related to it: “[t]he person is what the self-image images; the 
self-image is like a picture, and the persona, what it portrays. In terms of belief, it is what self-
beliefs are about” (134). 
 Yet again, even though our self-conception is as real as the set of beliefs we have of the 
person we are, what our self-conception pictures is fictional (134). Indeed, the person “has beliefs 
about himself; but the object of the self-image, the persona, is not” real (134). Canfield claims 
that the persona is at least party fictional or ‘quasi-real’ (134): “[t]o some significant degree the 
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persona is freely created or … invented. Invention enters at two points. First, when the persona 
is–if only implicitly–pictured as existing, and, second, during self-characterization, when its 
properties are elaborated” (134). Therefore, after we assume our persona to exist, we further 
chisel it by ascribing to the person we are a larger host of properties (135). But in what sense is 
one’s persona fictional? Canfield argues that the boundary between what counts as ‘creating’ 
one’s persona and describing the person one is happens not to be sharply delimited. He claims 
that a persona is like a character in a partly fictional historical novel (143). Thereby, the beliefs 
we hold about our persona are governed both by fictional and empirical criteria: 
I say these part-fictions partially model the persona in order to emphasize the two 
different criteria governing self-ascriptions. One sort has to do with objective fact. 
A person’s belief about where he is, how tall he is, whether he is married, what his 
name in social life is, and countless similar sorts of beliefs are all governed by 
criteria concerned with how things are … [but] there are also self-ascriptions 
where the person is free to make up truths about himself … we are free to create 
and maintain certain aspects of our personae, including some of our beliefs about 
why we do things. (146) 
 
The point of making this analogy is that, in this class of novel, historical truths about a person are 
told although there is room for fiction to enter with respect to the thoughts of the person in 
question, the content of the conversations he had, and the reasons for many of his actions (145). 
However, the analogy breaks inasmuch as partly fictional historical novels will not be revised if 
historical facts that came to light contradicted the events narrated in them, whereas our self-
conception is indeed subject to modification if these facts were to surface. 
 Then again, we are interested in the utility of the self-image of a person and not so much 
in the persona pictured by such an image. The persona, still, is pertinent to our inquiry inasmuch 
as it is the target of the self-beliefs constituting the notion we have of ourselves. Consequently, 
we need a clearer understanding of the role of one’s self-image relative to the persona depicted by 
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it, for we intend to determine in this chapter what is exactly the purpose to our self-image or self-
conception.  
We can say now that, whilst deliberating with ourselves about which is the best course of 
action to pursue in a given situation, the concept we have of ourselves plays a role as it helps us 
determine whether such a course of action is viable given the way others see us and what they 
find admissible. What we take ourselves to be appears to be relevant in this case even if our self-
image does not accurately portray the attributes and thoughts of the person we are, this is, as long 
as others see us that way as well. In this class of moment, our self-conception has a practical 
import insofar as it guides us in the course of figuring out what we can do and what should be 
avoided. Additionally, our self-conception plays a role in the context of our autobiographical 
narrative. As the persona it depicts constitutes the protagonist of this narrative (143), the diverse 
roles performed by the persona in it depend on which traits our self-conception comprises. 
Importantly, autobiographical narratives need not be linguistically articulated, but can count as 
such as long as they amount to a tacit understanding of an unfolding, structural whole to be 
identified with the life of the person we are (see Schechtman 2014 99-102). Nonetheless, for these 
narratives to make sense or structure the course of our life, we must at least possess an implicit, 
pre-theoretical sense of what we call ‘I’ or ‘me’ — namely, of our persona. Our self-conception 
must therefore be useful because it entails an understanding of the trajectory of our life (100). 
Furthermore, the image we have of ourselves plays a distinct role as it affects not only how we 
perceive our life but also how we lead it: depending on how we conceive of it (i.e., how we 
recount it to ourselves), we will correspondently act in the world of life. It follows that self-
conception plays a complementary role in the way a person’s life unfolds to the extent that it 
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impacts to a meaningful degree its constitution through the way the existence of this life is 
understood by the person in question.  
 
The Sense in which Our Self-Conception Is a Useful Fiction 
 
We can now explain exactly in what way our self-conception is a useful fiction by drawing on 
Canfield’s considerations of a ‘persona’ as the target of our self-conception and Schechtman’s 
discussion of autobiographical narratives relative to the function these play in how a person 
structures his life. We have accepted that anytime we act we operate with a given self-conception, 
even if this is unspoken, not linguistically articulated, or shoved to the back of our minds in order 
to act in the flow. Based on the implicit, holistic understanding of the life we are leading, we 
decide what to do, what to avoid, when to do such-and-such so that our life can in the best 
scenario unfold as we want it to. We are thus constantly conceiving of ourselves as agents in the 
world, undertaking actions and then many times evaluating their implications, while we 
instinctively react to how others treat us (Cf. I.1) based on what are the attitudes that others have 
towards us.  
 Even so, we cannot literally, immediately, and entirely observe the person we are when 
acting as agents. This is not, though, a deficiency that (strangely enough) we all share, as it would 
otherwise seem from a static standpoint (Cf. IV). On the contrary, not being able to do this is, 
among other things, what is implied in being a living person who engages with other persons in 
the context afforded by a ‘person space’ or ‘sociocultural context’, as Schechtman would call it. 
We will see in the final section of this chapter that our not being able to step outside of our 
awareness and view ourselves as persons just as we can see others is a necessary condition for our 
existence as individuals. All the same, we do have beliefs, attitudes, and opinions about the 
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person we are, which constitute our self-conception. But we have seen that not all of these reflect 
our actual attributes. As Canfield notes, there is enough space for us to make up many reasons for 
our actions and the content of our thoughts. As we are aware of who we are, our self-conception 
cannot then merely be limited to a list of the properties we could directly observe if we could step 
outside of ourselves and see us as others do. Therefore, as we make explicit to others and 
ourselves the content of our autobiographical narrative, we cannot refer to the person we are and 
select properties of ourselves we consider pertinent to who we are without having to fill in some 
gaps. Still, these ‘gaps’ are not the consequence of lacking the opportunity to literally observe 
who we are, but rather filling them is characteristic of how our autobiographical narrative is 
further elaborated in the course of our social interchanges. Many times, we must justify to others 
why we did this instead of that, although we might not remember why we acted that way, we may 
want to hide our real motives, or maybe we simply acted without a conscious reason guiding our 
behavior.  
 Other times, people might want to know what we are thinking, perhaps not only to made 
sense of our current behavior but to discern what are our patters of reasoning. We might then 
want to say actually what we were thinking; however, if this might compromise us in our social 
exchange, we may need to substitute what our response would be for a harmless one. Even more, 
in some situations we might not actually be thinking anything relevant, but when asked to 
contribute to a discussion by saying what are we thinking about a subject matter, we may 
spontaneously have to come up with what might seem the current status of a train of thought. This 
way, by fitting in with the image others have of us (of what ‘we’ would say about such a topic), 
we may facilitate the continuation of a conversation that would otherwise be interrupted. It is thus 
as if when we fill those blanks we convey to others a fuller image of who we are, which boils 
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down to how we see ourselves, because normally we are not just interested in how other persons 
literally look but want to know more about why they act as they do, what they tend to think in 
given circumstances, and so forth. Our self-conception has in those instances a social role, for it 
supplements a member of a social group and of a given community not only with an image of 
how others see him, but, correspondently, it provides others with an image this member has of 
himself, which facilitates their social interchanges. In this sense, our self-conception is useful as it 
enables us to relate to one another by relying on how other see themselves and how we see 
ourselves: we can coordinate our action and discourse around the image a person has of himself, 
while others can regulate how they relate to us based on how we see ourselves, provided that they 
have a grasp on what our auto-biographical narrative is and that we understand what are their 
respective autobiographical stories. In consequence, self-conceptions would be useful as they help 
us navigate a world of people circumnavigating us.  
 From what we have seen, the ‘image’ a person has of himself does not accurately reflect 
the list of attributes of the person in question nor is it meant to. It also comprises beliefs and 
attitudes that the individual has of himself and which are recounted in his autobiographical 
narrative. Therefore, his self-conception is partly ‘fictitious’ to the degree that it is articulated in 
an autobiographical narrative, which comprises aspects that are not subject to factual verification 
such as the reasons for one’s actions and the content of one’s thoughts. The criteria governing 
how these ‘aspects’ feature in our autobiographical story are similar to those governing the main 
character of a partly fictional historical novel (Canfield 1990 143), so there is consistency to them 
in these narratives just as there is consistency to our patters of thought about a given subject 
matter. In these sense, our self-conception is a construct because it strings an autobiographical 
narrative we build to understand our place in the world in a dynamic fashion, this is, relative to 
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how others see us and what would they expect us to say or do if some conditions were met. This 
does not mean, however, that these aspects comprised in our self-conception are actually false, for 
this would entail that they could be ‘true’ by mischaracterizing actual traits of our person. As 
Canfield explains, since the limit between what counts as ‘creating’ our persona and describing 
our person are not severely delimited, there is space for us to invent parts of our narrative that 
would help us integrate into the autobiographical narratives of those around us.  
 Hence, it is in this sense that the notion we use of ourselves goes beyond a construct from 
socially available materials: as we have room to create aspects of who we are through the 
elaboration of our autobiographical narrative, our self-conception is not reduced to a compilation 
of the standpoints that the persons around us have on us. It further includes properties we ascribe 
to ourselves –like beliefs about the content of our thought and the motives for our actions in 
different opportunities– which do not depend on what others gather from inspecting who we are. 
 
Steps for Addressing the Puzzle of Self-Conception 
 
In order to address the puzzle of self-conception we must start by recognizing that, when we are 
to conceive of ‘ourselves’, we are not looking for an image of a ‘self’ or a ‘human body’. It is 
rather about conceiving an ordinary human being in the context of a concrete life. And, as we 
stated in the previous chapter, it makes no sense to look for an immediate perception of ourselves 
because any perception must be mediated to take place. Mead appreciates this when he says that 
the individual does not enter his own experience “directly or immediately” (1962 138).  
 But an immediate, entire perception of a particular human being is not really required in 
order to attain a self-conception, since we are not limiting the origin of our self-conception to a 
visual impression or image. Indeed, following Mead we have redefined our standards of ‘self-
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conception’ in terms adopting the standpoints of other persons by assuming the beliefs and 
attitudes that they have towards us. Moreover, as we have assumed a dynamic approach, we have 
conceived of the human being as situated in a community, playing certain roles, engaging with 
other individuals from which he has acquired the beliefs and attitudes that make up for his self-
conception. Consequently, there is no fundamental mystery about the source of a person’s self-
conception, since he is not isolated from his surroundings in a way that he could only obtain a 
self-conception through a contemplative perspective, seeking thus an impossible visual 
impression of himself. 
 Next, we can attend to the specific issue of whether the individual enters his own 
experience as an object by appealing to Mead, as he believes that we become objects to ourselves 
as soon as we adopt the beliefs and attitudes of others towards us, seeing ourselves as others do 
and thus treating ourselves as an ‘other’. We end up having a notion of the person we are by 
treating ourselves as objects of the attitudes that other human beings have towards us, taking their 
standpoints on ourselves. It follows that the ordinary human being indirectly enters his own 
experience as an object through the experience of others. 
 On the other hand, despite Mead’s position (138) we can argue that a notion of ourselves 
as a subject enters our own experience although, again, indirectly. Even as we enter our own 
experience as objects of indirect awareness by assuming the attitudes that others have towards us, 
this does not exclude the possibility of simultaneously taking ourselves to be indirect subjects of 
our awareness while engaging in action. A notion of ourselves also becomes part of our own 
awareness to the extent that we take ourselves to be ‘agents’ from the first point of view. This is 
explained in the fact that our self-conception is entailed in the form of our actions, such that we 
have sense of who accompanies our actions as these occur (McDowell “Response to Dreyfus” 
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367). We are then subjects of our actions, beliefs and attitudes as these have real implications in 
the world. This way, it can be argued that the ordinary person we are becomes a part of our own 
awareness as a ‘subject’ by appeal to McDowell’s concept of the ‘self’, which is not only implied 
from the first-person point of view but rather can be appreciated from a third-person perspective 
as an ordinary ‘self’ among persons. Then, from the first person perspective we can perceive the 
consequences of our actions even though we are not directly aware of ourselves. To put this 
differently: as we are the ones from which these actions emanate, we trace ourselves as their 
cause in a core sense. Even if we do not perceive ourselves while perceiving the world, from a 
dynamic perspective it can be said that we still assume that we are the ones acting, thus treating 
ourselves as subjects and not merely as objects. Therefore, while the notion we possess of 
ourselves plays the role of a mechanism of social control, it is nonetheless complemented by the 
sense we have of ourselves as a subject of action, in the absence of which we would not be able to 
attribute the actions we commit to the person we are from the first-person perspective. This 
‘sense’ is in effect entailed in our action, as we can monitor our behavior from the first-person 
perspective — although, again, this would not be all that we require for attaining an altogether 
functional self-conception. We would still need to take ourselves as objects of our experience by 
assuming the attitudes of others towards us, thus being able to coordinate our action in relation to 
theirs by putting ourselves in their place. 
The idea that we can indirectly become subjects of our experience would not give rise to 
an infinite regress (see IV. 1) because, as we have established that the origin of our self-
conception is social, this conception need not be based on an ulterior awareness. Instead, it only 
needs to be grounded on our social practices, as it is articulated in terms of the roles a person 
plays in his daily life and the attitudes others have towards him. Our self-conception is useful in 
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showing us what our social roles are given the ways in which other social actors view us. Thus, a 
notion of ourselves enters experience indirectly, this is, through the meditation of language and 
behavior, because we adopt the beliefs and attitudes that others have towards us after the fact, this 
is, once we have actually engaged with others in the context of the activities and customs that 
constitute the forms of life of a community.  
Finally, we cannot ‘step outside’ of ourselves and view ourselves ‘completely’ anymore 
than we can view other people ‘completely’. For how is this supposed to be accomplished? We 
can observe a person from several perspectives, but we cannot see him from all possible 
perspectives at once, which is what would have to be done, in a rigorous sense, to see someone 
‘completely. Then again, if we cannot see anyone (or anything) from all possible angles at the 
same time, why would we need to see ourselves simultaneously from all possible points of view 
to acquire a self-conception? As this exigency seems out of place, this cannot be what it is meant 
when we say “completely,” so we could reinterpret this expression more charitably if we read it as 
meaning ‘as a whole’. In this sense, it is a matter of fact that we can see a whole person standing 
at a distance, and in virtue of that visual impression we can discern who he or she is, say, by 
recognizing the shape of that person. We can thus identify someone we have already acquaintance 
with. Yet, we cannot ever do the same in our own case. But why would we ever need to do this? 
We need not identify ourselves, from the first-person perspective, by recognizing our silhouette as 
we do need to in the case of others. Actually, from the first-person point of view, we need not 
‘recognize’ who we are if this means obtaining a visual image of our whole person. Why then 
assume that we must fulfill such a requisite to ever come up with a notion of ourselves, this is, if 
we do not need to contemplate the person we are as a whole from the first-person perspective to 
form such a notion? This seems to be a confusion produced by adopting a static standpoint, since, 
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from a dynamic perspective, we are not looking for a direct visual image of our person as a whole 
to explain the acquisition of our self-conception. To do this, we must only pay attention to how 
we participate in the habitual activities and customs that give rise the forms of life of the 
community in which we reside, as our self-conception is rather based on how others see us given 




We have assumed at the beginning of this proposal that self-conception does not imply personal 
identity. This is due to the notion that you can have a sense of who you are, be aware of the career 
of your life as you track yourself in the past and project yourself onto the future, without 
presupposing the literal existence of a substantive ‘self’ which you pick out with the use of “I” 
(McDowell Mind and World 100). On the other hand, we have stated that having a personal 
identity –which, from our perspective, roughly means living in agreement with a typical way of 
life– does not entail possessing a corresponding self-conception mirroring such a life. In the end, 
that is part of what it means to be ‘alienated’ in the sense implied in Chapter III: even though you 
lead a given person life, you do not see it as representing who you are. Maybe because you have a 
problematic idea of life in general, you problematize your own life in a way that ultimately you 
cannot identify with, hence becoming dissociated from it. And as you do not see your life the way 
others might see and evaluate its structure, you further become alienated by entertaining a 
different conception of who you are and what type of life you lead. 
 Still, even if having a determined self-conception does not necessarily entail the 
possession of a firm grasp of personal identity, whereas having a personal identity does not 
presuppose having a corresponding notion of the person one is and the life one has, the subjects of 
personal identity and self-conception intersect at diverse points. We can thus synthesize our 
practical and phenomenological approximations to the human being by fleshing out these points 
of intersection. 
 First, in order to obtain the class of ‘practical unity’ discussed by Schechtman with the 
intention of overcoming alienation, it is not sufficient to live in agreement with the forms of life 
of a community. It is further necessary to change how we perceive our own life in a way that its 
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problematic appearance can fade away to an extent. This would be possible if we could modify 
the tone of our autobiographical narratives, recounting our lives in accordance with the alienated 
life we have had, accepting it for what it was, to then embrace the vital changes we seek to 
undergo in order to adapt to the forms of life of a community. The ordinariness we would bring 
afloat would merge with our story without it seeming as an abrupt, artificial choice. The goal is to 
rephrase our autobiographical narrative in a way that we are not too hard on ourselves, such that 
we can encounter a tone, after going through the pertinent changes, with which to relate a story 
that is in accordance with the larger structure of our life, understanding our past alienation as a 
phase of it that does not significantly determine its overall path. If this is viable, the source of the 
problematic appearance of our life ingrained in our self-conception can begin to lose its grip on 
us, enabling us to see a life we can identity with, so we can see ourselves out of our dissociation. 
The reason is that our self-conception would not be confined to picturing an alienated life, as it 
would encapsulate a broader pathway in which such alienation is merely a period. 
 From this it is clear that the role that self-conception plays in autobiographical narratives 
is key. If we do not pay attention to what notion we have of ourselves and modify it if necessary, 
after we have gone through the mentioned vital changes it would be easier to revert to an 
alienated form of life. This is a point in which our two general approaches to the human being 
interconnect: in order to avoid alienation, a human being must change the way he sees himself to 
a degree in which he can assess the different phases or stages of his life as parts of his identity, 
and he must resist defining himself, accordingly, based on an alienated phase of it. Following 
Schechtman, he would see these different phases as parts of an ongoing whole, which is his 
person life (2014 108). Moreover, as he conceives of his life holistically, he would be able to 
reorient his life towards a typical class of development by modifying the narrative that constitutes 
 150 
his understanding of himself. Since having a ‘self-conception’ would involve possessing some 
kind of orientation towards what we are doing based on an understanding of who we are, by 
remodeling how we conceive of ourselves in a more indulgent way we would be able to associate 
with typical aspects of our life that are already present in it; although they have been dismissed as 
irrelevant, actually through them we can reenter the world of life. The individual would then 
adopt an unproblematic perspective on his life by changing how he values himself, which could 
lead him to interact differently with others. 
 To put the point otherwise: after modifying the tone in which he recounts his 
autobiographical narrative, he would not see the different social roles he plays in life as a burden, 
as if there was a gap between himself and these roles such that his life could exist without them, 
but rather as integral aspects of his identity (Mead 1972 xxix). This is possible by reconceiving 
these roles holistically, seeing them as pieces which taken together give rise to who he is. By 
understanding this, he could motivate himself to perform them in a committed way since he 
would find precisely in that commitment a way of outlining who he is. Therefore, by graciously 
relating his life he would come to terms with it, comprehending that after all it has been worth 
living it. It would further help if the individual can tell himself a convincing autobiographical 
narrative, specifically, one that can help him persuade himself about the value of ordinary 
activities and interactions with others. It would also be of benefit if this story can dissuade him 
from continuing down a path that is disconnected from everyday life. Ultimately, with an affable 
self-conception it would be easier for him to assume the type of proper disposition that 
Wittgenstein recommends to overcome alienation (see III. 3).  
 Another point of junction is, accordingly, that changing the way we see our lives (this is, 
our self-conception) is not sufficient for surmounting alienation. It is also necessary to change the 
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way we behave and engage with others by leading an ordinary life; we would then be able to 
think of this life as our own, as something that represents who we are. Indeed, as someone 
modifies how he interacts with others and the type of activities he engages in, he can properly 
redescribe himself, thereby adopting a different self-conception than that of the alienated 
individual he was. He would approach the world of life differently in order to assess his place in it 
from another angle. By associating with others in a more ordinary fashion, he could reconceive 
the roles he plays in life such that he would be able to commit himself to them in the way 
previously specified. Therefore, as he is no longer dissociated from his social roles, he recognizes 
himself as the person playing them and can therefore gain the class of ‘practical unity’ with his 
life that Schechtman speaks of. Particularly, he would amend his self-conception by explicitly 
adopting the attitudes that others have towards him insofar as he engages with them differently, 
emphasizing his ordinary traits, such that there would be no longer an incompatibility between 
how he sees himself and how others see him. In the absence of this incompatibility, he would be 
able to exceed the fictitious boundaries he saw in his life, which apparently separated him from 
the lives of others and confined him to live in an alienated way: as he no longer perceives a gulf 
between his life and the lives of others, he can associate anew with the shared forms of life of a 
community. 
 As a result, if we understand the class of alienation we discussed here as a class of ‘self-
exile’, to overcome it it is both important to change to a degree the form of our lives and the way 
we see life in general, so that we can modify in turn how we evaluate our own life. The idea is to 
restore our everyday comportment and self-conception by adopting the structure of a unitary 
individual’s life and a similar undertone of his autobiographical narrative, respectively. A 
suggestion that can prove helpful to realize this is that, if we have departed from ‘ourselves’ at 
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some point by abandoning the exercise of a typical life, we can overcome alienation by having 
good will towards life in general and, importantly, by assuming a gracious attitude towards our 
own life (Cf. III.1, III.3). We can thus find the means to reconstruct a life story in which we 
actually find ourselves in as being involved with forms of life we belong to. It is not, though, as if 
such graciousness and good will constitute an antidote by themselves to surmount alienation. 
Nonetheless, it is a start for eventually attaining this, because without them we would not have the 
necessary resources for living a happy life, as Wittgenstein would put it, in the lack of which we 
could not live in agreement with the world. Therefore, having a good disposition towards our own 
life and good will towards the life of others is part of what must be in place for acquiring a 
discrete personal identity, as we thus can merge ourselves with our own life. It is further required, 
again, a change in the way we lead our life, as we want to reach a bare minimum of ordinariness 
that we have lost. Finally, a change in self-conception is needed, this is, a modification in how our 
autobiographical narrative takes shape; for if it is told in a way that we can identify ourselves with 
the main character it depicts, we can mitigate another source of alienation. 
 In respect specifically to the first part of this proposal, since the identity of a person 
depends on his agreement with the forms of life of a community, it follows that an individual 
avoids alienation by participating in the language games, customs and habitual ways of 
interaction of these forms of life. We can thus restate the conclusion of Part One by saying that an 
individual acquires a clearly defined personal identity through his engaging with typical ways of 
human life, particularly by playing the language games of a community and not merely being a 
spectator, which means that he must actually participate in their habitual activities. Further, this 
point would intersect with the discussion in Part Two, and it can be rephrased in that a person 
would do well in abandoning a static approach to his self-conception and adopt instead a dynamic 
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standpoint on his interactions with others, because it is in these terms that his self-conception 
would indeed acquire content. A person has to get involved with the members that share the forms 
of life of his community to develop a self-conception that can in turn be compatible with his life. 
Conversely, in the absence of this involvement he would not be able to properly assess his life in 
a way that is useful to overcome alienation, because he would only count with a notion of himself 
that is incompatible with his actual life, which cannot then be useful in redirecting him towards a 
typical way of life. Therefore, he must partake in the habitual activities of the forms of life of a 
community to develop a self-conception that is useful in regulating his interactions with others by 
adopting their attitudes towards him (Mead 1972 138). Moreover, he needs a self-conception that 
is in accordance with a life that is ordinary in character if he is going to value at a bare minimum 
the act of planning his future and if he is going to remember his past as his own. All of this 
involves, once more, adopting a holistic outlook on his life, so that he can understand its 
unfolding as being that of a class of life he finds worth living.  
 Meanwhile, with particular regard to the issue of the use of self-conception, the main 
conclusion of Part Two can be recapitulated by appeal to the Two-Moment View, which is a 
dynamic account meant to address it. There is indeed a partial use to our self-conception 
depending on the type of moment we find ourselves in. For example, as we adopt the beliefs and 
attitudes that others have towards us, we presently become an object of our own awareness by 
coordinating our action based on that of others (138). In addition, this notion has a use while 
deliberating with ourselves about what is the best course of action to undertake in the future, as 
we learn from past events by thinking of ourselves one way or the other in a given situation. Self-
conception also has a purpose when employed in counterfactual thought, as we conceive of 
ourselves based on how others would see us, given how we extend the beliefs and attitudes of 
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others towards us in the actual world to possible worlds. In virtue of this extension, we fashion a 
notion of ourselves and of what we would do if certain conditions were met. Other times, 
however, our self-conception can be rather detrimental to action, as Dreyfus shows, specifically 
when we overanalyze our performance in ways that can deteriorate its quality while acting (2007 
354). Canfield notes as well that if we become self-absorbed in the concept we have of ourselves 
to the extent that we cannot see past how we perceive our own life, this can produce a level of 
anxiety (1990 223) that can hardly help us engage with the world. This way, we could become 
paralyzed, thus not being able to participate in the world of life effectively, namely, in the way 
required for overcoming the sort of alienation discussed in Chapter III. Still, we have observed 
that even in these cases we cannot completely do away with the sense we have of ourselves, even 
while performing a task ‘in the flow’. In such moments, at best we get to push our self-conception 
to the back of our minds so that it does not interfere with our performance and engagement with 
others. The point is to not monitor excessively our behavior whenever this can lead us to 
dissociate ourselves from our action and interaction with other persons.  
 Generally speaking, another upshot worth stressing is that, inasmuch as an ordinary 
human being gains both a personal identity and a self-conception by participating in the customs 
and institutions of the forms of life of a community, he does not have an ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ that 
predates his contingent sociocultural interaction with other human forms of life. This is, he has no 
prior identity, or method of acquiring a self-conception, independently of what are his interactions 
with others; say, an inherent psychological faculty (e.g., the capacity of reasoning) or a biological 
property (such as being an animal) upon which he could determine what his personal identity or 
self-conception consists of. Quite the contrary, whether seen in respect to his practical or 
phenomenological dimension, a human being makes his personal identity and acquires a self-
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conception in relation to other persons by partaking in their customs and activities. It follows that 
a human being has no essential, primitive trait upon which his identity is definable or his self-
conception obtainable regardless of which is his concrete life, the roles he plays in it, and how 
others view him. 
 This implies that having a personal identity would be a rather difficult, fragmentary 
achievement to work out as it involves more than simply being a ‘human being’, whether we 
understand by this a Homo sapiens, a rational animal, or a member of the moral community (Cf. 
I.3). For we do not address the issue of personal identity by responding to the question “What am 
I?” which can instead be properly answered by presenting a locus of quantity, this is, by pointing 
to what we share and makes us alike: for example, our forms of life, which include our customs, 
institutions, and habits; our biological properties and functions; our psychological attributes and 
capacities such as the ability of reasoning; our moral dignity and worth, all of which could be 
argued to constitute our specific difference. Meanwhile, by addressing the question “Who am I?” 
we would tackle the problem of personal identity, as it asks for the singularity of our person, for 
what makes us a unique individual as opposed to a member of a biological or moral community. 
To satisfy this question, we would then have to offer a locus of quality in order to select what is 
unique to a high degree in the human being we are. But still, this would not be something 
essentially inner or intrinsic to our person such as an ‘inner self’ or ‘soul’. It would have to do 
instead with how we qualify our particular form of life, singling out the aspects that give it 
distinctiveness as a concrete value, as opposed to what is found in the ordinary lives of other 
humans. For example, it would comprise a list of the social roles that we play in our lifetime, our 
physical appearance, the demeanor and way of speaking that is peculiar to us, our general 
 156 
temperament and sense of humor, our life story, and other aspects that shape us into the unique 
persons we are. 
 Hence, the question demanding the reference of ‘I’ is ambiguous, since from one point of 
view it refers to a mundane human person with a concrete life, which is expressed by responding 
to the question of who am I, whereas from another standpoint it refers to a member of the class 
‘human being’, whether this is taken as a biological or moral category, and it would involve 
responding to the question of what am I. Olson conveys this point nicely when he claims that the 
problem of personal identity suffers from an equivocation in its formulation (1997 42). He 
explains that if something individualizes any human being into a single thing capable of 
persevering over a lifetime, it would in principle exclude the attributes that we all (or most of us) 
share, given our common human nature. In effect, if something makes us the distinct people we 
apparently are, a substance concept such as ‘human animal’ or ‘ordinary human being’ would not 
be satisfactory. For if we are supposed to speak to the differences that give uniqueness or 
singularity to the beings we are despite our obviously recognizable physical and psychological 
disparities, then the aforementioned substance concepts would not exhaust aspects of our concrete 
humanity in a way that can help us specify what our personal identity consists of. Having a 
personal identity, as mentioned above, has instead to do with leading a particular person life in the 
context of the forms of life afforded by a community (Schechtman 2014 139), so that selecting a 
substance concept would not work.   
 To conclude, the importance of this proposal can be seen in how it is meant to ease the 
potential anxiety caused by the notion that there is no fundamental, compulsory ‘track’, if you 
will, to which our life must adjust in order to acquire ‘sense’ or ‘purpose’ or else be alienated in 
an absolute way. The preoccupation we may have about how our life unfolds or what it would 
 157 
ultimately amount to could be attenuated in the realization that we have no ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ in 
virtue of which our personal identity could otherwise be specified or based on which we would 
acquire selfhood. Since the type of ‘correction’ of the way we live would not be based on an 
“agreement …  in opinions, but rather in form of life” (Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations 
§ 241), our existential problem about what grounds the judgments on how well we have lived 
would dissipate as long as we live in accordance with the forms of life of a community. For there 
are no grounds external to the agreement in our forms of life upon which these judgments are 
founded. Indeed, there would be no ‘correct’ way of living independently of what our agreements 
in life form entail, such that the necessity of our practices rests on nothing more than these.  
 This might still produce anxiety because we might not want that responsibility on us. 
Many would prefer the burden being on an external source based upon which the sense or purpose 
of human life would be a matter of fact. But why would the idea that the judgment on how our life 
unfolds ultimately depends on the contingency of our natural history make us anxious?  If, after 
all, there can only be ‘human necessity’, so to speak, such that it could not be otherwise –which 
means that there could not have been an external, necessary ‘track’ our lives would adjust to–, 
why would this terrify us? For if there could not be transcendence grounding the sense or purpose 
of human life, our agreements in form of life, the necessity of our practices, and so on, it seems 
like we are merely longing for something that could not ever be. Our anxiety seems thus to be the 
product of craving for something to justify our practices when in fact they do not require of any 
such foundation. 
 From the phenomenological perspective, making an analogous point can help us 
appreciate the value of our inquiry. Even if the conception we have of life’s structure in general 
can worry us to the extent that we end up problematizing our own life, what terrifies us cannot be 
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the fact that life occurs the way it does. Just because there is no foundational sense or purpose to 
our life, this does not imply that our alienated life is ‘good’ as it stands. We are not more 
‘authentic’ when we renounce to live a typical life because we have discovered that there is no 
essentially ‘correct’ paradigmatic way of life. For if there could not be a compulsory foundation 
external to our forms of life upon which our own life could be grounded, why would we think that 
we can find genuine ‘sense’ through living an alienated life? By understanding the ‘purpose’ of 
life in an alternative, distanced way, a person might dissociate himself from his ordinary life but 
would still not find a self-conception to conciliate with, for he would not have acquired that way a 
clear-cut personal identity to reflect in his self-conception. He would have thus watered down his 
identity, and as this is precisely partly the source of his anxiety, he can begin to mitigate it by 
living in agreement with an ordinary form of life. In consequence, as his self-conception would 
present him in this agreement with life, it would be of actual use to him insofar as it would at least 
not be any longer in conflict with how, roughly speaking, human life is normally conceived. This 
way, even if there would always be opportunities for his self-conception and person life to 
mismatch, he can encounter means to combat his anxiety by readapting to the forms of life of a 
community. This is possible as he modifies how he perceives life in general, for this would enable 
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